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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
Abstract 
Market Response to Bank Loan Announcements in a Government-
Controlled Banking System: Evidence from China’s Banks  
by 
Yuan Zhang 
 
Under an enriched notion of “inside debt”, the unique benefits of bank financing from 
screening and monitoring processes have been well documented in a large number of studies 
investigating the information content of bank loan announcements. Thus, bank loan 
announcements convey positive signals to the market, and the market response should be 
positive. However, previous studies were conducted extensively in the non-government-
controlled banking systems, such as the U.S., the U.K., Canada and Australia. It is unclear 
whether the traditional predictions on the functions of banks for non-government-controlled 
banking systems also hold for government-controlled banking systems. This study examines 
the market reaction to bank loan announcements in the Chinese financial market, where the 
banking system is highly controlled by the Chinese government. The study also investigates 
the possible characteristics of lending banks, borrowers and loans that may influence share 
price reaction to bank loan announcements in the Chinese financial market. 
Standard event study methodology is employed to test the share price returns of the borrowing 
firms in response to the bank loan announcements. The event window comprises of 21 trading 
days from the period beginning 10 days before the event date (day 0) and ending 10 days 
before the event date (day −10 to day 10).  
Data used in this study are collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database and China Financial Newspaper Database. This study samples all bank loan 
announcements from companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) between 1996 and 2009. The share-split reform started in 
2005 which affected the stock price of listed Chinese companies considerably. In order to 
avoid the influence of the share-split reform, this study divides the sample period into two 
sub-samples, namely, 1996 to 2004 and 2005-2009. A total of 501 bank loan announcements 
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are collected in the final sample for period 1996 to 2004 and 106 bank loan announcements 
for the period 2005 to 2009.  
Contrary to what previous studies have found for bank loan announcements in non-
government-controlled banking systems, this study finds significant declines in stock values 
of Chinese borrowing firms during bank loan announcements for the sample period 1996 to 
2004. The result implies that both positive and negative bank loan announcement effects are 
possible, depending on whether the banking system is run on purely commercial goals in non-
government-controlled banking systems or is subject to political intervention in government-
controlled banking systems. Banks controlled by the government may have to lend to bail out 
poorly performing firms for political reasons. If these weak borrowing firms are prevalent, the 
direction of the market response to bank loan announcement should be negative, and vice 
versa. The results show that the negative effect is particularly significant for loans from Big 
Four state banks, state owned or controlled banks, banks with lower ranking and banks in 
provinces with lower marketization in credit allocation. The negative effect is also particularly 
significant for problematic borrowing firms including firms that are opaque, have a higher 
possibility of expropriation or tunnelling, have ineffective expropriation-reduction 
mechanisms, and are controlled by the state. The results also show that the negative effect is 
particularly significant for loans with greater amount, shorter term, with covenants/collateral, 
and less syndication. There is a significant difference in the market response to bank loan 
announcements among different bank loan purposes and among different industries.  
This study finds no significant market response to bank loan announcements in the Chinese 
financial market for the sample period 2005 to 2009. However, the result shows that there is a 
significantly negative market response to bank loan announcements in the Chinese financial 
market for the sample period 1996 to 2004. This implies that the Chinese stock market does 
not view bank loan announcements unfavourably any longer after a series of reforms in the 
Chinese banking system.  
Keywords: market response, bank loan announcements, government-controlled banking 
system, Chinese financial market, abnormal returns 
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    Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Early theory and empirical analysis of capital structure initially focused on the choice between 
issuing debt and equity (Dann & Mikkleson, 1986; Eckbo, 1986; Myers & Majluf, 1984), but 
recently the discussion has broadened to incorporate issues relating to the structure of firms’ 
debt, such as the mix of corporate loans (Dennis, Nandy & Sharpe, 2000; Hadlock & James, 
2002; James & Smith, 2000). In general, corporate loans can be categorised into public and 
private debt (Denis & Mihov, 2003; Diamond, 1991b; Fama, 1985; Hooks, 2003). A firm can 
raise funds through a private loan arrangement with financial intermediaries or from 
individual or institutional investors by issuing public debt such as bonds. Figure 1.1 below 
summarises the sources of external financing for companies. 
Figure 1.1 Sources of external financing for companies 
 
There is much research on the function and effect of bank credit agreements, private non-bank 
debt, and publicly placed straight debt issues on capital structure or, more specifically, 
corporate debt choice (Diamond, 1991b; Fama, 1985; James, 1987; Rajan, 1992). According 
to Fama (1985), bank financing and private placements are defined as “inside debt” because 
of their enhanced ability to gather information about their borrowers. Conceptually, as 
Diamond (1991b) points out, relationship lending can be considered as repeated extensions of 
“informed debt” by the same lender, whereas public debt can be thought of as “arms-length” 
financing or “outside debt” and lenders do not engage in proprietary information production. 
Private debt financing (primarily from commercial banks) is the most important source of 
external funds for nonfinancial firms in the U.S., Western Europe and Japan (Mayer, 1988), 
External Finance 
Equity Issues Debt Issues  
Public Debt  Private Debt  
Bank Loans 
Other Private 
Placement  Straight Debt  Convertible Debt  
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but the determinants of the choice between the concentrated ownership of private (bank) debt 
and the diffused ownership of public debt (or arm’s length private placements) for a firm in 
the capital acquisition process are ambiguous. There was an active debate concerning the 
choices of corporate financing in the 1980s when the U.S. financial market witnessed 
dramatic leveraged recapitalisation, which created the “junk bond” market. Specifically, from 
1995 to 1996, the U.S. companies experienced a return of leverage in the capital raising 
process, adding vigour to the waves of discussion on debt choice (Bank of America 
Roundtable, 1997).  
Theoretical studies in financial intermediation on the choices of financing can be readily 
traced to fundamental differences in information production and monitoring effects on 
borrowers of different types of debt (Benston & Smith, 1976; Fama, 1985; Johnson, 1998; 
Leftwich, 1983; Leland & Pyle, 1977). For example, Fama (1985) suggests that private 
lenders (especially banks) have a comparative advantage vis-à-vis other lenders in collecting 
information about borrowers and subsequently provide monitoring services about their 
behaviour. Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that all modern theories of financial intermediation 
are “information-based” paradigms where the bank’s relations with borrowers enable them to 
obtain information not available to other providers of funds.  
A large number of empirical studies (Dann & Mikkelson, 1984; James, 1987; James & Wier, 
1988; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986) have attempted to identify the determinants between private 
and public debt by testing the impact of corporate loan announcements on the market value of 
a firm. For example, Dann and Mikkelson (1984) find that there is a significantly negative 
abnormal return to straight debt announcements, whereas Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and 
James (1987) find that the abnormal return to straight debt announcements is negative but not 
statistically significant. Moreover, Dann and Mikkelson (1984) report a significantly negative 
abnormal return to convertible debt announcements, but Mikkelson and Partch (1986) report a 
non-significantly negative abnormal return to convertible debt announcements. These results 
reveal that the average excess returns accrued to firms placing public debt are either 
significantly negative or not significantly different from zero providing evidence supporting 
the notion of “inside debt”.  
Past theoretical studies (Fama, 1985; Johnson, 1998; Leftwich, 1983; Leland & Pyle, 1977) 
and empirical works (Dann & Mikkelson, 1984; James, 1987; James & Wier, 1988; 
Mikkelson & Partch, 1986) are robust enough to provide evidence that private debt, as a 
whole, has a comparative information advantage over pubic debt. The choice between bank 
loans and other private debt, however, is still ambiguous. This gave rise to a particular stream 
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of literature evaluating private lenders’ identity to investigate whether commercial loans from 
non-bank financial institutions are close substitutes for bank loans or bank loans comprise a 
unique source of debt financing1 (Billett, Flannery & Garfinkel, 1995; James, 1987; Preece & 
Mullineaux, 1994). Billett et al. (1995) and Preece and Mullineaux (1994) suggest that there 
is no statistically significant difference between the market responses to bank loan and non-
bank private loan announcements. However, James (1987) argues that a bank loan is indeed 
unique because only bank loan announcements can elicit positive excess returns from the 
borrowers.  
One of the pioneer theoretical analyses on bank uniqueness was Fama (1985). Fama (1985) 
explains the uniqueness of bank loans based on the inside-debt notion where banks are able to 
access to private or inside information about borrowing firms that is not available to other 
institutions or investors. Thus, bank loans may solve the information asymmetry problem 
between lenders and borrowers that public debt issues or other “outside” debt cannot, and 
hence monitor the borrowing firms more efficiently than other investors. 
There is a large body of literature that has tested the share price reaction to both bank loan 
announcements and private placements (Aintablian & Roberts, 2000; Armitage, 1995b; Billett 
et al., 1995; James, 1987; Preece & Mullineaux, 1994). For example, Billett et al. (1995), 
James (1987) and Preece and Mullineaux (1994) find that there is a significantly positive 
excess return to bank loan announcements in the U.S. These studies empirically confirm 
Fama’s (1985) argument on the uniqueness of bank loans in the U.S. financial market. 
Aintablian and Roberts (2000) report a significantly positive abnormal return to bank loan 
announcements in the Canadian financial market but it has a different banking system from 
the U.S. This finding is consistent with prior studies done in the U.S. Armitage (1995b) find 
that the market also reacts positively to bank loan announcements using a data set drawn from 
the U.K. financial market where the banking system is different from other developed 
countries such as the U.S. and Canada. These studies arrived at a consensus conclusion that 
the market response to bank loan announcements was significantly positive in non-
government-controlled banking systems such as the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. 2 . In 
government-controlled banking systems such as China and Taiwan (La Porta et al., 2002; 
Morck et al., 2009), however, the results are ambiguous. For example, Chen and Tsai (2006) 
and Cui and Zhao (2004) report significantly positive abnormal returns whereas Bailey, 
                                               
1
 According to the information from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, James and Smith (2000) argue that 
corporate loans by non-bank financial companies have increased in recent years. 
2 La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) and Morck, Yavuz and Yeung (2009) categorise banking 
systems in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong and South Korea as non-
government-controlled banking system. 
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Huang and Yang (2010) and Shen, Zhang and Chen (2007) find significantly negative results 
from their empirical studies. The ambiguity of the results may stem from the different 
financial systems or institutional settings across nations and industries in the sample. 
Furthermore, in terms of private placements, the results were also ambiguous. For example, 
Billett et al. (1995) and Preece and Mullineaux (1994) report significantly positive abnormal 
returns whereas Aintablian and Roberts (2000), James (1987) and Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986) document a non-significant stock price response from their empirical studies. 
Beside the inconsistent results about the direction of the corporate loan announcement effect, 
stock traders may infer information about the conditional probability of lender characteristics, 
borrower characteristics, and loan characteristics. Accordingly, many researchers 
disaggregated corporate loans based on the characteristics of the lender, borrower and loan to 
investigate their effects on the size of market response to corporate loan announcement.     
In terms of lender characteristics, Preece and Mullineaux (1994) divide the corporate loan 
announcement effect based on the lenders’ identity (bank versus non-bank) and suggest that 
the lenders’ identity is not one of the factors that may impact on the observed stock price 
reaction to loan announcements; it is the terms and characteristics offered by lenders rather 
than the types of financial intermediaries that elicit abnormal returns to borrowers. When all 
the lenders were banks, some bank characteristics including their reputations (Aintablian & 
Roberts, 2000; Billett et al., 1995; Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Thakor, 1996), rankings 
(Bailey et al., 2010) and locations (Bailey et al., 2010) may affect the size of the market 
response to bank loan announcements.  
With regard to borrower characteristics, prior studies identified that borrowers’ informational 
opaqueness (Denis & Mihov, 2003; Fields, Fraser, Berry & Byers, 2006; Krishnaswami, 
Spindt & Subramaniam, 1999; Slovin, Johnson & Glascock, 1992), their credit rating (Denis 
& Mihov, 2003; Diamond, 1991b; James, 1987; Rajan, 1992) and their financial status 
(Brown, James & Mooradian, 1993; Fields et al., 2006; Hadlock & James, 2002; James, 1996) 
may affect the size of the corporate loan announcement effect. For example, Slovin et al. 
(1992) suggest that the information content for corporate loan announcements for small firms 
is more valuable than that for large firms. This is because small firms are inclined to suffer 
from informational opaqueness. 
Recently, the expropriation problem of outside investors by insiders in listed firms has 
attracted great attention in the finance and accounting area (Jensen & Mecking, 1976; Johnson, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; 
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Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Jensen and Mecking (1976) suggest that, when ownership is widely 
diffused (i.e. 100 percent small shareholders), it is impossible for each small shareholder and 
debt holder to influence the firm directly. This leads to the separation of ownership and 
control, in which managers (agents) implicitly act in the shareholders’ and debt holders’ 
(principals’) interests to maximize the firm value. In this scenario, each small shareholder or 
debt holder has less incentive or contractual mechanisms to align the interests of managers 
with outside shareholders. Therefore, managers may disadvantage shareholders and debt 
holders by expropriating some of the company’s assets. However, Johnson et al. (2000), La 
Porta et al. (1999) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that, when the ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of one large shareholder, the controlling owner who acts as an agent 
on behalf of all the minority shareholders makes the decisions. Controlling shareholders can 
easily abuse their power and expropriate the firm’s wealth by maximizing their private benefit 
at the expense of minority shareholders and outside investors. Banks, as outside investors, 
have inevitably been involved in the expropriation problem. Thus, a number of studies argue 
that the borrowers’ expropriation problems may affect the size of the corporate loan 
announcement effect (Bailey et al., 2010; Khanna, 2000; Tian, 2004; Wei & Wan, 2007). 
With regard to loan characteristics, previous studies found that loan types (Billett et al., 1995; 
Lummer & McConnell, 1989; Preece & Mullineaux, 1994; Slovin et al., 1992), maturity 
(Aintablian & Roberts, 2000; Flannery, 1986; Kale & Noe, 1990), covenant (James & Smith, 
2000; Park, 2000; Rajan &Winton, 1995), collateral (Carey, Post & Sharpe, 1998; James & 
Smith, 2000; Rajan & Winton, 1995), syndication (Houston & James, 1996; Preece & 
Mullineaux, 1996; Rajan, 1992), and size of loans (Easterwood & Kadapakkam, 1991; 
Krishnaswami et al., 1999) may influence the size of the corporate loan announcement effect. 
For instance, Lummer and McConnell’s (1989) study focuses on the effect of bank loan types 
on the market response to corporate loan announcements and concludes that a significantly 
positive reaction occurs only for announcements of extensions or renewals of existing 
agreements and not the initiation of a bank announcement.  
Most studies that examined the corporate loan announcement effect are conducted in the U.S., 
but a number of studies have also extended this topic to other financial markets, such as 
Canada (Aintablian & Roberts, 2000; André, Mathieu & Zhang, 2001; Mathieu, Robb & 
Zhang, 2006), the U.K. (Armitage, 1995b; Franks & Sussman, 2005), Australia (Fery, 
Gasbarro, Woodliff & Zumwalt, 2003), New Zealand (Koh, 2001), Japan (Kang & Liu, 2008), 
Hong Kong and South Korea (Boscaljon & Ho, 2005). These studies suggest that, when banks 
are independent from the state, they can grant loans only for profit-maximizing rather than 
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political or social objectives. It implies that the decision to grant loans by banks is based only 
on the borrowing firms’ performance. Thus, the approval of giving loans is considered as a 
positive signal by the stock market. Banks have indeed played a role in screening and 
monitoring borrowing firms under the enriched notion of “inside debt”.  
Previous studies have enhanced our understanding of the bank loan announcement effect in 
non-government-controlled banking systems. However, it is unclear how the market reacts to 
bank loan announcements in a government-controlled banking system like China.  
Like most countries, China’s functioning financial system includes the financial markets and 
financial intermediaries. However, the financial system in China is dominated by financial 
institutions, especially the banking sector, since China’s equity and corporate bond markets 
are still in their initial development accounting for a small proportion of the total corporate 
financing (Allen, Qian & Qian, 2005a, 2005b).  
China’s equity markets have been growing very fast since their inception in 1990, but they are 
still not comparable to the financial institutions, especially the banking industry, in terms of 
their scale and importance for entire economy (Allen et al., 2005a, 2005b). For example, total 
bank loans stood at 138.1% of GDP at the end of 2004 and the combined market value of 
China’s two stock exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges) comprised only 
27.1% of GDP (Allen et al., 2005a, 2005b). Allen et al. (2005a) also find that, in terms of size, 
the ratio of total bank credit to GDP in China was highest (with a weighted average of 111%) 
among the sample countries including England, France, Germany, Scandinavia, and China3. 
However, in contrast to the banking industry, Allen et al. (2005a) find that China’s stock 
markets are smaller than the sampled countries both in terms of market capitalization and the 
total value traded as a fraction of GDP. 
Moreover, China’s bond market, launched in 1981, has been growing slowly. Government 
bonds have dominated the bond market, accounting for about 95% of the total domestic bond 
market and 28.9% of GDP by 2003 (Chen & Thomas, 2005). In terms of corporate bonds, the 
market is very much undeveloped and virtually non-existent. For example, Allen et al. (2005a) 
find that corporate bonds account for less than 1% of GDP in China at the end of 2001. Table 
1.1 shows that corporate bonds account for less than 3% of GDP in China at the end of 2006. 
 
 
                                               
3
 Allen et al. (2005a) compare China’s financial system to those of La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny’s (1997, 1998) sample countries. 
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Table 1.1 China’s domestic corporate bonds (RMB billion). 
Year Total Corporate Bonds Outstanding % of GDP 
1995 33.27 0.55 
1996 59.77 0.84 
1997 52.10 0.66 
1998 67.69 0.80 
1999 77.90 0.87 
2000 86.20 0.87 
2001 100.86 0.92 
2002 133.36 1.11 
2003 169.16 1.25 
2004 201.86 1.26 
2005  402.81 2.20 
2006 553.29 2.61 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of China 
The small size and slow growth of China’s corporate bond market may be the result of many 
barriers to issuing corporate bonds. First, it is difficult for Chinese companies to obtain the 
high issuer qualifications. Second, credit protection is poor for the following reasons: (1) 
there is not yet a bond-rating agency able to monitor company performance; (2) Chinese 
companies’ opaque accounting practices provide bondholders with insufficient information; 
(3) there is no sound framework to deal with companies that renege on their bond obligations 
(Bailey et al., 2010; Chen & Thomas, 2005). 
The financial system in China is dominated by financial intermediaries that include banks and 
non-bank financial institutions4, such as trust and investment companies, finance companies 
associated with enterprise groups, financial leasing companies, securities companies, and 
credit rating companies (Lardy, 1998). According to China Banking Regulatory Commission 
2009 Annual Report, China’s banking sector comprises of 3 policy banks, Big-Four state-
owned banks, 13 joint-stock commercial banks, 143 city commercial banks, 43 rural 
commercial banks, 196 rural cooperative banks, 11 urban credit cooperatives, 3,056 rural 
credit cooperatives, one postal savings bank, 37 locally incorporated foreign banking 
institutions, 148 village and township banks, 4 banking asset management companies, 58 trust 
companies, 91 finance companies of enterprise groups, 12 financial leasing companies, 3 
money brokerage firms, 10 auto financing companies, 8 lending companies and 16 rural 
mutual cooperatives as of end of 2009. The total number of financial institutions registered in 
China is 3,857 at the end of 2009. Figure 1.2 shows an overview of China’s financial 
intermediaries at the end of 2009. 
                                               
4
 In the mid-1980s, several new types of non-bank financial institutions began to emerge.  
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Figure 1.2 Financial intermediaries in China at the end of 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission 2009 Annual Report
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However, the scale of non-bank financing institutions is much smaller than that of banks. 
Figure 1.3 presents the total assets of financial institutions in China. The total assets of banks 
accounted for 94%, 96% and 98% of the total assets of all financial institutions at the end of 
1994, 2002 and 2009, respectively (see Figure 1.3). Non-bank institutions accounted for only 
6%, 4% and 2% of the assets of the financial sector, respectively.  
Figure 1.3 Total assets of financial institutions in China at the end of 1994, 2002 and 
2009 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
1994 2002 2009
Banks
Non-bank financing
institutions
Source: Almanac of China’s finance and banking (1995; 2003) and China Banking Regulatory Commission 
2009 Annual Report 
In addition, banks prefer to grant credits to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and publicly listed 
companies. Non-bank financial institutions, acting as a substitute for banks, grant most of 
their loans to small private firms that have problems in getting a loan from banks (Allen et al., 
2005a, 2005b; Cheng & Degryse, 2007, Xie, 1998). Thus, banks are still the dominant 
providers of debt capital to listed firms in China.   
Several studies have examined the market response to bank loan announcements in the 
Chinese financial market, but the findings of these studies are inconsistent. For example, Cui 
and Zhao (2004) find a significantly positive market response to bank loan announcements in 
their study, but Bailey et al. (2010) and Shen et al. (2007) report significantly negative market 
reaction. Bailey et al. (2010) explain these findings by suggesting that state-controlled banks 
may have to lend to some weak firms for political reasons such as avoiding widespread 
unemployment and social instability. If these weak borrowers are prevalent, the market 
response to bank loan announcement should be negative, and vice versa.  
In addition to the inconsistent results, the data set in Bailey et al.’s (2010), Cui and Zhao’s 
(2004) and Shen et al.’s (2007) studies are not recent. For example, the sample period in 
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Bailey et al.’s (2010) study is from 1999 to 2004, January 1, 2004 to May 20, 2004 in Cui and 
Zhao’s (2004) study and January 1, 2005 to November 18, 2005 in Shen et al.’s (2007) 
studies. Thus, these studies can not capture the recent reforms in the Chinese banking system 
and financial market.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Based on the above discussion, the issue of the market response to corporate loan 
announcements is still controversial, especially in China with its different financial system or 
institutional settings. In addition, much has happened in the Chinese banking system since 
2005, and it is plausible that China’s banking system has improved since then. However, no 
previous studies have used updated data to examine the issue of the market response to bank 
loan announcements in the Chinese financial market. Further, the issue of how the 
characteristics of the bank, borrower and loan affect the size of corporate loan announcement 
effect is still ambiguous, especially the increasing expropriation problem of borrowing firms 
encountered by external investors.  
The purpose of this study is to address these controversies and ambiguities by examining bank 
loan announcements in the Chinese financial market and investigating whether the 
expropriation problem affects the market response to bank loan announcements.  
China represents an ideal experimental setting for investigating the bank loan announcement 
effect since China’s banking system, corporate structure, institutional structure and legal 
environment are very different from those in many developed markets and other emerging and 
transition economies (Bailey et al., 2010; Cai, Fairchild & Guney, 2008, Chen, Firth, Gao & 
Rui, 2006; Fan, Lau & Young, 2007). This has different implications in terms of refinancing 
means, bankruptcy procedures, information asymmetries and expropriation problems. 
Foremost in the unique characteristics is that most banks and most borrowers in China are 
mostly controlled by the state. In such a government-controlled banking system, government-
owned banks have to assume policy lending (lending based on policy objectives or political 
criteria and connections rather than creditworthiness) functions to minimize unemployment 
and social instability. Listed firms owned or controlled by the state, thus, are able to receive 
funds from bank loans although they do not meet internationally accepted standards for 
making payments on time. This is because these enterprises have served as the main source of 
employment and social safety net for much of the population.  
The ownership structure of China’s listed firms is typically highly concentrated. According to 
the 2003 China Corporate Governance Report (CCGR), the percentage of the company’s 
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shares owned by the largest shareholder in China’s listed firms averaged 44.26% at the end of 
2002. In addition, over 40% of the largest shareholders have more than 50% of their 
company’s shares; and firms with the top five shareholders owning more than 50% of the 
company’s shares are 74.4% of all China’s listed companies. There is also a divergence 
between the voting rights and the cash-flow rights of controlling shareholders since most 
Chinese listed firms have a parallel or pyramid holding company structure (Fan, Wong & 
Zhang, 2005, 2007). Given the high concentration of ownership and high degree of separation 
of ownership and control in China, the expropriation problem is likely to be severe. 
Controlling shareholders generally have incentives and opportunities to expropriate outside 
investors (minority shareholders and creditors) to enjoy their private benefits.  
Several researchers have examined the incidence of agency problems of controlling 
shareholders in China from different perspectives. For example, Jian and Wong (2003) and 
Yu (2004) examine expropriation problems from the related-party (also known as 
“connected”) transaction perspective; Chen, Jian & Xu (2008) and Yu (2004) examine 
expropriation problems from the dividend perspective; Ding, Zhang and Zhang (2007), Jian 
and Wong (2003), Liu and Lu (2003) examine expropriation problems from the earning 
management perspective; and Gao, He and Yi (2006), Gao and Kling (2008), Tian (2004) and 
Wei and Wan (2007) examine expropriation problems from asset appropriation perspectives. 
Bailey et al. (2010) initially claims that the expropriation problem exists in loan 
announcements. The authors argue that it is likely for Chinese banks to have evolved into the 
expropriation problem of Chinese listed firms that have a highly concentrated ownership 
structure. However, these studies concentrated only on specific cases or firm performance. 
Little research has shed light on the roots of the expropriation problem, that is, the divergence 
of cash-flow and voting rights. Thus, this study will fill this gap by examining the incidence 
of expropriation problems employing the divergence between the voting rights and the cash-
flow rights and firm performance. 
1.3 Research Objectives  
The general objective of this research is to evaluate the market response to bank loan 
announcements in the Chinese financial market. It also investigates whether the expropriation 
problem of listed firms involves the Chinese banking system. 
The specific research objectives include the following: 
1. To examine how bank, borrower and loan characteristics may influence the share price 
reaction to bank loan announcements in the Chinese financial market. 
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2. To examine the incidence of the expropriation problem of the banking system by the 
controlling shareholder among companies listed on the Chinese Stock Exchange.  
3. To evaluate the influence (or effectiveness) of ownership structure and internal 
corporate governance mechanisms in limiting or controlling the magnitude of the 
expropriation problem between Chinese listed firms and banks.  
In order to achieve the objectives of this study, the conventional event study methodology 
will be applied to examine the market response to all bank loan announcements made by 
companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) over the period 1996-2009. The decision to choose 1996 as the starting year is due to 
the availability of data. The share-split reform started in 2005 which affected the stock price 
of listed Chinese companies considerably. In order to avoid the influence of the share-split 
reform, this study divides the sample period into two sub-samples, namely, 1996 to 2004 and 
2005-2009. A total of 501 bank loan announcements are used in the sample period 1996 to 
2004 and 106 bank loan announcements in the sample period 2005 to 2009. In addition, this 
study will use the degree of divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights as well as 
firm performance as proxies for the possibility of expropriation.  
1.4 Contribution by the Research  
This study will contribute to the rapidly growing literature on banking and corporate 
governance. First, this study provides an analysis of the market response to bank loan 
announcements by the Chinese banking system, which is different from previous research that 
focused on developed capital markets. Previous research documented that banks may have a 
comparative advantage in gathering information and providing monitoring services not 
duplicated elsewhere in the capital market. However, the uniqueness of banks may not be 
replicable in different financial markets. This study explicitly investigates whether the 
theoretical predictions, tested in non-government-controlled banking systems, also hold in a 
government-controlled banking system such as China with a different corporate financial 
policy and bank regulatory policy.  
Secondly, this study examines how banks and borrowers with Chinese characteristics affect 
the market response to bank loan announcements. Foremost among the unique characteristics 
is that most lenders and borrowers are controlled by the state. Banks in China may have to 
take responsibility for a number of “policy loans” for social stability or other political reasons. 
Moreover, it is likely that the funds from a bank loan are misused by controlling shareholders 
since most Chinese listed firms have an excessive concentrated ownership structure. Thus, 
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investigating the characteristics of lenders and borrowers in China will have implications for 
Chinese economic reformers and regulators who are striving to improve the efficiency of bank 
loans. 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis  
The rest of thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the relevant 
literature on market response to bank loan announcements. Chapter 3 discusses the research 
methodology and data collection. Analysis of the data and empirical results are presented in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 summarises the major findings and implications, followed by the 
limitation of the research and recommendations for future research.  
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    Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature related to the market response to bank loan announcements 
in both non-government-controlled banking systems and government-controlled banking 
systems. There are two strands of studies on the bank loan announcements. The first strand 
focuses on the direction of the market response to bank loan announcements. The second 
strand of studies focuses on the size of the market response to bank loan announcements. 
Section 2.2 reviews the literature that addresses the direction of the market reaction to bank 
loan announcements in non-government-controlled banking systems. Section 2.3 reviews the 
studies that investigate the direction of the market reaction to bank loan announcements in 
government-controlled banking systems. Section 2.4 discusses the bank characteristics that 
might affect the magnitude of the bank loan announcements effect in both non-government-
controlled banking systems and government-controlled banking systems. Section 2.5 reviews 
evidence emphasising borrower characteristics in both non-government-controlled banking 
systems and government-controlled banking systems. Section 2.6 reviews studies on loan 
characteristics in both non-government-controlled banking systems and government-
controlled banking systems. Different studies theoretically and empirically investigate how 
bank, borrower and loan characteristics influence the stock market response to bank loan 
announcements. It is difficult to distinguish the literature that discusses the above three 
characteristics in isolation since these characteristics are often interrelated and have some 
causal relationship. They are discussed separately in this chapter in order to simplify the 
analysis of bank loan announcement effects. Section 2.7 provides a summary of the chapter. 
2.2 Direction of the Market Response to Bank Loan 
Announcements in Non-government-controlled Banking 
Systems 
Researchers (Aintablian & Roberts, 2000; Fields et al., 2006; James, 1987; Preece & 
Mullineaux, 1994) have investigated the direction of market reactions to bank loan 
announcements in non-government-controlled banking systems, i.e. the sign of bank loan 
announcement effect in non-government-controlled banking systems, but their findings are 
ambiguous. Some studies report positive market responses but others report negative market 
reactions.  
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2.2.1 Positive Market Resposne 
The literature on bank loans, in general, reports a positive market reaction to bank loan 
announcements since bank loans are typically unique compared with other forms of debt. 
2.2.1.1 Uniqueness of Bank Loans 
Bank loans are narrowly defined as loans from commercial banks or other depository 
institutions. Debt from other private sources, such as private placements, suppliers, and 
finance companies, is categorised as other private debt. There are two reasons for this 
classification. First, bank loans are generally regarded as one special form of external 
financing, where banks obtain information via a deposit relationship (and potentially other 
sources) that might not be available to other providers of finance, including bond and stock 
investors (Fama, 1985). Secondly, unlike the announcement effects of other private security 
issues, bank loan announcements elicit significantly positive excess returns to the borrowers’ 
common stock5. 
Fama (1985) initially examines the incidence of reserve tax on bank certificates of deposits 
(CDs) in the U.S. to investigate the uniqueness of banks. The author compares the average 
rates of interest on large CDs with other close substitutes for bank CDs such as high-grade 
commercial paper or bankers’ acceptances and finds no significant difference between them. 
Because commercial banks are required to hold non-interest-bearing reserves in specified 
ratios to their demand deposits and CDs are also subject to bank reserve requirements in the 
U.S., this insignificant result implies that the CD holder does not bear the reserve requirement 
tax. Therefore, Fama (1985) argues that, since other privately placed or publicly placed 
securities on open-market are not subject to reserve requirements, there must be something 
special about bank loans relative to other credit contracts that motivate borrowers to pay 
higher interest rates than other securities of equivalent risk.  
Fama (1985) first explains the special role of bank loans in a company’s information process 
by analysing the difference between inside and outside debt. The author defines inside debt as 
a contract where the debt holders have the ability to acquire the information from a firm’s 
decision processes not otherwise publicly available. Bank loans are a form of inside debt6, 
since banks have privileges that enable them to access inside proprietary information about 
the borrowers that is not available to other institutions or investors7. Fama (1985) further 
                                               
5
 Evidence from a number of empirical studies (James, 1987; Lummer & McConnel, 1989; McDonald, 1994; 
Mikkelson & Partch, 1986) provides support for Fama’s (1985) argument. 
6
 Similar arguments are in found Bernanke (1983), Kane and Malkiel (1965) and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
7
 Fama (1985) attributes banks’ unique advantage in obtaining information about borrowers based on the 
hypothesis that banks hold a firm’s deposit (or cheque) account, especially a daily settlement account, which 
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argues that the short-term nature of bank loans and the repeating process (rollovers) triggers 
periodic evaluation of the organisation’s performance to signal the firms’ creditworthiness. 
By using these types of renewal signals, banks are able to avoid duplication of information 
costs. In addition, compared with other lenders, the ongoing history of the deposit relationship 
allows a bank to effectively monitor the loans at a lower cost (Black, 1975; Diamond, 1984; 
Kane & Malkiel, 1965; Leland & Pyle, 1977). Consistent with Black’s (1975) cost advantage 
argument, Fama (1985) claims that it is more valuable for small companies to finance with 
bank loans since it costs more to provide a set of publicly available information needed in 
using outside debt or equity. Therefore, Fama (1985) reaches two conclusions: CD holders do 
not bear the research requirement tax and therefore bank loans are special; secondly, there are 
two main attractions unique to bank debt, the ability of banks to obtain inside information and 
the less costly services to monitor the loans. 
James (1987) extends Fama’s (1985) study by employing an alternative method to investigate 
the incidence of the reserve tax. The author examines the performance of CD yield in relation 
to the yields on other securities in reference to changes in the reserve requirements. James 
(1987) assumes no changes in insurance costs occurring at the same time, so an increase in 
reserve requirements should decrease the profits of CDs relative to other profits if the reserve 
tax is paid by the depositors. In fact, James (1987) finds that the average CD rates do not 
differ in two different required-reserve regimes. Therefore, James’ (1987) results suggest 
Fama’s (1985) conclusion that the reserve tax falls on borrowers and reinforce the Fama’s 
(1985) notion that bank loans possess unique informational properties. 
James and Wier (1988) investigate the possibility that banks have some unique advantages in 
providing capital to the market and find that inside debt (loans from financial institutions – 
mainly commercial banks) appears to be a major source of financing for firms. The authors 
explain firms’ preference in financing by enumerating the advantages of using inside debt as 
follows. First, inside debt may solve the information asymmetry problems that firms face in 
raising funds in public capital markets. Second, banks and financial institutions, as inside debt 
holders, can monitor the borrowing firms effectively with the use of restrictive covenants after 
they issue the debt. The third advantage of inside debt is that it may be able to help firms 
maintain confidentiality about their investing opportunities. Finally, inside debt may help 
borrowers avoid consuming money and time in issuing new securities. 
                                                                                                                                                   
gives the bank easy access to comprehensively view the borrowers’ cash flows over time. Thus, the bank can 
monitor the borrowers more effectively. 
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To further investigate the unique role of banks, Dahiya, Puri and Saunders (2003) take a 
different approach and study the announcement of a sale of a borrower’s loans by its lending 
bank. The authors find that the stock price of those firms whose bank loans have been sold by 
the initial lending banks reacts negatively to the sale announcements. This negative impact is 
pronounced for sub-par loan (or distressed loan) sales, where the information effects of bank 
sales are likely to be greatest and where they have a more representative sample of loan sales. 
These findings are consistent with a negative information effect arising from loan sales. 
Furthermore, Dahiya et al. (2003) find that firms whose loans are sold have a higher 
probability of bankruptcy than firms that are not. However, those firms whose loans are sold 
are not the worst performers in their respective industries during the year before selling off 
their loans. This implies that outside investors are not able to identify the degree of weakness 
of the borrowing firms based on ex-ante publicly available information alone. Dahiya et al.’s 
(2003) findings support previous arguments (Cambell & Kracaw, 1980; Diamond, 1984; 
Fama, 1985; James, 1987) that banks are able to detect borrowers’ information not readily 
observable to other investors.  
However, both James (1987) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) report statistically significant 
and negative stock price responses to announcements of other privately placed debt. These 
findings can not be explained by the inside-debt argument8. If privately placed debt belongs to 
the inside-debt category, it should have the same comparative advantage over other outside 
debts as that of banks. Therefore, it is expected that private placement is able to enhance 
returns to shareholders of borrowing firms and thereby reduces the information asymmetries 
or monitors firm performance. This expectation is based on the view that banks and other 
private lenders are generally assumed to be better informed about a firm’s prospects than 
public securities holders. Thus, the findings of a non-positive stock response for private debt 
in James’ (1987) and Mikkelson and Partch’s (1986) studies suggest that the uniqueness of 
bank loans is not only because they are inside debts but they can also provide some special 
services with their lending activity that are not available from other lenders (James, 1987). 
For example, banks may elicit a positive signal by monitoring the borrower (Datta, Iskandar-
Datta & Patel, 1999; Diamond, 1991b; Pennacchi, 1988), or helping a borrower to establish a 
reputation (Datta et al., 1999; Diamond, 1991b). 
 
 
                                               
8
 Fama (1985) categorises private placements and other non-bank finance institutions as inside debt since private 
placement buyers are better informed about the issuing firm than are public security holders. 
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2.2.1.1.1 Monitoring 
Campbell and Kracaw (1980), Diamond (1984, 1991b), Fama (1985), Leland and Pyle (1977) 
and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) theoretically modelled the role of monitoring played by 
financial intermediaries to highlight the unique monitoring function of banks. These studies 
propose that bank financing utilised economies of scale in information production to eliminate 
the adverse selection and moral hazard costs of new debt issuing through gathering inside 
information to bridge information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. For example, 
Fama (1985) holds that banks can possess an informational advantage over other outside 
(public) debt holders that enables banks to provide more efficient monitoring by reducing the 
monitoring and bonding costs. This availability of such privileged information banks enjoy 
typically arises because of their ability to observe confidential/private information about 
borrowers.  
Similarly, Diamond (1991b) argues that directly placed debt is a contract with terms and loan-
granting decisions that rely only on public information, whereas a bank loan employs this 
information plus costly information from monitoring of the borrower’s performance as a 
condition in granting a loan. The author concludes that banks have more scale economies in 
information production, which enables them to engage in superior debt-related monitoring. 
Furthermore, Diamond (1991b) suggests that bank monitoring can either serve as a screening 
risk assessment device before the loan is approved, or help align the self-interested managers’ 
action thus providing incentives for managers to pursue ex-post efficient investment strategies.  
Datta et al. (1999) find evidence to support the importance of bank monitoring by showing 
that the existence of bank cross-monitoring significantly lowers the at-issue spread for initial 
public debt offers. Krishnaswami et al. (1999) suggest that bank monitoring is beneficial 
because it can help to reduce the agency costs of public debt through covenants and 
renegotiation. Almazan and Suarez (2003) also argue that banks can protect shareholders’ 
interests by monitoring the borrowing firm’s actions and forcing managers to avoid “pet 
projects”.  
Pennacchi (1988) develops a theoretical model where banks may improve the returns on loans 
by monitoring borrowers. The author notes that the banks’ incentive to effectively screen loan 
applicants and monitor borrowers reduces once the loan is securitized and this limits the range 
of assets that can be profitably securitized. Therefore, Pennacchi (1988) argues that the 
determinant of banks’ ability to sell loans is the investor’s perception of the banks’ incentive 
to monitor the loans they sell and overcome moral hazard problems. Pennacchi (1988) also 
argues that giving the bank a disproportionate share of the gains from monitoring in designing 
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an optimal loan sales contract enables banks to sell a greater amount of the loan and therefore 
make a higher level of profit while maintaining monitoring efficiency. Finally, Pennacchi 
(1988) concludes that the difference between bank loans and marketable securities is that the 
borrowing firms monitored by banks can create value.   
2.2.1.1.2 Helping Borrowers to Establish a Reputation 
Diamond’s (1991b) “life cycle” model considers how banks help borrowers to establish a 
better reputation. The author predicts that costly bank-monitored debts are primarily taken on 
by new borrowers to acquire a credit reputation. During this period, banks perform delegated 
monitoring of firms by taking diversified portfolios. Once a good reputation for a borrower is 
established, it is more likely for the borrower to acquire financing from the publicly placed 
debt market to save costly monitoring. In addition, helping borrowers to establish a reputation 
can solve the moral hazard problem since a better reputation with time alleviates the adverse 
selection problem.  
Datta et al. (1999) test Diamond’s (1991b) reputation-building argument and confirm that 
firm reputation established by banks (proxies by the length of the bank/firm relationship) 
could significantly reduce the cost of external debt capital. Denis and Mihov (2003), Hale and 
Santos (2008) and Krishnaswami et al. (1999) also empirically support the reputation-building 
predictions of Diamond’s (1991b) model by concluding firms that have not gained a good 
credit reputation preferred bank debt financing rather than non-bank or public financing since 
banks can help them to establish better reputation.  
Boot (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000) conclude that the combination of theoretical 
benefits that bank loans have a competitive advantage in accessing detailed inside information 
or providing monitoring and developing reputation services (Datta et al., 1999; Diamond, 
1991b; Fama, 1985; James, 1987; James & Wier, 1988) and the empirical evidence that bank 
loans generate a positive announcement effect (Best & Zhang, 1993; James, 1987; Lummer & 
McConnell, 1989; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986) result in the labelling of loans from banks as 
“special” or “unique” based on U.S. data.  
A number of studies have discussed the bank loan announcement effect in other non-
government-controlled banking systems such as Canada (Aintablian & Roberts, 2000; André 
et al., 2001; Mathieu et al., 2006), the U.K. (Armitage, 1995b), Australia (Fery et al., 2003), 
New Zealand (Koh, 2001), Japan (Kang & Liu, 2008), Hong Kong and South Korea 
(Boscaljon & Ho, 2005) to confirm if the findings of prior studies of bank loan 
announcements based exclusively on the U.S. data hold also in different banking systems. 
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These studies generally find that bank loan announcements display significantly positive 
abnormal returns, supporting the U.S. studies that commercial banks play a unique role in 
reducing information asymmetries in non-government-controlled banking systems. 
2.2.1.2 Challenges to the Uniqueness of Bank Loans 
Billett et al. (1995) and Preece and Mullineaux (1994) challenge the uniqueness of bank loans 
and conclude that it is the terms and characteristics offered by the lenders rather than the types 
of financial intermediaries that elicit abnormal returns from the borrowers.  
Preece and Mullineaux (1994) assume that, if market reactions to bank loan announcements 
and non-bank announcements are similar, it implies that banks have lost their unique 
advantage. Using the U.S. data, Preece and Mullineaux (1994) find that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the market response to announcements of bank 
loans and non-bank loans9. Consistent with this argument, Billett et al. (1995) also report 
positive and marginally significant abnormal borrowers’ returns to both bank and non-bank 
loans.   
However, James’ (1987) study shows that the announcements of other kinds of privately 
placed debt are associated with small negative responses whereas only bank loans generate 
significantly positive abnormal returns. James and Smith (2000) further conjecture that the 
difference between these three findings may contribute to various types of non-bank loans 
examined by each study. Both Billett et al. (1995) and Preece and Mullineaux (1994) focus on 
commitment-type non-bank loans made by non-bank lenders, which resemble bank debt, but 
James (1987) analyses mostly longer-maturity private placements, which resemble publicly 
traded debt contracts. 
Best and Zhang (1993) argue that the information content of bank loan announcements is not 
only determined by banks but also relies on other non-bank information. To support this 
argument, Best and Zhang (1993) examine the information content of bank loans by 
addressing two issues. First, the authors recognise that financial institutions other than banks 
also evaluate and monitor borrowing firms. Second, the authors investigate whether banks 
expend equal resources to evaluate all borrowing firms. By employing financial analysts’ 
percentage earning forecast errors and the most recent earnings forecast revisions as non-bank 
information, Best and Zhang (1993) find that banks first rely on other information resources 
to screen and monitor the borrowers and decide where to best allocate their evaluation efforts. 
If the non-bank indicators are reliable and signal improving prospects, banks do little further 
                                               
9
 Preece and Mullineaux (1994) classify insurance companies, commercial companies and non-bank subsidiaries 
of bank holding companies as non-bank institutions. 
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investigation, resulting in the production of marginal information. However, if the indicators 
are noisy and signal declining prospects, banks have an incentive to expend effort in 
evaluating the borrowers, and hence convey more useful information.   
In addition, Greenbaum, Kanatas and Venezia (1989), Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990) 
question the benefit of bank debt by arguing that bank financing and monitoring may impose 
endogenous costs on firms. This problem is later substantiated by several empirical studies 
(e.g. Detragiache, Garella & Guiso, 2000; Diamond, 1993; Kang & Stulz, 2000; Ongena & 
Smith, 1999, 2000). These studies show that firms using bank credit could not approach new 
outside financiers for refinancing, that is, they are locked into their original banks. This lock-
in problem is possible because in forming a lending relationship, a bank, or other private 
lender, is able to obtain proprietary information about the borrowing firm. This may create an 
“information opaqueness” or hold-up problem in which it is impossible for the borrower to 
approach any uninformed potential lenders for follow-on financing. This is because, as a 
privileged lender, the bank has an incentive to generate significant non-transferable 
information about the firm to prevent other alternative investors competing on a par with it. 
As a consequence, the ex-post information monopoly provides the original bank with 
substantial bargaining power. The incumbent bank, therefore, may be able to expropriate 
surplus for successful projects at the refinancing stage. The expectation of additional rent 
extraction by the bank, in turn, curbs incentives for the firm to exert effort in raising profits in 
the first place (Diamond, 1993; Kang & Stulz, 2000; Ongena & Smith, 1999, 2000; Rajan, 
1992). In other words, the bank-borrower relationship is costly since the exploitation of the 
banks’ market power distorts investment efficiency.  
With respect to evidence from other countries, Aintablian and Roberts (2000) employ return 
data from the Canadian capital market and report that, overall, bank loan announcements in 
Canada generate significantly positive abnormal returns whereas announcements of other 
private placements are not statistically significant to the stock price. Fery et al. (2003) and 
Koh (2001) separately employ Australian and New Zealand data and find that only bank loan 
announcements elicit a significantly positive abnormal return whereas non-bank loan 
announcements produce an insignificant response. 
2.2.2 Challenges to Positive Market Response 
Recently, a growing body of literature started to question the validity of the information 
content conveyed by bank lending revealing that the average bank loan no longer adds 
significant value to the borrowing firm (Billett, Flannery & Garfinkel, 2006; Fields et al., 
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2006). These studies provide a different explanation for their findings on the direction of the 
bank loan announcement effect from different perspectives including event window (long-run 
performance) (Billett et al., 2006) and changes in financial markets (Fields et al., 2006). 
2.2.2.1 Different Event Window 
The short-run performance following a bank loan announcement has been extensively 
examined, but the long-term performance of borrowing firms following the announcement of 
a bank loan is relatively limited. Billett et al. (2006) initially re-examine the uniqueness of 
bank loans from a long-run perspective and find that over the three-year period following a 
loan announcement, borrowers from banks suffer significantly negative stock market returns 
similar to those experienced by seasoned equity offerings or public debt issuance. Therefore, 
Billett et al. (2006) conclude that loan announcements are misinterpreted by the market, not 
only in the magnitude of their effect on firm value but, in many cases, also the direction of the 
effect. Billett et al. (2006) also conclude that bank loans are not as “unique” as previously 
claimed. However, contrary to Billett et al. (2006), Le (2007) finds a long-term positive 
performance following bank loan announcements. 
2.2.2.2 Changes in Financial Market 
Numerous studies have shown that bank loan announcements produce positive abnormal 
returns for borrowing firms given no changes in the nature of banking environments and 
lending relationships. However, there are limited studies on the issue of whether many of the 
advantages associated with bank lending relationships still exist when there are changes in 
financial system since the 1990s in the U.S. Fields et al. (2006) use a sample of 1,111 loans 
for the period 1980-2003 and observe a significantly positive abnormal return for the entire 
24-year sample. However, when the authors divide their sample into three sub-periods, 1980-
1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2003, they find significantly positive abnormal returns associated 
with bank loan announcements have not only diminished but disappeared over time. Fields et 
al. (2006) argue that the value of bank loan relationships has been reduced by structural 
changes in the financial market.  
2.3 Direction of the Market Response to Bank Loan 
Announcements in Government-controlled Banking Systems 
Though a substantial amount of literature has enhanced our understanding of the direction of 
the market response to bank loan announcements in non-government-controlled banking 
systems, it is unclear how the market response to bank loan annoucements differs when banks 
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are owned or controlled by the state. There are few studies on the issue of market response to 
bank loan announcements in government-controlled banking systems. 
Despite the wave of privatization in 1980s and 1990s, La Porta et al. (2002) argue that 
government ownership of banks is still prevalent, in particular in countries with low levels of 
per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, 
and poor protection of property rights. Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2001), Barth, Caprio 
and Levine (2001, 2003, 2004), Berger, Hasan and Klapper (2004) and Sapienza (2002, 2004) 
argue that banks with a high degree of government ownership, especially banks owned by the 
state, may not be as efficient as privatized banks in lending behaviour since state-owned 
banks often pursue political objectives rather than profit and value maximization in their 
lending policies, which generally result in unfavourable economic consequences. Berger, 
Clarke, Cull, Klapper and Udell (2005) and Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007) find that a 
great extent of government ownership of banks is associated with high risk-taking, negative 
net present value projects, weak monitoring, and/or lack of aggressive collection procedures. 
These arguments indicate that the market may unfavourably react to loans issued by banks 
that are interfered with by government since government intervention inhibits banks from 
allocating their assets according to market criteria.  
To the best of our knowledge, only four studies have investigated the issue of market response 
to bank loan announcements in government-controlled banking systems. Three studies use 
Chinese data and one study uses Taiwanese data. Cui and Zhao (2004) employ the event study 
method to investigate the market response to bank loan announcements in the Chinese 
financial market. Consistent with studies conducted in the U.S., Canadian, the U.K., Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong and South Korea, Cui and Zhao (2004) find there is a 
significantly positive market reaction to bank loan announcements.  
One of the limitations in Cui and Zhao’s (2004) study is that only 53 bank loan 
announcements were in their study. The sample is relatively smaller and the observation 
period is relatively shorter than studies of other financial markets.  
Chen and Tsai (2006) investigate the information content of syndicated loan announcements 
in Taiwan and find that syndicated loan announcements add significantly positive value to 
borrowing firms. However, the sample is relatively smaller than Cui and Zhao’s (2004) study 
and studies of other financial market studies. Only 40 syndication bank loan announcements 
were included in Chen and Tsai’s (2006) study.  
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Shen et al. (2007) investigate the market response to bank loan announcements in the Chinese 
financial market and find a significantly negative reaction to bank loan announcements. 
However, the authors do not provide a reasonable explanation for their findings. In addition, 
unlike prior studies using two or three days as the event window, Shen et al. (2007) employ a 
longer (30 days) event window because they suggest that the Chinese financial market is not 
as efficient as others, which implies that the market response is relatively slow. 
Bailey et al. (2010) find that the borrowers’ stock value reacts negatively to a bank loan 
announcement in the Chinese financial markets. The authors reason that, in a government-
controlled banking system such as China, the lending activities of state owned or controlled 
banks are often driven by political considerations such as avoiding unemployment and social 
instability rather than economic considerations. This implies that state owned or controlled 
banks may have to lend to some bailed-out poorly performing firms for political reasons. 
Comparing to the conventional notion that approval of a bank loan signals a high-quality, 
creditworthy borrower, approval of a bank loan in Chinese financial market signals a poor-
performing firm which cannot obtain sufficient funds from operations and receives a bailout 
from the government-controlled banking system. Thus, the direction of the market response to 
bank loan announcements is hypothesized be negative in the Chinese financial market.  
Researchers who investigated the market response to bank loan announcements paid great 
attention to China’s banking system since it is a unique system in which to study bank loans 
in a government-controlled banking system.  
Chinese banking industry is dominated by state owned or controlled banks. Big Four state-
owned commercial banks account for 54% of China’s total bank assets and liabilities (Fu, 
2005). Figure 2.1 shows the Chinese banking industry in terms of assets at the end of 2004. 
Figure 2.1  The Chinese banking industry in terms of assets (at the end of 2004) 
 
Source: Fu (2005) 
 25 
In addition, Big Four are the only financial institutions that have branches in almost all 
locations in China and, by 2001, they accounted for nearly two thirds of loans outstanding and 
deposits in China (Boyreau-Debray & Wei, 2004). Although China created a number of new 
joint-stock banks after the mid-1980s, most of these banks are still controlled by different 
state-owned entities. For example, the Bank of Communication is controlled by the Ministry 
of Finance on behalf of the state. La Porta et al. (2002) reported that the government owned 
99.45% of the 10 largest commercial banks in China in 1995 (100% in 1970). This ownership 
level was one of the highest in their sample of 92 countries. The concentration ratio has fallen 
sharply since 1997 with the entrance of many non-state banks and financial intermediaries. 
However, at the end of 1997, Big Four bank concentration ratio was still near 91% 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2001). Minsheng Bank was the only private bank developed by 
the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce in 1996.  
With state ownership, the banking sector in China is politically interfered with by the 
government. Since the government pursues its own political interests, state owned or 
controlled banks tend to pursue some political objectives, which are, to a great extent, 
different from those of the private commercial banks and generally at the expense of bank 
profitability (Allen, Qian & Qian, 2008; Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny, 1996; Tian, 2001b, 
2004). When these political interests interfere with economic interests, the contracts of bank 
loans cannot function well (Tian, 2004). The banks have low efficiency in monitoring 
borrowers. Some inefficient borrowers, particularly SOEs are still supported by cheap bank 
credit to minimize unemployment and potential economic instability (Bailey et al., 2010; 
Brandt &Zhu, 2000; Dobson & Kashyap, 2006; Lardy, 1998). When inefficient borrowers are 
prevalent, bank loan announcements may generate negative market response (Bailey et al., 
2010).  
Past lending practices that were entirely based on political considerations have left Chinese 
banks with a large number of non-performing loans (NPLs) (Dobson & Kashyap, 2006; Tian, 
2004). Comparing China and other major Asian economies in recent years, Allen et al. (2008) 
show that the amount of NPLs is the highest in China and the profitability of China’s banking 
system is the lowest for the same group of countries. In order to resolve the NPLs, Chinese 
authorities decided to restructure state owned or controlled banks. In December 2003, the 
BOC and the CCB were selected as pilot banks for reform. The authorities announced the 
decision to recapitalize these two banks to strengthen their corporate governance structure and 
risk management, resolve NPLs, use reputable external auditors to assess the true financial 
position of the banks as well as enhance external oversight of the banks’ operations. 
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Following the financial restructuring, the CCB listed in Hong Kong in 2005, and the BOC 
listed in Hong Kong and Shanghai in 2006. In early 2005, the authorities approved the 
restructuring of the ICBC, the largest commercial bank in China following the same 
restructuring process of BOC and the CCB. The ICBC listed in Hong Kong and Shanghai in 
2006 (Podpiera, 2006). Following the public listing, the CCB, the BOC and the ICBC 
incorporated as joint stock companies, introduced new corporate governance structures, 
worked on changing risk management and internal organization, and brought in strategic 
investors (Podpiera, 2006).  
Beyond state-owned banks, reforms have also extended to state-controlled banks. For 
example, in 2005 and early 2006, foreign ownership participated in a number of state-
controlled banks such as Huaxia Bank, Bohai Bank, Guangdong Development Bank and Bank 
of Beijing (Podpiera, 2006). In addition, at the end of 2006, under a World Trade 
Organization agreement, the banking sector in China was opened to foreign banks. It is 
plausible that China’s banking system has improved by the reforms since 2005. The market 
response to bank loan announcements may differ from the results found in Bailey et al.’s 
(2010), Cui and Zhao’s (2004) and Shen et al.’s (2007) studies.  
2.4 Bank Characteristics  
In addition to the debate on the direction of market reactions to bank loan announcements, 
many studies have focused on factors that may influence the size of the market response to 
bank loan announcements. Previous studies suggest that the stock price response to bank loan 
announcements may be impacted by bank, borrower and loan characteristics.  
2.4.1 Bank Characteristics in Non-government-controlled Banking Systems  
Prior studies argue that banks have distinctive advantages over other lenders in monitoring 
borrowers in non-government-controlled banking systems (Diamond, 1984, 1991b; Hadlock 
& James, 2002; Leland & Pyle, 1977). However, the monitoring ability is different for 
individual banks because of their reputation, risk attitude, size and monitoring effort (Caprio, 
Laeven & Levine, 2007; Coleman, Esho & Sharpe, 2006; Heremans, 2007; Lee & Sharpe, 
2006, 2009; Rime, 2003). The effect of the market response to bank loan announcements is 
affected by different banks’ monitoring ability (Lee & Sharpe, 2006, 2009). Previous studies 
have used different measures to proxy for the monitoring ability of a bank since it is not 
directly observable. These measures include bank reputation/credit rating, bank size, bank 
monitoring effort and other bank monitoring ability characteristics.  
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2.4.1.1 Banks’ Reputation/Credit Rating 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) pay greater attention to reputation acquisition by banks 
instead of by borrowers. Unlike previous studies that assume an informational advantage of 
banks over other lenders, Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1994) model suggests that the 
comparative advantage of banks with respect to bondholders is their ability to acquire a 
reputation for financial flexibility10 when confronted with firms in financial distress. This 
financial flexibility enables banks to make the “right” renegotiation versus liquidation 
decisions when it is necessary to avoid inefficient liquidation (Berlin & Mester, 1992; Gorton 
& Kahn, 2000; Nakamura, 1989). In Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1994) model, banks are 
exogenously endowed with different abilities to identify true firm values. Hence, the authors 
label banks with greater evaluative abilities as “more reputable” and conclude that loan 
renewals from such banks deliver more favourable information relative to that from less 
reputable ones.   
Billett et al. (1995) and Lee and Sharpe (2006, 2009) provide empirical support to 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1994) proposition by revealing that lenders with a higher rating 
are likely to be associated with significantly higher abnormal returns to borrowers’ stock, 
even after controlling for borrower characteristics. This finding is confirmed by Thakor (1996) 
who shows that the positive impact of a lending announcement on the stock return of the 
borrower is greater when the lender faces more binding capital constraints. This is because 
lenders with capital constraints are inclined to ration credit more critically. Therefore, when 
such a lender grants loans, the equity market will react more positively.  
In contrast to Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1994) argument on banks’ financial flexibility, 
Gilson and Warner (1998) provide a different opinion by investigating contractual debt 
restrictions, bank monitoring and flexibility in the bank versus public debt choice. In Gilson 
and Warner’s (1998) sample of junk bonds11 where the funds pay bank debts, the authors find 
that the terms of the junk bonds are less restrictive than the bank borrowing they replace. 
Gilson and Warner’s (1998) cross-sectional analysis results show that firms grow most 
rapidly after the issue of junk bonds. These results indicate that junk debt appears to preserve 
financial flexibility by using fewer restrictions because junk bonds imply a higher probability 
of default. This is consistent with the argument that the greater constraints in bank loans can 
be value reducing. Renegotiating these restrictions can be costly if banks have monopoly 
                                               
10
 Financial flexibility is defined as a capital structure’s ability to support activities at low transaction and 
opportunity cost (Higgins, 1992)  
11
 Junk bonds are defined as any straight public debt issue with a Moody’s rating of Ba or below, or a Standard 
and Poor’s rating of BB or below (Gilson & Warner, 1998).  
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power over borrowers (Houston & James, 1996; Rajan, 1992). Therefore, Gilson and Warner 
(1998) conclude that bank debt may be inferior to public debt since it provides less financial 
flexibility.  
Boscaljon and Ho (2005) find that the excess returns for bank loan announcements before the 
Asian financial crisis are not significant, whereas the abnormal returns for bank loan 
announcements post the Asian financial crisis are significantly positive in the Asian financial 
markets (Hong Kong, Korea, Thailand and Taiwan). Boscaljon and Ho’s (2005) result further 
support Billett et al.’s (1995) who argue that commercial banks with higher quality convey 
more information to the market.  
In addition, Boscaljon and Ho (2005) find excess returns are largest in the healthier banking 
system of Hong Kong. Kang and Liu (2008) find that borrowing firms benefit when they 
borrow from banks with relatively lower risk in the Japanese market. These results are 
consistent with Billett et al.’s (1995) argument on the importance of lender quality.  
2.4.1.2 Banks’ Size 
Unlike prior studies that employ bank reputation/credit rating to proxy banks’ monitoring 
ability, Byers, Fraser and Shockley (1998) and Cook, Schellhorn and Spellman (2003) use 
lender size as a proxy for specialized expertise in the loan function. Both studies suggest that 
a larger bank is able to monitor more effectively since it has more specialized staff and/or 
better monitoring technology. Lee and Sharpe (2006, 2009) empirically support Byers et al.’s 
(1998) and Cook et al.’s (2003) argument by concluding that the borrowers’ stock price reacts 
more favourably to announcements of loans from larger banks. 
2.4.1.3 Banks’ Monitoring Effort 
Unlike previous studies that focus on the ex-post outputs (e.g. credit rating or bank size) of 
the lending process, Coleman et al. (2006) employ a novel, well-specified, ex-ante proxy for 
banks’ monitoring ability – banks’ monitoring effort based on the labour input into 
monitoring. Lee and Sharpe (2006, 2009) use Coleman et al.’s (2006) loan screening and 
monitoring proxy to investigate whether banks’ monitoring effort affects abnormal bank loan 
announcement returns for borrowing firms. Lee and Sharpe (2006, 2009) find that banks with 
superior monitoring ability add greater value to the borrowing firms than less capable banks.  
2.4.1.4 Other Banks’ Monitoring Ability Characteristics 
Boscaljon and Ho (2005) investigate the importance of the banking relationship by 
segregating the sample into local banks and international banks. The authors find that loans 
from local banks add more value than loans from international banks since local banks are 
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generally perceived as having advantages in monitoring the borrowers than international 
banks.  
2.4.2 Bank Characteristics in Government-controlled Banking Systems  
Since banks have low efficiency in monitoring borrowing firms in government-controlled 
banking systems (Berger et al., 2005; Iannotta et al., 2007), researchers pay more attention to 
the extent of intervention by the government in banks’ lending behaviour when investigating 
how bank characteristics affect the magnitude of bank loan announcement effect in 
government-controlled banking systems.  
Bailey et al. (2010) find that the negative effect of bank loan announcements is particularly 
significant when loans are granted by state owned or controlled banks especially Big Four 
state-owned banks or banks with lower ranking in China. The authors argue that political 
interference is stronger in state owned or controlled banks. In addition, lower ranking banks 
(local branches) suffer from greater pressure to issue loans to serve the political goals of local 
government than higher ranking banks (headquarters or main provincial branches). Gao et al. 
(2006) suggest that the market may also unfavourably react to bank loan announcements 
when the bank’s location is in a province with a lower marketization level in credit 
allocation12 in China. 
2.5 Borrower Characteristics  
In addition to bank characteristics, market reaction to corporate loans in prior studies appears 
to be associated with borrower characteristics.  
2.5.1 Borrower Characteristics in Non-government-controlled Banking 
Systems  
Studies that examine effects of borrower characteristics on the magnitude of bank loan 
announcements focus on borrower quality and borrower industry. 
2.5.1.1 Borrowers’ Quality 
Prior studies argue that the information content of bank loan announcements is more for 
borrowers with low quality than those with high quality in non-government-controlled 
banking systems since borrowers with high quality would not gain greater benefit from bank 
screening and monitoring services (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Diamond, 1991b; Slovin 
et al., 1992). However, there is no consensus criterion on borrower quality. Previous studies 
                                               
12
 The marketization level in credit allocation means the degree of intervention in allocating credit by 
government.   
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have used different measures to proxy for borrower quality including the borrowers’ 
information opaqueness, credit rating, financial status and their possibility of expropriation.  
2.5.1.1.1 Borrowers’ Information Opaqueness 
Large capitalization firms usually draw more attention from analysts and investors and 
therefore more information is produced for these firms to reduce information asymmetry 
(Arbel, Carvell & Strebel, 1983; Atiase, 1985). Atiase (1985) asserts that the expected 
percentage change in share price in response to a public announcement is a decreasing 
function of firm size.  
Slovin et al. (1992) find a significantly positive stock price reaction to both the initiation and 
renewal of bank loan announcements for small firms, but little evidence that bank credit 
arrangements convey new information for larger firms. The authors conclude that larger, more 
prestigious borrowers would not gain greater benefit from bank screening and monitoring 
services because large firms are more likely to be monitored than smaller and less visible 
borrowers. This conclusion is consistent with Cole, Wolken and Woodburn’s (1996), 
Diamond’s (1991b) and Fama’s (1985) argument that larger firms already operate under the 
scrutiny of numerous external monitors, such as analysts, bond rating agencies and the 
financial press.  
A number of studies employ different data from Canada (Aintablian & Roberts, 2000; André 
et al., 2001), and the U.K. (Armitage, 1995b), and generally find that loan announcements 
transmit more information for smaller firms relative to larger ones since the market has less 
information about the former. However, Koh (2001) finds that only large firms experience a 
significantly positive market response to loan announcements in the New Zealand financial 
market. 
2.5.1.1.2 Borrowers’ Credit Rating 
Besides the borrowers’ size, the borrowers’ credit rating may also influence the loan 
announcement (James, 1987). For example, Diamond (1991b) shows that firms with a high 
credit rating (as evidenced by an established reputation) use directly placed debt (e.g. 
debenture and commercial paper), whereas medium/low-rated firms use bank financing. The 
reason is that the bank’s monitoring is of no value when the credit rating of the firm is high 
since the associated moral hazard in such firms is valueless. However, for firms with a lower 
credit rating, the monitoring service of banks can provide screening functions and incentives 
if the moral hazard is pervasive. Thus, Diamond (1991b) suggests that the choice of 
borrowing from banks with monitoring implies that the borrower is building up his or her 
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credit history gradually in order to acquire reputation through time. This action is favourable 
news to the market in an assessment of a firm’s future prospects. 
Rajan (1992) shows that both the benefits and costs of choosing an ex-post informed lender 
such as a bank are relatively insignificant for high quality firms in a competitive capital 
market. Therefore, the author concludes that firms with a high credit rating are not sensitive to 
the choice between bank credit and arm’s length public debt. This implies that the decisions to 
borrow from either private or public debt among high quality companies may lead to a limited 
stock price reaction from the market. The contrary scenario applies to lower quality firms, 
with a significant effect of ex-post monitoring.  
Denis and Mihov (2003) empirically support Diamond’s (1991b) and Rajan’s (1992) 
argument by showing that firms with a high credit quality are more apt to borrow from public 
sources. Conversely, firms with no established credit ranking are more likely to choose bank 
debt. Using the firm’s existing mix of debt claims as the control variables, Denis and Mihov 
(2003) find that highest ratings are public debt borrowers, followed by bank debt borrowers 
and the quality of credit rating is lowest for private debt borrowers. On the other hand, 
Aintablian and Roberts (2000) find that borrower’s credit rating has a negative effect on the 
magnitude of share price response to loan announcements in the Canadian financial market.  
2.5.1.1.3 Borrowers’ Financial Status  
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argue that a valued reputation enhances a private market 
lender’s ability to make credible commitments to act in good faith when a borrower 
experiences financial problems. In addition, the authors suggest that bank loans would be 
renegotiated more often than publicly traded debt in times of financial distress since banks 
spend more resources to evaluate firms that encounter financial problems than holders with 
other kinds of debt. The authors conclude that firms confronting a greater likelihood of 
financial distress prefer to borrow from banks despite higher interest rates, whereas firms 
characterized by a low level of financial distress borrow from the public (non-bank sources) at 
a lower cost. Bolton and Freixas (2000) argue that firms choose bank debt mainly because of 
banks’ financial flexibility in helping them through times of financial distress. Hence, riskier 
firms prefer bank loans rather than publicly traded debt in equilibrium.  
Brown et al. (1993) find that firms re-value upward when private lenders offer equity and re-
value downward when public debt-holders offer equity. This finding verifies the earlier 
argument that private lenders’ willingness to restructure transmits a signal of the firm’s bright 
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prospects since they are better informed than public lenders with regard to a firm’s 
continuation value.  
Contrary to Brown et al.’s (1993) argument that there is no hold-out problem among public 
debt-holders, James (1996) argues that the hold-out problem should be more serious for firms 
that have more publicly traded debt since such debt is prone to be more widely held, 
compared with private debt such as bank debt. Based on this reasoning, James (1996) claims 
that bank and other private lender participation in the restructuring process, such as bank 
concessions, can mitigate adverse selection problems. James (1996) therefore suggests that 
private lenders play an important role in facilitating out-of-court debt restructuring for firms 
in financial distress. The author concludes that it is more likely that a bank suffers from 
impairment when financial distress occurs in the borrowing firm if it holds a higher stake of 
the total debt of that firm. Thus, the bank has a stronger motivation to take part in 
restructuring. This argument is consistent with Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1994) and Bolton 
and Freixas’ (2000) assumption that riskier firms with a higher possibility in financial distress 
prefer bank debt.  
James (1996) argues that it is more likely for bank debt forgiveness via exchange offers with 
the composition of public debt when the debt structure of the distressed companies involves 
banks loans. In contrast to James’ (1996) argument, Franks and Sussman (2005) show that 
when companies are distressed, banks almost never forgive or scale down principal payments 
even though forcing bankruptcy may result in larger losses. The authors regard this 
contradiction as being due to the differences in bankruptcy laws between the U.K. and the U.S. 
Franks and Sussman (2005) argue that although banks make very limited concessions, they 
cannot be characterised as “lazy” monitors. Because nearly all of the firms’ assets are pledged 
as collateral to the bank in the U.K., banks tend to liquidate collateral at a price close to the 
face value of the secured claim in timing bankruptcy decisions. 
2.5.1.1.4 Borrowers’ Possibility of Expropriation Problem 
Recently, several studies propose that the expropriation problems of borrowers may impact on 
the market response to corporate loan announcements (Bailey et al., 2010; Deng & Wang, 
2006; Khanna, 2000; Wei & Wan, 2007). These studies argue that insiders can expropriate 
outsiders through diverting valuable resources out of the firms. Johnson et al. (2000) use the 
term “tunnelling” to describe this diversion or transfer. The authors further suggest that 
insiders can take a variety of tunnelling channels including outright theft or fraud; paying 
excessive executive compensation to themselves when they hold positions in the company; 
paying special dividends to themselves; exploiting business relationships between the firm 
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and other entities wholly under their control through transfer pricing, such as selling assets, 
goods, or services to themselves or other companies; through self-dealing transactions at 
values below the prevailing market prices; and subsidising personal loans or guaranteeing 
other affiliated entities using the firm’s assets as collateral.  
Tunnelling can also take more subtle legal forms such as dilution of minority shareholders by 
issuing additional shares at a preferential price or a merger transaction between affiliated 
companies to siphon resources from the target or bidder. These tunnelling channels do not 
break any law, but exert the same influence as theft on minority shareholders and creditors 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000a). Johnson, Boone, Breach and 
Friedman (2000) also describe a means of expropriation by illustrating with alleged incidents 
of stealing in the Asian financial crisis. The authors propose that transferring assets out of a 
company with outside shareholders to repay personal debt, raising funds to prop up another 
affiliated firm with different shareholders, or even diverting cash into personal accounts 
abroad are common in emerging markets where management is also the controlling 
shareholders and, hence, such transfers are more frequent. 
Since insiders in a listed company may misuse funds from corporate loans to pursue their 
private benefit, a firm with a higher possibility of expropriation obtaining funds from a 
corporate loan may convey a negative signal.  
However, there are limited empirical studies directly investigating the relationship between 
the borrowers’ possibility of expropriation and the magnitude of the bank loan announcement 
effect in non-government-controlled banking systems. Mathieu et al. (2006) provide indirect 
evidence by examining the impact of one of the expropriation-reduction mechanisms – a 
firm’s leadership structure on its ability to generate value from loans. Mathieu et al. (2006) 
reveal that there is a significantly positive market response for firms organised in a low-
expropriation-cost separating CEO-Chair structure, but not for firms who are organised in a 
high-expropriation-cost combined CEO-Chair structure. This finding implies that the 
separation of CEO and Chair of board responsibilities between two people is more effective 
with respect to the use of loans. This conclusion is further confirmed by the fact that the 
observed market response for firms with a separate CEO-Chair structure is also greater when 
controlling the presence of other monitoring mechanisms (the presence of outside directors on 
the board and institutional shareholders) and the efficiency of the board (the size of the board). 
In addition, the authors show that the positive market response is eminent for firms with no 
institutional shareholders, where bank debt ownership and institution equity ownership have 
similar effect on alleviating expropriation problems.   
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2.5.1.2 Borrowers’ Industry 
Brumm (1996) suggests that the exchange and industry to which a borrowing firm belongs are 
import characteristics that can affect the magnitude of the bank loan announcement effect.  
2.5.2 Borrower Characteristics in Government-controlled Banking Systems  
Studies that investigate how borrower characteristics affect the magnitude of the bank loan 
announcement effect in government-controlled banking systems also focus on borrower 
quality and borrower industry.   
2.5.2.1 Borrowers’ Quality 
The discussions on borrowers’ quality in government-controlled banking systems also include 
borrowers’ information opaqueness, their financial status and their possibility of expropriation. 
2.5.2.1.1 Borrowers’ Information Opaqueness 
Cui and Zhao (2004) find that the significantly positive bank loan announcement effect is 
particularly strong for small borrowing firms in the Chinese financial market. Chen and Tsai 
(2006) find that the positive effect of syndicated loan announcements is particularly 
significant for small borrowing firms in the Taiwanese financial market. Bailey et al. (2010) 
show that the negative effect of bank loan announcements is particularly significant for 
smaller borrowing firms in the Chinese financial market. These results are consistent with 
Aintablian and Roberts’ (2000), Diamond’s (1991b), Fama’s (1985) and Slovin et al.’s (1992) 
argument that large firms typically have less information opaqueness and hence a smaller 
information content in bank loan announcements.  
2.5.2.1.2 Borrowers’ Financial Status  
Chen and Tsai (2006) empirically support Bolton and Freixas’ (2000), Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri’s (1994) and James’ (1996) findings by revealing in the Taiwanese financial 
market13 that the positive effect of syndicated loan announcements is greater for borrowing 
firms with a higher possibility of financial distress.  
Bailey et al. (2010) find that there is no significant response for firms in financial distress. 
The authors argue that firms in financial distress may have been propped up by the Chinese 
government and hence there is little informational value in additional bank loan 
announcements.  
 
                                               
13
 Chen and Tsai (2006) use fixed assets to total assets and debt ratio proxy for the possibility of financial 
distress.  
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2.5.2.1.3 Borrowers’ Possibility of Expropriation Problem 
Shen et al. (2007) find that abnormal returns are higher for borrowing firms with higher free 
cash flow. This result implies that bank debt can reduce the free cash flow used by managers 
for their private benefit and hence mitigate the agency cost.  
Bailey et al. (2010) investigate the impact of the borrowers’ expropriation problem on the 
magnitude of the bank loan announcement effect in the Chinese financial market by 
employing some novel variables to proxy for the borrowers’ expropriation problem. The 
authors argue that the banking system is directly involved in tunnelling by internally 
controlling shareholders as the concentration of ownership. Thus, Bailey et al. (2010) expect 
that the negative effect of bank loan announcements is particularly significant for firms that 
suffer from frequent expropriation/tunnelling. After segregating the bank loan announcement 
effect based on the proxies for the expropriation problem, the authors find that the negative 
effect of a bank loan announcement is particularly significant for firms with a higher 
possibility of expropriation. This finding supports their hypothesis that the banking system 
has been involved in tunnelling by internal controlling shareholders.  
In addition, both Bailey et al. (2010) and Shen et al. (2007) show that the negative effect of 
bank loan announcements is particularly significant for borrowing firms that are controlled by 
the state. Both studies argue that borrowing firms with relatively high state ownership may be 
subject to non-maximizing goals.  
Bailey et al. (2010) and Shen et al. (2007) shed light on the relationship between borrowers’ 
expropriation problem and the market response to bank loan announcements in the Chinese 
financial market. However, both studies employ some specific actions of expropriation or the 
firm performance as a proxy for the likelihood of expropriation and do not discuss the root of 
expropriation problems and relevant expropriation-reduction mechanisms.  
The Chinese financial market is seen as potentially prone to substantial expropriation-related 
problems between insiders and outside investors for the following reasons. 
First, the ownership in Chinese publicly listed firms tends to be highly concentrated rather 
than diversified (CCGR, 2003; Fan et al., 2005, 2007; Lu & Yao, 2006). CCGR (2003) 
reported that the largest shareholder of a publicly listed company owns, on average, 44.26% 
of the company’s shares. In addition, in over 40% of cases the largest shareholders have more 
than 50% of their company’s shares and firms with the top five shareholders owning more 
than 50% of their company’s shares include 74.4% of all the companies’ shares.  
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Second, the ongoing corporatisation and listing of many large SOEs reveal listed firms in 
China have an interesting and unique ownership mix. The majority of Chinese listed firms 
have been transformed from state-owned, collective, and private enterprises through 
restructuring (Leung, Liu, Shen, Taback & Wang, 2002; Wang, 2005; Xu & Wang, 1997, 
1999). In the restructuring process, the state and legal persons essentially transformed part of 
the assets into non-tradable shares of the listed companies (Lau, Qian & Roland, 2000; Leung 
et al., 2002; Xu & Wang, 1997, 1999). The original enterprise became a holding company that 
coexists with the listed company through a parallel or pyramid structure (CCGR, 2003; Fan et 
al., 2007; Xu & Wang, 1997, 1999).  
The ownership of most Chinese listed firms is highly concentrated with successive layers of 
holding companies through parallel or pyramid structures, which results in divergence 
between the voting rights and the cash-flow rights of controlling shareholders (Fan et al., 
2005, 2007; Lu & Yao, 2006). As the divergence between cash-flow rights and control 
(voting) rights increases, controlling shareholders have incentives (small cash-flow rights) and 
the ability (sufficient voting rights) to abuse their power and expropriate the firm’s wealth by 
seeking their private benefit at the expense of minority shareholders and creditors (Barca & 
Becht, 2001; Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999).  
A number of researchers have provided empirical evidence for the incidence of expropriation 
of controlling shareholders in China from different perspectives. Controlling shareholders are 
likely to expropriate minority shareholders and creditors through direct fund appropriation 
(Bailey et al., 2010; Deng & Wang, 2006; Wei & Wan, 2007), related-party transaction 
(Cheung, Rau & Stouraitis, 2006; Jian & Wong, 2003; Yu, 2004), earning management (Ding 
et al., 2007; Jian & Wong, 2003; Liu & Lu, 2003), dividend policy (Chen et al., 2008; Yu, 
2004) and direct asset appropriation (Gao et al., 2006; Gao & Kling, 2008; Tian, 2004; Wei & 
Wan, 2007). The minority of outside tradable shareholders and creditors tend to become free 
riders and play an extremely weak role in corporate governance. This promotes insider 
controlling behaviours (Ho, 2003). Furthermore, Hess, Gunaskarage and Hovey (2008) and 
Tian (2001a) find that ownership concentration has a negative impact on the firm’s 
performance. This finding implies that the expropriation of minority shareholders by large 
shareholders exists in China.  
The expropriation problem is likely to be more serious in firms in which the controlling 
shareholder is the state or state-related institutions. This is because the state may pursue some 
multiple and often conflicting social objectives such as social welfare and employment 
protection. These objectives are often different from profit maximization (Bai, Liu, Lu, Song 
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& Zhang, 2004; Chang & Wong, 2004; Cheung, Jing, Rau & Stouraitis, 2005; Wei, Xie & 
Zhang, 2005). In addition, some state agencies may be beneficial for expropriated state 
companies (Goriaev & Sonin, 2004). 
Furthermore, expropriation-reduction mechanisms in Chinese listed firms are in form rather 
than in substance. For example, over 70% of the directors are appointed by the state and legal 
person shareholders (Cheung et al., 2005, Ho, 2003), and over half are appointed by the 
controlling shareholder in proportion to their shareholding (Ho, 2003). There are very few 
representatives of individual or outside shareholders elected as directors at the shareholders’ 
assembly (Kato & Long, 2006; Wang & Deng, 2006; Xu & Wang, 1997, 1999). After 
restructuring, board members and managers are almost exclusively insiders (Tian & Estrin, 
2008; Xu & Wang, 1997, 1999). The expropriation problem by insiders may not be alleviated 
by existing ownership structure arrangements and corporate governance mechanisms.  
2.5.2.2 Borrowers’ Industry  
There is limited evidence on how the borrowers’ industry affects the market reaction to bank 
loan announcements in government-controlled banking systems. Bailey et al.’s (2010) study 
shows the negative effect is stronger for firms that belong to heavy industry, suggesting that 
the stock market does not like firms in “rust belt” trouble in the Chinese financial market.  
2.6 Loan Characteristics  
Apart from the investigation of bank and borrower characteristics, a number of researchers 
have shed light on loan characteristics i.e., whether the features of loans influence the 
borrowers’ share price response to bank loan announcements.  
2.6.1 Loan Characteristics in Non-government-controlled Banking Systems  
Studies that examine effects of loan characteristics on the magnitude of bank loan 
announcements in non-government-controlled banking systems focus on loan characteristics 
in loan contracts that can be complementary monitoring mechanisms by banks. These 
characteristics include the types of loan, loan size, loan maturity, covenants/collateral and 
loan purposes. 
2.6.1.1 Types of Loans 
2.6.1.1.1 Types of Loans—Initiations versus Renewals 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) investigate whether banks add value by accessing additional 
information over other capital market-participants at the outset of a loan or whether this 
uniqueness emerges as a result of the ongoing banking relationship. The authors document an 
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insignificant market response to bank loan announcements in the case of initiation. In addition, 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) further find that revised credit agreements are on more 
favourable terms than term loans, which consist of favourable terms or unfavourable terms14. 
Based on their results, Lummer and McConnell (1989) infer that bank loan announcements 
are competitively informative only after they have established a lending relationship with 
firms that enabled them to acquire private information, not at the initial credit appraisal stage. 
Lummer and McConnell’s (1989) findings strongly support Fama’s (1985) renewal 
hypothesis. Brumm (1996), Fields et al. (2006), Le (2007), Lee and Sharpe (2006, 2009) and 
Preece and Mullineaux (1994) provide further confirmatory evidence for this continuing 
deposit relationship theory.  
Contrary to Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Preece and Mullineaux (1994), some studies 
(Best & Zhang, 1993; Billett et al., 1995; Brumm, 1996; Slovin et al., 1992) reject the 
hypothesis that announcement effects differ between new and revised loan agreements since 
there are positive stock price response reactions for both types of announcement. However, 
their arguments are based on certain conditions. Slovin et al. (1992) clarify that both loan 
initiations and renewals generate positive abnormal returns, but only for small firms, not large 
firms. Best and Zhang (1993), Billett et al. (1995) and Brumm (1996) also report significantly 
positive abnormal returns for both new and renewed loans. However, neither study have 
found a statistically significant difference in the reactions to initiations versus renewals once 
they controlled for differences in other borrower and lender characteristics, such as the 
precision of analysts’ forecasts and the credit quality of lenders.  
James and Smith (2000) carry out a comprehensive review of the past and recent research on 
the special nature of bank loan financing. The authors argue that the findings in Best and 
Zhang (1993), Billett et al. (1995) and Slovin et al. (1992) are inconsistent with Lummer and 
McConnell’s (1989) findings because the differentiation between initiations and renewals in 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) is ambiguous. In addition, many borrowers already have an 
ongoing relationship through an existing loan agreement or unused loan contract with the 
bank despite new loans in the initiations category. 
In terms of evidence from other non-government-controlled banking systems except the U.S., 
Aintablian and Roberts (2000), André et al. (2001) and Mathieu et al. (2006) find that both 
                                               
14
 Lummer and McConnell (1989) divide loan announcements into new loan announcements, favourable 
renewals and unfavourable renewals. The authors claimed that there are four criteria that determine whether loan 
renewals are favourable or unfavourable including: (1) time until maturity, (2) relative interest rate, (3) the dollar 
amount, and (4) protective debt covenants. Favourable loan term revisions include a lengthening of the maturity, 
a reduction in the interest rate of restrictive covenants, and an increase in denomination.     
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new loans and renewals produce significantly positive responses although the average 
abnormal return for new loans is less significant than renewals in the Canadian financial 
market. In addition, in the renewal category, Aintablian and Roberts (2000) and André et al. 
(2001) find a significantly positive response to favourable renewals but a non-significantly 
negative abnormal return to unfavourable renewals. However, André et al. (2001) did not 
identify unfavourable renewals from revised loans. Boscaljon and Ho (2005) also find that the 
average excess return for both loan initiations and renewals is significantly positive in some 
Asian markets. Boscaljon and Ho (2005) also find significantly positive abnormal returns 
associated with favourable and mixed renewals but significantly negative excess return to 
unfavourable ones.  
Armitage’s (1995b) study shows no significant response to announcements of new loans for 
U.K. borrowing firms. With regard to loan revisions, Armitage (1995b) finds that there is a 
small positive response to increases in the existing facilities and announcements of positive 
news but there is no significant response to negative and mixed news. 
Fery et al. (2003) find that only loan announcements published in the financial press elicit 
significantly positive market response, but loan announcements that are not published lead to 
an insignificant response in the Australian financial market. This finding is consistent with 
Lummer and McConnell’s (1989) argument that both borrowers and lenders are more likely to 
announce favourably revised loans rather than unfavourably revised loans. Therefore, studies 
that use only publicly available announcements may suffer from “loan reporting bias”. 
2.6.1.1.2 Types of Loans—Syndicate Loans versus Non-syndicate Loans 
Preece and Mullineaux (1996) investigate two additional aspects of bank loans: contractual 
flexibility and syndicate size. The authors postulate that the capacity to renegotiate a bank 
loan relatively inexpensively in corporate restructuring should complement monitoring as a 
source of value to borrowers. Consequently, as the number of lenders increased in a syndicate, 
contracting costs rise and the capacity to renegotiate declines. This is because, as the 
syndicate size increases, the contractual flexibility inherent in debt contracts (compared with 
loans by a single lender) declines due to potential hold-out problems in the process of 
renegotiation (Gorton & Kahn, 2000). In addition, as Petersen and Rajan (1994) point out, the 
concentration of borrowing is regarded as good news. Preece and Mullineaux (1996) therefore 
hypothesise that the market reaction to loan announcements is a declining function of the 
number of lending banks and find support in their testing. Brumm (1996) and Le (2007) 
confirms Preece and Mullineaux’s (1996) findings where the market views non-syndicated 
loans favourably. 
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However, Rajan (1992) argues that the information acquired by a single bank can lead to an 
“information monopoly” or hold-up problem, which makes it costly for the borrower to 
switch lenders. Houston and James (1996) test Rajan’s (1992) model and find that firms 
borrowing from multiple banks undertake more investment opportunities than firms that rely 
on a single bank for their financing needs because, in the latter case, these firms do not have 
incentives to invest in new projects given that the bank uses its monopoly information to 
capture most of the profits. Therefore, multiple bank lending or syndicated loans, similar to 
public debt, could enhance contractual flexibility and limit hold-up problems, which showed a 
statistically positive relationship between the borrowers’ abnormal returns and syndicate size. 
This finding supports Rajan’s (1992) claim. In addition, Fields et al. (2006) and Lee and 
Sharpe (2006, 2009) suggest that the syndicate size has no influence on the abnormal returns 
of bank loan announcements.  
With respect to evidence from other financial markets except the U.S., Aintablian and Roberts 
(2000), André et al. (2001) and Mathieu et al. (2006) find that syndicated loans in Canada 
result in lower excess returns than non-syndicated loans. Fery et al. (2003) also find that a 
single lender provides a positive abnormal excess return for published agreements, but 
multiple lenders for published announcements and all other non-published announcements 
produce insignificant effects in the Australian financial market. However, Koh’s (2001) study 
in the New Zealand financial market shows that syndicated loans show significantly positive 
abnormal returns but the abnormal returns for non-syndicated loans are insignificant. 
2.6.1.2 Loan Size 
Based on previous research, there are at least four factors to consider in the private/public 
debt choice. These are: (1) flotation costs such as issue costs; (2) leverage-related costs such 
as contracting costs, and bankruptcy costs and agency costs of debt; (3) liquidity of debt in 
secondary markets; and (4) resolution of information asymmetry (Easterwood & Kadapakkam, 
1991). By examining the effect of transaction costs and leverage-related costs on the choice of 
debt, Easterwood and Kadapakkam (1991) argue that it is more likely for firms with small 
debts to raise funds in private markets. The reason is that flotation costs are relatively larger 
and yield reduction relatively smaller when firms issue public offerings. By comparison, 
larger firms, with their larger issue sizes, save on transactions costs (the large “fixed” cost 
portion being spread over a larger issue size), and tend to lean on public debt more than 
medium-sized firms. This results in a mismatch of debt size in light of private or public debt 
which transmits adverse information to the capital market. Easterwood and Kadapakkam 
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(1991) suggest that the monitoring, regulation or information asymmetry may be important to 
a firm’s debt placement decision, but they do not directly test these propositions. 
Krishnaswami et al. (1999) find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that smaller debt size 
relies more on private debt than public debt. Their findings also indicate that firms with larger 
issues exploit the economy of scale in the flotation costs of public loans. Lummer and 
McConnell’s (1989) study shows no significant difference in the excess returns between large 
and small size announced loans. However, Lummer and McConnell’s (1989) result reveals 
that the borrowing firms’ announcement returns are positively associated with the size of the 
loans. Kang and Liu (2008) show that, in the Japanese financial market, the positive effect of 
bank loan announcements is more pronounced the larger the loan size. However, Koh (2001) 
finds that, in the New Zealand financial market, both large and small loans exhibit an 
insignificant response.  
2.6.1.3 Loan Maturity 
Loan maturity is another common loan characteristic in a loan contract that has an impact on 
the expected magnitude of the announcement abnormal return. Many researchers (Diamond, 
1991a, 1993; Flannery, 1986; Kale & Noe, 1990; Robbins & Schatzberg, 1986) propose that a 
more positive reaction to loan debt announcements occurs in response to a shorter maturity 
since longer-maturity loans are subject to greater interest-rate risk exposure over the loan 
period and may have a higher risk premium of principal repayment default. Current issuance 
of short-term debt reveals that the firm will take the uncertainty due to the floating rate in the 
refinancing process (Flannery, 1986), On the other hand, current issuance of long bonds may, 
to a large degree, lead to elimination or postponement of the uncertainty resulting from the 
fixed financing rate. 
Considering the effect of asymmetric information on the debt maturity decision, Diamond 
(1991a, 1993) and Flannery (1986) conclude that firms may prefer short-maturity debt even 
though liquidation or refinancing are costly because those costs may serve as a credible signal 
of favourable insider information about the firm’s superior prospect, which should result in a 
positive share price response to the issuance of new debt. Kale and Noe (1990) and Robbins 
and Schatzberg (1986) confirm this by finding that the better quality firms tend to adopt short-
term debt to transmit their optimistic assessment of loan quality to an asymmetrically 
informed market. 
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Another justification for the effect of loan maturity is that bank loans have considerably 
shorter maturity compared with private or public debt15. Because of the short term nature of 
bank loans (Aintablian & Roberts, 2000; Fama, 1985; James, 1987), firms are required to roll 
them over frequently. It is the repeated refinancing transactions with the borrowers that make 
banks continuously re-evaluate the borrowing companies, thereby strengthening the banks’ 
unique ability to assess inside information and monitor the loans effectively (James, 1987; 
James & Smith, 2000; Rajan, 1992;).  
Contrary to Diamond’s (1991a, 1993), Flannery’s (1986), and Kale and Noe’s (1990) 
argument, Brumm (1996) finds that the market response to loans with a maturity of one year 
or less is insignificant whereas loans with maturities longer than one year show significantly 
positive excess returns. 
2.6.1.4 Covenant and Collateral 
Rajan and Winton (1995) focus on two other features of loan contracts –covenants and 
collateral – and their effect on the lenders’ ex post monitoring incentives. 
2.6.1.4.1 Covenant 
Rajan and Winton (1995) define loan covenants as “clauses in a loan contract that require the 
borrower to take or refrain from various actions” (Rajan & Winton, 1995, p. 1113). The 
authors argue that some shareholders, including investors, trade creditors, employees and the 
government, are able to free ride on the bank’s monitoring mechanism if the banking 
relationship already exists. This monitoring externality discouraged banks from seeking and 
making use of extra information. Thus, if bank monitoring is socially beneficial, then long-
term debt with covenants may be preferred to covenant-free short-term debt as long as the 
covenants relied on information that is not available to the public for free use16. This is 
because the effective use of covenants forces the lender to do some monitoring. The authors 
conclude that the presence of debt covenants increases the bank’s incentive to monitor by 
increasing the sensitivity of a lender’s return to information or by decreasing the bank’s 
payoff if it does not monitor. 
Park (2000) also argues that more restrictive covenants can serve as a commitment 
mechanism for firms by maximizing the lenders’ incentives to monitor. Such monitoring 
activity reduces the borrower’s information asymmetry since a well-structured covenant 
                                               
15
 James (1987) documented that the longest bank loan is 12 years, less than the median maturity of privately or 
publicly placed debt.  
16
 Although covenants restricted the ability of the bank to act, the bank would not be able to act at all unless it 
acquired adequate information to show that the covenants have been violated (Rajan & Winton, 1995). 
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enables lenders to detect a borrower’s opportunistic behaviour and to punish it either by 
liquidation or through renegotiation. 
Several researchers argue that covenants on private debt (particularly for bank loans) are more 
restrictive than those on public debt to maintain the financial ratios at a certain minimum level 
(James & Smith, 2000; Park, 2000; Rajan & Winton, 1995). This argument may have partial 
explanatory power from previous findings, where the market response to bank loan 
announcements is positive; however, the response to public debt issues is not significantly 
positive or negative. More recently, Demiroglu and James (2007) find that there is a larger 
stock price reaction to the announcement of bank loans associated with restrictive covenants. 
This finding supports the argument that restrictive covenants convey favourable private 
information. 
Franks and Sussman (2005) find that U.K. banks typically respond to distress with an attempt 
to rescue the firm rather than automatically liquidate it. This implies that bank lenders are 
tougher than other creditors (such as trade creditors and bondholders) in their bargaining 
power with distressed firms. This evidence is consistent with arguments in U.S. studies 
(James & Smith, 2000, Park, 2000; Rajan & Winton, 1995). That is, compared with other 
suppliers, banks impose more restrictive covenants in the event of borrowers’ financial 
distress. 
2.6.1.4.2 Collateral 
Collateral is another loan characteristic that has been given considerable attention (Berger & 
Udell, 1990; Bester, 1985; Rajan & Winton, 1995). Rajan and Winton (1995) propose the 
importance of collateral in a model with moral hazard, monitoring and pre-contract 
asymmetric information. In Rajan and Winton’s (1995) model, a bank’s ability to claim 
additional collateral if the firms are distressed may improve the bank’s ex ante incentives to 
monitor. Moreover, Rajan and Winton (1995) argue that the existence of collateral provides a 
degree of protection not only to the lenders, but also to other outside creditors since, by 
demanding additional collateral, lenders would indirectly “sound the alarm bell” and induce 
efficient liquidation that would not otherwise have taken place.  
James and Smith (2000) further conjecture that collateralised bank debt is typically short term 
and improves a bank’s ability to monitor informational-intensive loans. Thus, by securing a 
loan, banks ensure their senior position, which effectively increases their return in the debt 
payoff structure. This, in turn, increases their incentive to monitor. Therefore, the authors 
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argue, bank loans are more often, typically secured with collateral relative to other private 
placements. 
However, Carey et al.’s (1998) finding show that commercial finance companies specialising 
in asset-based lending (collateralized lending) tend to monitor the collateral more closely than 
do commercial banks. 
2.6.1.5 Loan Purpose 
James (1987) argues that loan purpose is also a common loan characteristic that theoretically 
has an impact on the expected magnitude of the bank loan announcement effect. However, 
James (1987) empirically finds no significant difference in the share price reaction to bank 
loan announcements based on loan purpose. Contrary to James (1987), both James and Wier 
(1988) and Slovin et al. (1992) report significantly positive abnormal returns for loans for 
general corporate purpose. Lee and Sharpe (2006, 2009) and Slovin et al. (1992) find that 
loans used to refinance existing debt add significant value to borrowers. The inconsistent 
results could be due to the different criteria in classifying loan purpose. For example, James 
(1987) and James and Wier (1988) classify refinancing debt and repayment of bank loans as 
two separate categories while Slovin et al. (1992) combine the two categories into one group 
as repayment debt. 
With respect to evidence from other financial markets, Koh (2001) reports significant 
abnormal returns for loans for stand-alone projects but a non-significant response for loans for 
general corporate, fund acquisition and debt refinancing purposes in the New Zealand 
financial market. In some Asian markets, Boscaljon and Ho (2005) report significant 
abnormal returns for loans for capital expenditure, for no specific purpose, or for repayment 
of bank debt, but a non-significant response for loans for general corporate and restructuring 
purposes.  
2.6.2 Loan Characteristics in Government-controlled Banking Systems  
Since the bank monitoring function is not efficient in government-controlled banking systems, 
loan characteristics in loan contracts that can act as complementary monitoring functions by 
banks draw little attention from researchers. The discussions related to the effects of loan 
characteristics on the magnitude of bank loan announcements are restricted to some features 
including types of loan, loan maturity and loan purpose.  
Cui and Zhao (2004) find that both new loans and loan renewals can elicit a significantly 
positive reaction, but the positive effect of bank loan announcements is pronounced for loan 
renewals in the Chinese financial market. This result is similar to that of Aintablian and 
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Roberts (2000), Billett et al. (1995), Boscaljon and Ho (2005) and Slovin et al. (1992), but 
fails to confirm Armitage’s (1995b), Fama’s (1985) and Lummer and McConnell’s (1989) 
argument that only renewal loans can generate a significantly positive response. 
Chen and Tsai (2006) find that there is a decreasing function between the effect of syndicated 
loan announcements and the number of lenders in the Taiwanese financial market. This 
finding supports Aintablian and Roberts’ (2000), Fery et al.’s (2003) Gorton and Kahn’s 
(2000) and Preece and Mullineaux’s (1996) findings.  
In terms of loan maturity, Bailey et al. (2010) discover that in the Chinese financial market 
the negative effect of a bank loan announcement is particularly significant for loans with 
shorter maturity. This finding is inconsistent with Diamond’s (1991a, 1993), Fama’s (1985) 
and Flannery’s (1986) argument that the market reacts favourably to shorter-term loans. 
Bailey et al. (2010) explains that many Chinese listed firms use short-term loans to fund long-
term assets.  
For loan purpose, Chen and Tsai (2006) argue there are significant abnormal returns for loans 
for the purposes of capital expenditure but a non-significant response for loans for refinancing 
debt, purchasing facilities, stand-alone projects and other purposes in the Taiwanese financial 
market. Bailey et al. (2010) find that the negative effect of a bank loan announcement is 
particularly significant for loans used to repay old loans in the Chinese financial market. 
These findings contrast with Boscaljon and Ho’s (2005), Lee and Sharpe’s (2006, 2009) and 
Slovin et al.’s (1992) finding that the stock market reacts favourably to loans used to 
refinance existing debt.  
2.7 Chapter Summary  
In summary, the literature in general concludes that: (1) banks have the ability to access inside 
information about borrowing firms that is not available to other investors; (2) the market 
response to bank loan announcements, conducted primarily in non-government-controlled 
banking systems with little political influence ,such as the U.S., Canadian, the U.K., Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong and South Korea, are generally consistent, that is, 
borrowing firms enjoy positive excess returns to their securities around the announcement 
date of their bank loans; and (3) the magnitude of the bank loan announcement effect varies 
according to different bank, borrower  and loan characteristics.  
However, some studies question the robustness of the information content conveyed by bank 
loan announcements in a government-controlled banking system. For example, Bailey et al. 
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(2010) and Shen et al. (2007) find that bank loan announcements display negative abnormal 
returns in one of the government-controlled banking systems, the Chinese financial market. 
Bailey et al. (2010) explain that the dominant (albeit declining) share of state owned or 
controlled Chinese banks in total lending and continuing political intervention result in too 
many negative net present value policy loans to support less-profitable firms to avoid 
unemployment and social instability.  
Except for some typical borrower characteristics, some researchers (Bailey et al., 2010; 
Mathieu et al., 2006; Shen et al., 2007) propose that a series of new borrower characteristics, 
including borrowers’ expropriation problem and relevant expropriation-reduction mechanisms, 
may affect the magnitude of the bank loan announcement effect. 
The empirical findings of previous studies on stock price responses (abnormal returns) to 
bank loan announcements are summarised in Appendix A. Appendix B summarises the 
discussion of prior research results on bank loan announcement effects.  
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    Chapter 3 
Hypothesis Development and Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the hypothesis development and the research methodology. Section 3.2 
presents the testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data collection procedure and the 
sample selection criteria employed. Section 3.4 describes the statistical methodology 
employed.  
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
As discussed previously, bank loan announcements are considered positive signals that yield 
positive abnormal returns for the borrowers’ stock (Aintablian & Roberts, 2000; Boscaljon & 
Ho, 2005; Chen & Tsai, 2006; Fields et al., 2006; James, 1987). However, bank loan 
announcements may transmit negative information if the banks have to lend to weak firms to 
avert unemployment and social instability in a government-controlled banking system such as 
in China (Bailey et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2007). The following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between bank loan announcements and abnormal 
returns.  
The size of bank loan announcement effect may differ, depending on the bank, borrower and 
loan characteristics (Aintablian & Roberts, 2000; Bailey et al., 2010; Lummer & McConnell, 
1989; Slovin et al., 1992). This study also investigates the relationships between size effects 
and characteristics of the bank, borrower and loan.  
In terms of bank characteristics, the positive signal value of bank loan announcements should 
be particularly pronounced if the loan is issued by banks other than Big Four state banks, 
private banks, banks with higher ranking, and banks in provinces with higher marketization 
level in credit allocation. This is because the financial conditions of the banks other than Big 
Four state banks or private banks are healthier and they lend on a commercial basis. In 
addition, the headquarters or main provincial branches of banks or those in provinces with 
higher marketization level in credit allocation are able to avoid excessive intervention by local 
government (Bailey et al., 2010; Dobson & Kashyap, 2006; Shen et al., 2007). For example, 
local government prefers to minimise the impact on employment rather than repay 
government-owned creditors.  
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In contrast, Big Four banks, state owned or controlled banks, local branches of banks, and 
banks in provinces with lower marketization level in credit allocation are routinely under 
significant pressure by government to supply “policy loans”. Therefore, loans from such 
banks convey particularly strong negative signals in the market, and the following hypothesis 
is proposed: 
H2: The negative effect of a bank loan announcement is particularly significant for 
loans from Big Four state banks, state owned or controlled banks, lower ranking banks 
and banks in provinces with lower marketization level in credit allocation. 
Borrower characteristics may explain cross-sectional differences in bank loan announcement 
effects. Prior studies argue that the positive effect of a bank loan announcement is particularly 
strong for problematic borrowing firms including firms that are opaque, have a higher 
possibility of expropriation or tunnelling, have ineffective expropriation-reduction 
mechanisms, are controlled by the state and are in financial distress (Bailey et al., 2010; 
Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994; Diamond, 1991b; Slovin et al., 1992).  
However, bank loan announcements may convey negative information if bank loans are used 
to prop up troubled firms for non-commercial reasons and will be more pronounced for 
problematic borrowing firms. The following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: The negative effect of a bank loan announcement is particularly significant for 
problematic borrowing firms. 
Similarly, features of loans may influence the market response to bank loan announcements. 
According to previous studies (Diamond, 1991a; Krishnaswami et al., 1999; Preece & 
Mullineaux, 1996; Rajan & Winton, 1995), most loan characteristics, such as loan size, loan 
term, loan contract with or without covenant/collateral, and loan syndication, marginally 
influence the size of the announcement effect, but have no influence on the sign of the 
announcement effect.  
In banking markets where bank loans are driven purely by commercial objectives, the positive 
signal value of bank loan announcements should be significant if the loans are large, short 
term, have covenant/collateral, and less syndication (Diamond, 1991a; Krishnaswami et al., 
1999; Preece & Mullineaux, 1996; Rajan & Winton, 1995). In a government-controlled 
banking system in which non-commercial motivations are common, the negative effect of 
bank loan announcements should be particularly prominent if the loans have the 
aforementioned characteristics. The following hypothesis is proposed: 
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H4: The negative effect of a bank loan announcement is particularly significant for 
loans with greater amount, shorter term, with covenant/collateral, and less syndication. 
In addition, Bailey et al. (2010) propose that the loan purpose may affect the magnitude of the 
bank loan announcement effect. Thus the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H5: There is a significant difference in market response to bank loan announcements 
among different bank loan purposes. 
Brumm (1996) and Koh (2001) suggest that the industry in which a borrowing firm belongs 
may affect the magnitude of bank loan announcement effect. Thus, the following hypothesis 
is proposed: 
H6: There is a significant difference in market response to bank loan announcements 
among different industries.  
3.3 Data Collection and Sample Selection 
This study sampled all bank loan announcements from companies listed in the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) between 1996 and 2009. 
The decision to choose 1996 as the starting year is due to the availability of data. The share-
split reform started in 2005 which affected the stock price of listed Chinese companies 
considerably. In order to avoid the influence of the share-split reform, this study divides the 
sample period into two sub-samples, namely, 1996 to 2004 and 2005-2009.  
The three sources of information employed in this study are： 
1. China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database17. This database was 
used to collect most of the data including the bank loan announcement information such 
as the announcement date, the stock code and name of the borrower, the lender, the loan 
type, the loan term, any covenant or collateral, loan size and loan interest; stock market 
trading information such as the daily individual returns and the daily market returns; 
borrower information such as shareholder information, corporate governance information 
and accounting data.  
                                               
17
 The CSMAR database was designed by the China Accounting and Finance Research Centre of the Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University and developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Company. It covers data on 
the Chinese stock market and financial statements for China’s listed companies since their Initial Public 
Offerings (IPO).  
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2. China Financial Newspaper Database18. This database was used to verify the accuracy of 
the bank loan announcement sample and compensate for missing announcements. In 
addition, this database was used to search whether there were other corporate events, such 
as financial reporting, mergers and acquisitions, CEO turnovers and lawsuits in the event 
window. This database was also used to collect the annual reports of listed companies.  
3. The marketization index in credit allocation for China’s provinces was obtained from Fan 
and Wang (2001) and Fan, Wang and Zhu (2002, 2004, 2007, 2009).  
3.3.1 Bank Loan Announcements 
The sample of bank loan announcements was collected from the CSMAR® China Listed 
Firms’ Bank Loans Research Database. In order to verify the accuracy of the sample, we 
manually matched the sample from CSMAR to the China Financial Newspaper Database and 
added the missing announcements disclosed in the newspaper but not listed in the CSMAR 
database.  
The study excluded announcements that do not concern the actual bank loans. The disclosure 
of loan proceedings includes all the information relating to the bank loans. Some listed 
companies apply for bank loans, but no contracts have been signed between the company and 
the bank (Bailey et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2007). This study focuses only on bank loans that 
actually took place, that is, bank loan announcements with contracts. Thus, announcements 
that were not “actual bank loans” were deleted. 
In addition, this study discarded the “credit agreement” announcements. Bailey et al. (2010, 
p.17) define the “credit agreement” as “the ceiling on loans may extend to a particular 
company over a period of time but are not actual loan offers for potential investment projects 
or other use of funds”. The authors argue that credit agreements may be extended to all 
companies and therefore may be considered as a very weak loan “pre-qualification” 
containing less information than an actual bank loan announcement. Bailey et al. (2010) find 
that credit agreement effects are much weaker than those of bank loans announcements. Thus, 
this study omitted 786 such announcements.  
To minimise the effect of confounding events, this study eliminated “contaminated 
announcements” (Bailey et al., 2010; Lummer & McConnel, 1989) that accompanied bank 
loan announcements with other corporate events, such as mergers and acquisitions, CEO 
                                               
18
 The China Financial newspaper database was designed by Shenzhen Genius Information Technology Co., Ltd 
under direction of the China’s Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). It covers all the officially-designated 
newspapers (China Securities Journal, Shanghai Securities News, Security Daily, China Daily, Financial News, 
and China Reform Daily) for corporate disclosure.   
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turnovers, other type of concurrent financing arrangements and lawsuits within the event 
window of the loan announcements. Furthermore, for the sample period 2005 to 2009, this 
study excluded announcements with share-split reform during the estimation window and 
event window to avoid the influence of the share-split reform.  
In addition, this study considered only firms that were traded on the SHSE and the SZSE A-
shares19 exchanges. The study includes only the A-share price when the borrowing firms 
issued both A-shares and B-shares20. It also excludes firms that do not issue A- shares; 
otherwise, we would have had to use the share price of the foreign investors, but such market 
values are not comparable. 
Finally, this study eliminated observations with missing borrower returns in the estimation of 
the event period, yielding a final sample of 501 bank loan announcements for the period 1996 
to 2004 and 106 bank loan announcements for the period 2005 to 2009.  
Sorting bank loan announcements by bank, borrower and loan characteristics can lead to a 
substantial decrease in the sample size. This is because not all of the components of the bank 
loan announcement are reported. This study can not divide all the bank loan announcements 
by loan characteristics since loan characteristics are not unitary, that is, a bank loan 
announcement can include a number of loans from the same bank. Similarly, if a bank loan 
announcement includes a number of loans from different banks, we divide the bank loan 
announcement by borrower characteristics.  
3.3.2 Daily Stock Return and Market Return 
The daily individual stock return and daily A-shares market return were collected from 
CSMAR® China Stock Market Trading Database. These returns were based on adjusted 
closing daily prices21 and have been adjusted for cash dividend reinvestment. In addition, the 
                                               
19
 A-shares are also known as “Renminbi (RMB)-denominated ordinary shares”. They are ordinary shares issued 
by Chinese companies listed and traded in RMB. They are restricted to domestic investors who are either 
enterprises or organizations or persons in the PRC (excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao). 
20
 B-shares are domestically listed foreign investment shares. B-shares are issued in the form of registered shares 
and carry a par value denominated in RMB, to be subscribed for and traded in foreign currencies in either the 
Shanghai or the Shenzhen stock exchanges. The targeted investors are limited to foreign natural persons, legal 
persons and other organizations, including those domiciled in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and PRC citizens 
living in foreign countries and other investors as stipulated by the CSRC. At present, B-shares investors are 
mainly institutional investors. The B-share market is separated from the A-share market, with SHSE B-shares 
denominated in US dollars and SZSE B-shares in Hong Kong dollars. 
21
 Due to rights offerings, share splits, new issues and asset restructuring, the closing prices that are announced 
by the stock exchange undergo certain “adjustments” and are not readily comparable. Therefore, the closing 
stock prices in CSMAR are adjusted to a comparable closing price by using the first trading day’s price as the 
base price.   
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daily market returns were based on the total-value-weighted portfolio consisting of all the A-
shares traded on the SHSE and the SZSE.  
3.4 Research Methodology 
The research methodology in this study has two components. First, the event study 
methodology was used to investigate the borrowers’ stock price reaction to bank loan 
announcements. Following this, the study used the abnormal bank loan announcement return 
as the dependent variable in a multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis to explain the 
market response to bank loans announcements.  
3.4.1 Event Study Methodology 
In order to measure the share price response to bank loan announcements, this study employs 
the event study method. Event studies are generally used to evaluate the wealth effects of a 
special event through its influence on the stock price or the market valuation of a firm (Brown 
& Warner, 1980, 1985; Kothari & Warner, 2007; MacKinlay, 1997). This influence can be in 
the stock price, return variances, trading volume, operating (accounting) performance and 
earnings management via discretionary accruals (Kothari & Warner, 2007). This study 
concentrates only on the stock price effect. Following the seminal article by Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll (1969), the fundamental approach is to compare the actual returns during the 
event period with the returns that one would have normally expected to observe to examine 
whether there are any abnormal or excess returns associated with the announcement of an 
exogenous shock.  
Previous studies in the event study, such as Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) and Dodd and 
Warner (1983), are on the assumption that all the information or announcements were entirely 
unexpected by the market. In a related vein of recent literature, a number of researchers such 
as Acharya (1988, 1993), Eckbo, Maksimovic and Williams (1990), Li and McNally (2003), 
and Prabhala (1997) claim that some corporate decisions are partially predictable. In this case, 
the stock price reaction to the event would be decided by the unexpected part of the 
announcements. This leads to an alternative, namely, the conditional event-study method, 
which considers the possible endogeneity of announcements in the presence of private 
information. The non-conditional event-study method is generally called the traditional or 
standard event-study method (MacKinlay, 1997; Prabhala, 1997). In spite of the criticism of 
the traditional event-study method, no empirical analyses have investigated the effect of 
corporate loan announcements on the value of the firm. All existing studies on this issue have 
adopted the conventional event study methodology (Aintablian & Roberts, 2000; Armitage, 
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1995b; Fery et al., 2003). Furthermore, Prabhala (1997) underlines the robustness of the 
traditional event-study method by showing that it can perform as well as the conditional 
event-study method. In a survey of more than 500 papers published from 1974 to 2000, 
Kothari and Warner (2007) assert that the event study method appears to be well-specified 
and effective in analysing short-horizon events of less than one year.   
This study employs the traditional event study method to measure the effects of bank loan 
announcements on the share price. The procedures follow. 
3.4.1.1 Defining the Estimation Window 
In general, the estimation period in daily event studies ranges from 100 to 300 days (Peterson, 
1989). Based on previous studies, Armitage (1995a) concludes that an estimation period of 
100 days or more is appropriate. The estimation window in this study comprises 120 trading 
days from the period beginning 150 days before the event date (day 0) and ending 31 days 
before the event date (day −150 to day −31). We allow the estimation window to end 30 days 
before the event date in this study because the estimation period and the event period were 
chosen to avoid overlap so that the parameters of the model are not influenced by the event 
(MacKinlay, 1997; Peterson, 1989).  
3.4.1.2 Defining the Event Window 
Generally, it is difficult to know with complete certainty if the selected announcement date is 
indeed the correct date since some companies may promulgate an announcement one day and 
the financial news may report this information the following day. Thus, the event period may 
cover a few days surrounding the announcement including at least the announcement date 
itself and the day after the announcement (MacKinlay, 1997; Peterson, 1989). In addition, the 
event window may be defined as slightly longer than the specific period of interest including 
the periods before and after the announcement. In this way, researchers can correct any 
attenuation bias (information leakage) that has taken place before announcements or/and any 
market reaction that takes place gradually due to the announcements (MacKinlay, 1997). 
However, it is worth noting that a longer period does not imply better results since the test for 
significance of the event study can be decreased by lengthening the event window (Brown & 
Warner, 1985).  
In practice, most event studies adopt lengths of the event period ranging from 21 (day −10 to 
day 10) to 121 days (day − 60 to day 60) (Peterson, 1989). The literature documents event 
windows ranging from a one-day event period to a relatively longer period of 41 days. Most 
U.S. studies tested only a one-day event period ([−1, 0] or [0, 1]) (Best & Zhang, 1993; James, 
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1987; Lummer & McConnell, 1989; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986). With regard to a longer 
event window, Armitage (1995b) employs a 41-day event window, comprising 20-pre-event 
days, the event day, and 20 post-event days, to investigate possible information leakage 
before the announcement and any gradual response after the announcement. Preece and 
Mullineaux (1996) apply a relatively longer prior period [−11, −2] to detect any information 
leakage.  
This study took “Day 0” to be the date on which the announcement appears in the media. The 
study defined 21 days [−10, 10] as the event window following the method of Armitage 
(1995b) with some changes for the Chinese capital market. These changes include the period 
before the announcement date since a lot of information may have been divulged before the 
firms formally release the information (Shen et al., 2007). Employing slightly longer periods 
after announcements allows for the handling of the slower dissemination of information for 
less visible and infrequently traded stocks. The event windows in this study were generally 
wider than those in the U.S. studies. This is because the Chinese market is not as efficient as 
the U.S. market, which may result in a slower reaction to information in the Chinese capital 
market (Shen et al., 2007)22. 
3.4.1.3 Choosing the Model and Estimating Parameters 
The market model is most commonly used to generate expected returns since no better 
alternatives have been found (Armitage, 1995a, MacKinlay, 1997). In addition, most event 
studies employed the market model. This study followed the standard market model approach 
and employs ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to estimate the model parameters.   
The market model is given as follows:  
jtmtjtjtjt RR εβα ++=                                                         (1) 
Where: jtR is the observed rate of return on firm j on day t, jtα  is the intercept of firm j on 
day t, jtβ is the systematic risk of firm j on day t, mtR is the return on the market portfolio on 
day t, jtε is the error term of firm j on day t. 
3.4.1.4 Measuring and Analysing the Abnormal Return 
The abnormal return for each day of the event window was calculated using the following 
equation:  
mtjtjtjtjtjt RRAR βαε −−==                                                  (2) 
                                               
22
 Fery et al. (2003) also argue that a 3-day window in the Australian market is not as efficient as the U.S. market. 
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Where: jtAR  or jtε  is the abnormal return on firm j on day t; jtR  is the observed rate of return 
on firm j on day t; jtα and jtβ  are estimated parameters of the market model over the 120-day 
estimation period of 150 to 31 days before the event day; and mtR  is the return on the market 
portfolio on day t. 
The estimated abnormal returns need to be standardised to reflect the statistical error in the 
determination of expected returns before testing whether they are statistically significant 
(James, 1987; Mikkelson & Partch, 1986; Peterson, 1989). The standardised abnormal return 
for firm i on a day t within the event-window was calculated as follows: 
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Where: ieS  is the standard deviation of the abnormal returns for firm i over N periods within 
the estimation periods; 2iV is the residual variance of firm i’s market model regression; N is 
the number of days in the period used to estimate the market model (i.e., N = 120); mtR  is the 
market return in the event period; miR  is the market return in the estimation period and mR  is 
the mean market return over the estimation period.  
A standardised abnormal return for a firm j on a day t within the event-window ( jtSAR ) was 
calculated by dividing the abnormal returns for day t with the event-window by the standard 
deviation of the abnormal returns for the abnormal returns for the estimation period. The 
calculation is given as follows:    
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SAR =                                                             (4) 
Where: jtAR  is obtained from equation (2) and ieS  is obtained from equation (3).  
In order to draw the overall inferences for bank loan announcements of interest, the study 
aggregates the standardised abnormal return observations (MacKinlay, 1997). The 
aggregation includes cross-sectional and time-series aggregation. The cross-sectional 
aggregation examines whether the cross-sectional distribution of returns at the time of an 
event is abnormal (i.e., systematically different from predicted). Typically, it is interesting to 
test whether the mean abnormal return at time t is equal to zero. The time-series aggregation 
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establishes whether the average abnormal returns for any interval in the event window are 
equal to zero.   
For a sample of N bank loan announcements, the average standardised abnormal return ( tSAR ) 
for period t was calculated as follows: 
∑
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1
                                                      (5) 
Given the assumption that individual abnormal returns are cross-sectionally independent and 
normally distributed, the t-statistics can be computed as follows: 
)( tSARNT =                                                      (6) 
Where: N is the number of bank loan announcements. 
Under the null hypothesis of no announcement effect, the standardised cumulative abnormal 
returns are distributed asymptotically N (0, 1) and the mean standardised cumulative 
abnormal return is distributed N (0, N/1 ): H0: 0=tSAR  
The cumulative average standardised abnormal return over any multi-period interval during 
the period of interest was calculated as follows: 
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Where: ),( 21 ttCSAR  is the cumulative average standardised abnormal return which starts at 
time t1 to time t2. 
In order to confirm the robustness of the parametric tests, this study follows Aintablian and 
Roberts’ (2000) and Bailey et al.’s (2010) framework to perform the nonparametric sign test 
and Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Following Bailey et al. (2010), the sign test categorises data into binary outcomes with a null 
hypothesis that the percentage of negative tSAR  ( ),( 21 ttCSAR ) is equal to the percentage of 
positive tSAR  ( CSAR ). The alterative hypothesis is that the percentage of negative tSAR  
( CSAR ) is greater than the percentage of positive tSAR  ( ),( 21 ttCSAR ). 
Following Aintablian and Roberts (2000) and Bailey et al. (2010), the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test tests the information of magnitudes with the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
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between the negative and positive tSAR  ( ),( 21 ttCSAR ).The alternative hypothesis is that there 
is a difference between the two populations. The corresponding test statistic is:  
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Where: +T  is the sum of the ranks for positive abnormal returns. 
If the abnormal returns are centred at 0, i.e., 0H  is true, then +T  is approximately a normal 
random variable with mean (
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(Kvanli, Guynes & Pavur, 2002). 
3.4.2 Multivariate Cross-sectional Analysis Model 
This study also conducts a cross-sectional regression analysis by employing ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions to explain the stock response to bank loan announcements. The 
OLS regression model uses t-statistics calculated from heteroscedastic corrected standard 
error (White, 1980) and was estimated as follows: 
itLOANBORROWERBANKttCAR εβββα ++++= )()()(),( 32121                   (9) 
The dependent variable ),( 21 ttCAR  is the cumulative abnormal return which starts at time t1 to 
time t2. The independent variables are the proxies for bank, borrower and loan characteristics.  
3.4.2.1 Measurement of Bank Characteristics 
This study divides banks into two categories: Big Four state-owned banks (BIG4_BANK), 
equals one, and zero otherwise (Bailey et al., 2010). According to bank ownership, this study 
divided banks into two categories: state-owned/controlled banks and private banks. Except for 
China Minsheng Bank and foreign banks, the other commercial banks fall into the state-
owned/controlled bank category. This study employed a dummy variable with a value of one 
if the lender is one of the state owned or controlled banks (BANK_OWNERSHIP), and zero 
otherwise (Bailey et al., 2010). In terms of bank ranking, this study assumes that the ranking 
of local branches is lower than that of headquarters or provincial branches. The study employs 
a dummy variable with a value of one if a loan is issued by a bank’s local branches below the 
provincial level (BANK_RANKING), and zero otherwise (Bailey et al., 2010). In addition, 
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the marketization index in credit allocation for China’s provinces23 from Fan and Wang (2001) 
and Fan et al. (2002, 2004, 2007 & 2009) is used to divide banks according to their location 
(BANK_LOCATION). The study employs a dummy variable with a value of one if the bank 
in the province with the lower marketization level in credit allocation. 
3.4.2.2 Measurement of Borrower Characteristics 
To identify borrower characteristics, this study measures the information opaqueness, the 
possibility of expropriation or tunnelling, the expropriation-reduction mechanisms and the 
financial situation. 
3.4.2.2.1 Measurement of Information Opaqueness 
Following Slovin et al. (1992), firm size (BORROWER_SIZE) (the natural logarithm of total 
assets) is employed as a proxy measure of the level of information opaqueness. It is expected 
that information opaqueness will be more pronounced in smaller firms. This study classifies 
sample firms as small if the natural logarithm of total assets is less than the median natural 
logarithm of total assets of all the listed firms in the relevant year and large if greater than 
median value.  
3.4.2.2.2 The Possibility of Expropriation/Tunnelling 
In order to measure the possibility of expropriation or tunnelling, this study first identifies the 
ultimate controlling shareholders. This study uses the ownership structure chain to identify 
the controlling shareholder. Since the regulation for the disclosure of the ownership structure 
chain in China was not in effect until 2001, we follow Fan et al. (2005, 2007) to trace the 
ownership information to the IPO year based on the ownership information disclosed in 2001. 
If there is no change in the ownership structure, we may conclude that the ultimate controlling 
shareholder remains the same since the IPO. If there is any change in the ownership structure, 
we identify the ultimate controlling shareholder in the IPO year from the IPO prospectus, 
media reports and the websites of the company and its affiliated companies. 
The controlling shareholder can expropriate outsiders through diverting valuable resources 
out of the firms. Previous studies attempt to measure the expropriation problem or tunnelling 
using different proxies for the degree of expropriation. For example, Claessens, Djankov, Fan 
and Lang (2002), Faccio and Lang (2002), and La Porta et al. (1999) propose that the 
divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights is the root of the expropriation 
problem. Thus, the deviation of cash flow from control rights can be a proxy for the 
                                               
23
 According to Fan, Wang and Zhang (2000), while having achieved great progress in its market-oriented 
institutional transformation and economic development, China has been suffering significantly and with growing 
problem of regional disparity. The purpose of employing the marketization index in credit allocation for China’s 
provinces is to examine the magnitude of local government intervention in banks located in different provinces. 
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likelihood of expropriation. The greater divergence in voting and cash-flow rights of 
controlling shareholders, the more likely they are to expropriate minority shareholders. 
A second strand of literature uses the value/performance of a firm (market-to-book ratios or 
Tobin’s Q) as a proxy for the likelihood of expropriation (Claessens et al., 2002; Joh, 2003; 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2002; Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Lins, 2003; 
Mitton, 2002). For example, using a Southeast Asian sample, Claessens et al. (2002) find that 
market-to-book ratios are negatively related to the divergence between cash-flow and control 
rights. This implies that ex ante firms are more likely to expropriate traded at a lower 
valuation. 
A third vein of literature uses the specific action of expropriation as a proxy for the likelihood 
of expropriation. For example, studies examine expropriation problems from a related-party 
transaction perspective (Cheung et al., 2006; Jian & Wong, 2003), from a dividend 
perspective (Chen et al., 2008; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003), and from earning management 
(Ding et al., 2007; Jian & Wong, 2003; Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003; Liu & Lu, 2003). 
Atanasov, Black and Ciccotello (2008) divide actions of expropriation into three broad groups: 
cash flow, asset, and equity tunnelling and present a model how each type of tunnelling 
affects share prices and financial metrics. The authors conclude that the different ways taken 
by insiders to expropriate outsiders on share price and financial metrics can be measured by 
gross margin, operating margin, return on asset (ROA), Tobin’s Q and P/E ratio.  
This study uses three alternative measures as proxies for the possibility of expropriation or 
tunnelling. These various measures involve different proof of the existence of expropriation 
for the purpose of furnishing a robust and comprehensive investigation into the level of 
expropriation for outside investors in Chinese listed firms. The three measures are divided 
into two categories. The first category concerns the roots of the expropriation problem (the 
degree of divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights); the second category 
focuses on the effect of expropriation on share price and financial metrics. 
I. The Divergence between Cash-flow Rights and Control Rights (DCC) 
Previous studies (Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999) show 
that the greater the divergence in voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate controlling 
shareholders, the more likely they are to expropriate minority shareholders and creditors. The 
size of cash-flow rights and voting rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder is identified 
by La Porta et al. (1999), and explored further by Claessens et al. (2000), Claessens et al. 
(2002), Faccio and Lang (2002) and Faccio, Lang and Young (2001). These authors propose 
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that the definition of control takes only voting rights into account whereas the definition of 
ownership is based on cash-flow rights. They define the difference between voting and cash-
flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder as the percentage of votes controlled by the 
firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder minus the percentage of cash-flow rights owned by the 
firm’s ultimate controlling shareholder. According to Claessens et al.’s (2002) and Faccio et 
al.’s (2001) studies, the fraction of cash flow rights owned by the ultimate controlling 
shareholder is defined as the fraction of cash flow rights held by the ultimate controlling 
shareholder multiplied by the fraction of shares owned in each firm in the ownership chain. 
For example, if an investor owns 30% of the shares of Company A, which in turn owns 20% 
of the shares of Company B, which in turn owns 10% of the shares of Company C, the 
investor would end up with 0.6% (30%×20%×10%) of the ownership (cash-flow) rights of 
Company C but 10% of its control rights. In this case, the difference between voting rights 
and cash-flow rights for the investor is 9.4% (10%－0.6%). If there are several chains of 
ownership between a shareholder and the firm, this study adopts the sum of control rights 
across these chains following Claessens et al.’s (2002), Faccio and Lang’s (2002) and La 
Porta et al.’s (1999) methods. 
II. The Effect of the Expropriation Problem 
According to Atanasov et al. (2008), the expropriation of creditors is categorised as cash flow 
tunnelling, and affects the firm’s operating margin, ROA and Tobin’s Q. In addition, 
Claessens et al. (2002), La Porta et al. (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003) and Mitton (2002) 
suggest that a measure of firm performance (Market-to-book ratio or Tobin’s Q) can be a 
proxy for the level of the expropriation problem since expropriation by the majority 
shareholder is detrimental to the firm’s value.  
This study used the firm’s ROA and Tobin’s Q to proxy for the level of the expropriation 
problem. ROA is defined as after tax profits divided by the book value of total assets. Tobin’s 
Q is measured as the market value of equity and debts over the replacement value of net fixed 
assets and inventory. Tobin’s Q can be calculated as:  
RVAI
BVCABVCLBVINVBVLTDBVPSMVCSQTobins −++++=’         (10) 
Where: MVCS  is the market value of the firm’s common stock shares, BVPS  is the book 
value of the firm’s preferred stocks, BVLTD  is the book value of the firm’s long-term debt, 
BVINV  is the book value of the firm’s inventories, BVCL  is the book value of the firm’s 
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current liabilities, BVCA  is the book value of the firm’s current assets, and RVAI  is the 
replacement value of net fixed assets and inventory.  
Because the replacement value of net fixed assets and inventory is unavailable for Chinese 
firms, this study uses the book value of total assets as a proxy following Bai et al.’s (2004), 
Chung and Pruitt’s (1994), Gunasekarage, Hess and Hu’s (2007) and Wei et al.’s (2005) 
methods. In addition, since no preferred stock exists in China, the above formula reduces to:  
BVTA
BVCABVCLBVINVBVLTDMVCSQTobins −+++=’             (11) 
Where: BVTA  is the book value of the firm’s total assets.  
Tobin’s Q is a market-based measurement for firm performance. However, a large proportion 
of shares of Chinese listed firms cannot be traded and do not have market value. There is no 
consensus about how to calculate the total market value of firms with a substantial percentage 
of non-tradable shares. Bai et al. (2004) suggest using the price of the tradable shares as a 
proxy for the price of the non-tradable shares which results in overstatement of the market 
valuation of the firm since non-tradable shares should have a lower price than the tradable 
ones. Chen and Xiong (2002) find that the non-tradable state-owned shares and legal-person 
shares in China have an average illiquidity discount of between 70 and 80% when they are 
traded in the informal markets. Therefore, Bai et al. (2004) adjust the measurement of Tobin’s 
Q to take into account of illiquidity discounts of 70 to 80% in the Chinese market. The 
authors suggest these discounted measures may better reflect the market valuation of China’s 
listed firms. This study follows Bai et al.’s (2004) modification to define two valuation 
measures: using a 70% and an 80% discount for non-tradable shares. We multiply the number 
of tradable shares by the market price, and then add the number of non-tradable shares 
discounted by 30 and 20% of the market share price respectively to obtain the value of equity 
in the Tobin’s Q formula denoted by Tq_70 and Tq_80, respectively. For example, Tq_70 
was calculated as:  
BVTA
BVCABVCLBVINVBVLTDMPNTRAMPTRATq −++++= %30***70_
     (12) 
Where: TRA  is the number of tradable shares; MP  is the market share price; and NTRA  is 
the number of non-tradable shares. 
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III. Measurement of Expropriation-reduction Mechanisms 
Apart from the root and the impacts of the expropriation problem, several researchers 
examine this issue from the agency-reduction mechanism perspective (Agrawal & Knoeber, 
1996; Ang, Cole & Lin, 2000; Fama, 1980; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Singh & Davidson III, 
2003). The authors argue that some effective mechanisms could improve firm performance by 
mitigating the expropriation problem. The first category concerns ownership-related 
arrangements. The second category focuses on corporate governance mechanism related 
arrangements. 
i Ownership-related Arrangements 
Theoretical and empirical studies show that block shareholders, insider/managerial ownership 
and institutional ownership have positive impacts on corporate governance (Agrawal & 
Knoeber, 1996; Ang et al., 2000; Jensen & Mecking, 1976; Singh & Davidson III, 2003). For 
example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Yafeh and Yosha (2003) 
argue that block ownership provides a watchdog or efficient monitoring role over board and 
managerial decision-making to maximise the value of their shareholding and lower agency 
costs between managers and shareholders. Ang et al. (2000), Jensen (1993), Jensen and 
Mecking (1976), Singh and Davidson III (2003) and Yermack, (1996) assert that larger 
insider ownership (sometimes referred to as managerial ownership or board ownership) helps 
to control the agency problem by closely aligning the incentives and interests of managers 
with those of outside shareholders. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Brickley, Lease and Smith 
(1988) and Pound (1988) hold that institutional ownership (by banks, insurance companies, 
mutual funds, brokerage houses, endowments/foundations, nonbank trusts, investment 
counsel firms, miscellaneous financial services and unidentified institutions) is an effective 
mechanism to facilitate the alignment of insiders’ and outsiders’ interests. 
However, every ownership-related arrangement has a critical role in corporate governance 
because of the different level of ownership concentration. For example, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) summarise that, as ownership concentration exceeds a certain threshold, the large 
shareholders get nearly full control over the corporation and are wealthy enough to use firms 
to pursue their private benefits. Such private benefits cannot be shared by small shareholders 
and the benefits may be at the expense of minority shareholders. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2000b) suggest the argument of insiders varies from country to country 
because of different ownership structures. The role of insiders is played by the managers in 
countries with dispersed ownership structures, but the controlling shareholders are the insiders 
when ownership is highly concentrated since most mangers in these firms are appointed or 
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controlled by the controlling shareholders. In such situations, insider ownership is not a 
mechanism that is able to alleviate expropriation of all shareholders by managers of the firms 
but as a mechanism to reinforce expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders. Berle (1959) and Pound (1988) hold that institutional shareholders may be 
ineffective monitors because they have little time or resources to devote to active monitoring 
beyond that of underperforming firms in which they have large equity stakes.  
There are two effects of high ownership concentration: (1) the alignment effect (higher cash-
flow rights, and higher alignment), and (2) the entrenchment effect (lower cash-flow rights, 
and higher entrenchment at a lower cost). Increasing ownership concentration from a low 
level addresses the free-rider problem among shareholders so that the alignment effect 
dominates the entrenchment effect. However, a further increase in ownership concentration 
beyond a certain level reduces the constraint on tunnelling from other shareholders so that the 
entrenchment effect dominates the alignment effect (Faccio & Lang, 2002; Laeven & Levine, 
2008).  
Recent studies propose that the power balance in complex ownership structures with multiple 
large shareholders (the role of the second largest shareholder or the role of top five or top 10 
shareholders) can curb the expropriation problem and protect outside investors’ interests 
(Bennedsen & Wolfenzon, 2000; Gomes & Novaes, 2005; Liu, 2005; Wang & Deng, 2006). 
This study uses the power balance in ownership structure to proxy for one expropriation-
reduction mechanism.  
Following Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) and Liu (2005), this study uses two variables to 
measure the power balance in ownership structures. The first measure (Z-INDEX) was the 
total shareholding owned by the largest shareholder divided by the total shareholding owned 
by the second largest shareholder. The second measure (CR5 － CR1) was the total 
shareholding owned by the top five shareholders minus the total shareholding owned by the 
largest shareholder. 
ii Corporate Governance Related Arrangements 
Corporate governance research focuses on the issue of who should the corporate 
‘government’ represent. The roots of corporate governance studies can be traced back to the 
debates between Berle and Means (1932) and Dodd (1932). Since then, different arguments 
continue on this subject without reaching a consensus. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) conduct a 
survey of the present-day literature on corporate governance and state that the corporate 
governance problem that each country faced varies across the ownership structure. The 
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authors propose corporate governance as a set of models and mechanisms through which 
outside investors are able to protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders and 
ensure returns on their investment.   
Over the past three decades, a substantial number of potential agency-reduction mechanisms 
have been evaluated. The first category concerns internal corporate governance mechanisms 
including the board of directors, executive compensation and financial disclosure. The second 
category focuses on external mechanisms, such as external monitoring by creditors, the 
market for corporate control, and the law and regulatory protection.  
This study uses corporate governance mechanisms, including the size of the board of directors, 
the composition of the board of directors, the existence of the CEO and board chairman 
duality, the number of board of directors meetings, the size of supervisory board and the 
number of supervisory board meetings to proxy for the corporate governance mechanism 
related arrangements.  
Criticisms of and proposals for the role of boards of directors in corporate finance have 
proliferated over the last 30 years. Fama (1980) argues that the board of directors is one of the 
central internal corporate mechanisms for resolving agency problems. Based on two different 
legal systems, there are two models of the board: a one-tier board in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
and a two-tier board in Germany, Japan and some North-European countries (OECD, 2004). 
Two-tier boards separate the management function and the supervisory function into different 
bodies. Such systems typically have a “management board” composed entirely of executives 
and a “supervisory board” composed of non-executive board members. The former is called 
the “board of directors” and the latter is called the “supervisory board”.  
Potential governance-related attributes focus on the board of directors including the size of the 
board, the independence of board members, the existence of the CEO and board chairman 
duality, and the frequency of board of directors meeting. A board with a relatively smaller 
size (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells, 1998; Yermack, 1996), relatively 
higher independence (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Jensen, 1993; Klein, 1998), splitting the 
positions of CEO and chairman (Boyd, 1995; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Core, Holthausen & 
Larcker, 1999; Mak & Li, 2001) and higher board meeting frequency per year (Firth, Fung & 
Rui, 2007) is more effective in promoting corporate governance behaviour.   
Given that very few countries have supervisory boards, their influence on the agency problem 
has not previously been investigated. A few related studies examine the effect of the 
supervisory board on firm performance and earnings information (Cho & Rui, 2007; Firth et 
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al., 2007). For example, Firth et al. (2007) find that a supervisory board with relatively larger 
size and higher meeting frequency per year is more effective in monitoring the firm’s 
accounting system and the financial statements.  
Following Henry (2006), the size of the board of directors (BOARD_SIZE) in our study is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of board directors; the composition of 
the board of directors (BOARD_COMPOSITION) is calculated as the number of independent 
directors on the board relative to the total number of board members. To identify the existence 
of CEO and board chairman duality (DUALITY), this study employs a dummy variable with 
a value of one if one person holds both positions, and zero otherwise (Cheung et al., 2006; 
Henry, 2006). The size of the supervisory board (SB_SIZE) is the natural logarithm of the 
total number of supervisory board members (Firth et al., 2007). The frequency of board of 
directors meetings (BOARD_MEETING) is the number of board meetings per year, and the 
frequency of supervisory meetings (SB_MEETING) is the number of supervisory meetings 
per year (Firth et al., 2007). 
Companies that have issued offshore shares such as B shares or H shares or N shares are 
subject to stricter legal rules and more transparent financial disclosure requirements. In 
addition, the monitoring systems of foreign investors are relatively more sophisticated. Hence, 
the dummy variable (BHN) may be viewed as a proxy for a better legal environment and 
effective corporate governance mechanisms in our study (Bai et al., 2004).  
External mechanisms focus on external monitoring by creditors, the market for corporate 
control, and the legal and regulatory protection (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Effective 
monitoring by creditors (Cole, 1998; Diamond, 1984; Petersen & Rajan, 1994), active market 
for corporate control (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Fama, 1980; Weir, Laing & McKnight, 
2002) and stronger investor protection by law (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000a) have 
positive effects on corporate governance. However, external mechanisms are not active in 
China and are excluded in this study. 
3.4.2.2.3 Identification of Borrowers’ Financial Status 
Under the CSRC guidelines, a listed firm should be recognised as encountering “abnormality 
of financial situation” if one of the following situations takes place: (1) the firm experiences a 
net loss for two consecutive years; (2) the value of the net worth per share is less than the face 
value of the stock in the last year; (3) the auditor presents an adverse opinion or a disclaimer 
opinion on the financial report of the last year; (4) the value of the equity ownership 
recognised by the auditor and the departments concerned is less than the value of registered 
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capital in the last year; and (5) other financial situation abnormality judged by CSRC, or 
SHSE and SESE (Deng & Wang, 2006). In 1998, the CSRC introduced the “Special 
Treatment (ST)” designation policy for listed firms that suffer “abnormality of financial 
situations” or “other situation abnormality”. According to Deng and Wang (2006) and Jiang, 
Lee and Yue (2008), ST status can be regarded as a comparable measure of financial distress 
since Chinese firms rarely declare actual bankruptcy24. Thus, this study uses the ST status as a 
proxy for financial distress. 
3.4.2.3 Measurement of Loan Characteristics 
Following Bailey et al. (2010), the loan size (LOAN_SIZE) is the total amount of loan 
divided by the total assets at the end of the last year. In addition, this study assumes that a 
loan with one year or less maturity is short term loan (LOAN_MATURITY). All other 
variables of loan characteristics can be directly observed. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter first discusses the hypotheses of the study followed by a review of relevant 
literature. Following this, the chapter describes the data sources and research methodologies 
used in this study. Appendix C summarises the definition and computation of all variables 
used in this study. 
                                               
24
 The bankruptcy law in China was adopted in December 1986 with no amendments so far. The law is for SOEs 
only and is outdated. Some local governments set up their own regulations to regulate the bankruptcy of 
companies within their administrative territory (Wu, 2005). 
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    Chapter 4 
Empirical Results 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results and findings. Section 4.2 provides the 
characteristics of the sample and descriptive statistics on banks, borrowers and loans. The 
summary statistics on market response to bank loan announcements are presented in Section 
4.3. Section 4.4 provides summary statistics on the cumulative abnormal returns by bank, 
borrower and loan characteristics. Results for multivariate cross-sectional analysis are 
presented and discussed in Section 4.5. The final section summarises the findings of this study.  
4.2 Summary Statistics 
4.2.1 Summary Statistics for the Sample Period 1996 to 2004  
Table 4.1 shows the sample characteristics and descriptive statistics of banks, borrowers and 
loans for the sample period 1996 to 2004. Panel A presents the annual distribution of the 501 
bank loan announcements in the final sample. It shows that bank loan announcements from 
1996 to 2000 are fewer than those from 2001 to 2004. This is because Chinese companies 
offering securities are not required to disclose the information to the public until 1998 
(Trading Rules of Shanghai Stock Exchange, 1998; Trading Rules of Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, 1998). Until 2000, companies offering securities were required to disclose 
important issues on one of the officially-designated media by the CSRC (The First Revision 
of Trading Rules of Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2000; The First Revision of Trading Rules of 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2000). Thus, records on bank loan announcements before 2000 are 
rare.  
Panel B in Table 4.1 provides the descriptive statistics of bank characteristics for the sample 
period 1996 to 2004. The results show that for over half of the loan sample (259 out of 453), 
the bank loan announcements, including a number of loans from different banks, are made by 
one of Big Four state-owned banks. Almost all loans (473 out of 487) are from state owned or 
controlled banks, with only 13 loans from a privately-owned bank and one loan from a 
foreign bank. Nearly, two-thirds of loans (278 out of 451) are issued by local branches. In 
addition, almost two-thirds of loans (320 out of 485) are made by banks that are in provinces 
with a higher marketization level in credit allocation.  
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Table 4.1 Sample characteristics and descriptive statistics for bank loans in China (1996-2004) 
Panel A: Annual distribution of “clean” bank loan announcements in the final sample (501 bank loan announcements) 
Year of announcement Number of announcements in the final sample 
1996 1 
1997 0 
1998 2 
1999 8 
2000 22 
2001 75 
2002 133 
2003 135 
2004 125 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of lending banks Observations 
Lender is one of Big Four banks 259 
Lender is one of state owned or controlled banks  473 
Lender is one of privately owned banks 14 
Lender is one of the local branch banks 278 
Lender is one of the banks in the province with higher marketization level in credit allocation 320 
 69 
Table 4.1 (continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of borrowers  
All bank loan announcement observations  501 
Firm-year observations  326 
Larger borrowers  150 
Borrowers with divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights 208 
Borrowers with negative profits in the previous year 51 
Borrower’s control shareholder is state or state-related institutions 349 
Borrowers with combined CEO-Chair structure 70 
Borrower’s equity includes B or H or N shares  20 
Borrowers under Special Treatment (ST) status  112 
Borrowers industry  
    Borrowers from construction industry  9 
    Borrowers from farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery industry 6 
    Borrowers from information technology industry 40 
    Borrowers from integrated industry 52 
    Borrowers from manufacturing industry 203 
    Borrowers from mining and quarrying industry 4 
    Borrowers from production or supply of power, gas and water industry 28 
    Borrowers from real estate industry 81 
    Borrowers from social services industry 19 
    Borrowers from transmitting, culture industry 8 
    Borrowers from transportation, storage industry 32 
    Borrowers from wholesale and retail trades industry 19 
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
 
Note: The sample consists of “clean” bank loan announcements made by companies listed on the SHSE and the SZSE from 1996 to 2004. “Clean” loan 
announcements are not contaminated by any confounding corporate events and have returns based on actual transaction prices.
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of borrowers (continued)  Mean Median Minimum Maximum Observations 
Total assets (million yuan) 1597.79 859.96 114.50 149949.10 501 
Tradable shares market value (million yuan) 911.98 662.80 121.92 9619.65 501 
Borrowers’ total shareholding owned by the largest shareholder 
divided by the total shareholding owned by the second largest 
shareholder (Z-Index) 
37.34 3.59 1.00 935.56 501 
Borrowers’ total shareholding owned by the top five shareholders 
minus the total shareholding owned by the largest shareholder 
(CR5－CR1) 
18.19% 18.67% 0.21% 81.28% 501 
Borrowers’ board size  0.95 0.95 0.60 1.23 501 
Percentage of independent directors on the borrowers’ board 21.35% 25.00% 0.00% 50.00% 393 
The number of borrowers board meetings in previous year 8.68 8.00 1.00 30.00 501 
Borrowers’ supervisory board size 0.58 0.48 0.30 0.95 501 
The number of borrowers’ supervisory board meetings in 
previous year 
3.69 3.00 0.00 9.00 501 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics of loans Mean Median Minimum Maximum Observations 
Amount of loan (million yuan) 101.72 56.50 2.00 5750.50 488 
Maturity of loan (years) 1.46 1 0.08 10 460 
Interest rate on loan (%) 5.56 5.31 3.51 7.25 248 
Loans with covenants/collateral 294 
Non-syndicated loans 496 
Loans for capital expenditure 313 
Loans for long-term investment  64 
Loans to repay existing debt 15 
No specific purpose 109 
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Panel C in Table 4.1 summarises the borrower characteristics. There are 326 borrowing firms 
in the full sample. The firm size of the sampled firms is smaller than the average of all listed 
firms. The average total assets of the borrowers are 1597.79 million yuan, which is less than 
the mean (2499.74 million yuan) of the total assets of all listed firms.  
Panel C of Table 4.1 also provides information about some borrowers’ qualities. For example, 
150 of 501 announcements are by larger borrowers; 208 of 501 announcements are by 
borrowers with a divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights; 51 of 501 
announcements are by borrowers with negative profits in the previous year; 349 of 501 
announcements are by borrowers whose controlling shareholder is the state or a state-related 
institution; 70 of 501 announcements are by borrowers with combined CEO-Chair structure, 
20 of 501 announcements are from firms whose equity includes foreign-targeted B or H or N 
shares; and 112 of 501 announcements are by borrowers currently with “Special Treatment” 
status.  
In addition, the results in Panel C in Table 4.1 show borrowers in the study sample experience 
a lower expropriation-problem structure than the average of all listed firms. For example, the 
power balance in the ownership structure of the study sample is better than the average of all 
listed firms. The average of the Z-Index (the total shareholding owned by the largest 
shareholder divided by the total shareholding owned by the second largest shareholder) is 
37.74, which is less than the mean (52.79) of the Z-Index of all listed firms. The average of 
CR5 － CR1 (total shareholding owned by the top five shareholders minus the total 
shareholding owned by the largest shareholder) is 18.19%, which is larger than the mean 
(14.80%) of CR5－CR1 of all listed firms. The mean of the borrowers’ board meetings in 
previous announcement year is 8.68, more than the mean (6.93) of board meetings of all listed 
firms. The mean of the borrowers’ supervisory board meetings in the previous year is 3.69, 
slightly more than the mean (3.23) of supervisory board meetings of all listed firms.  
However, the results in Panel C in Table 4.1 show that borrowers in the study sample 
experience a higher expropriation-problem structure than the average of all listed firms. For 
instance, the mean of the percentage of independent directors on the borrowers’ board is 
21.35%, which is slightly less than the mean (28.90%) percentage of independent directors on 
board of all listed firms. The mean of borrowers’ supervisory board size is 0.58, which is 
slightly smaller than the mean (0.61) of supervisory board size of all listed firms. There is no 
significant difference in the board size between the study sample and all listed firms. Finally, 
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the largest percentage of the loan announcements granted to borrowers is in manufacturing 
industries (203 out of 501).  
Panel D in Table 4.1 presents the loan characteristics. The average loan size is 101.72 million 
yuan, which is consistent with the fact that only firms obtaining large loans are required to 
disclose bank loan announcements. The variation in the loan maturity is moderate, with a 
mean maturity of 1.46 years. However, there is little variation in the loan interest rates, with a 
mean interest rate of 5.56%. The relatively little variation in the interest rates reflects Chinese 
banks have little flexibility in determining their loan interest rates. Until 1 January 2004, the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) applied a floating band for the lending rate25. Furthermore, 
most loans (496 out of 501) are made by single banks. Almost two-thirds of the loans require 
covenants or collateral. Finally, 313 loans are for capital expenditure, 64 loans for long-term 
investment and 15 loans to repay existing debt.  
4.2.2 Summary Statistics for the Sample Period 2005 to 2009 
Table 4.2 shows the sample characteristics and descriptive statistics of banks, borrowers and 
loans for the sample period 2005 to 2009. Panel A presents the annual distribution of the 106 
bank loan announcements in the final sample. It shows that bank loan announcements from 
2005 to 2009 are much fewer than those from 1996 to 2004. This is because we excluded 
announcements with share-split reform during the estimation window in order to avoid the 
influence of the share-split reform. In addition, the required reserve ratio for commercial 
banks from 2005 and the lending rate increased from 2004. From April 25, 2004 to September 
24, 2008, China’s central bank raised the required reserve ratio for commercial banks 18 
times from 7.5% to 17.5% (see Table 4.3). Similarly, the lending rate increases from 5.31% to 
7.47% during the period of October 29, 2004 to September 15, 2008 (see Table 4.4). These 
changes imply that the government wanted to discourage lending from 2005 to 2008. Listed 
firms thus prefer to raise funds externally since it is cheaper. Although lending was 
encouraged after the “global financial crisis”, there is no significant change in the number of 
bank loan announcements.  
                                               
25
 The PBOC issued “The Interpretation of Policies on Expanding the Floating Range of Lending Rates” in 2003. 
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Table 4.2 Sample characteristics and descriptive statistics for bank loans in China 2005-2009 
Panel A: Annual distribution of “clean” bank loan announcements in the final sample (106 bank loan announcements) 
Year of announcement Number of announcements in the final sample 
2005 40 
2006 5 
2007 21 
2008 22 
2009 
 
18 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of lending banks Observations 
Lender is one of Big Four banks 37 
Lender is one of state owned or controlled banks  85 
Lender is one of privately owned banks 9 
Lender is one of the local branch banks 53 
Lender is one of the banks in the province with higher marketization level in credit allocation 
 
58 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of borrowers  
All bank loan announcement observations  106 
Firm-year observations  84 
Larger borrowers  53 
Borrowers with divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights 58 
Borrowers with negative profits in the previous year 7 
Borrower’s control shareholder is state or state-related institutions 58 
Borrowers with combined CEO-Chair structure 14 
Borrower’s equity includes B or H or N shares  11 
Borrowers under Special Treatment (ST) status  7 
Borrowers industry  
    Borrowers from construction industry  4 
    Borrowers from farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery industry 0 
    Borrowers from information technology industry 1 
    Borrowers from integrated industry 9 
    Borrowers from manufacturing industry 53 
    Borrowers from mining and quarrying industry 1 
    Borrowers from production or supply of power, gas and water industry 7 
    Borrowers from real estate industry 8 
    Borrowers from social services industry 0 
    Borrowers from transmitting, culture industry 2 
    Borrowers from transportation, storage industry 20 
    Borrowers from wholesale and retail trades industry 1 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
 
Note: The sample consists of “clean” bank loan announcements made by companies listed in the SHSE and the SZSE from 2005 to 2009. “Clean” loan 
announcements are not contaminated by any confounding corporate events and have returns based on actual transaction prices. 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of borrowers (continued)  Mean Median Minimum Maximum Observations 
Total assets (million yuan) 3485.04 1535.87 239.09 33134.25 106 
Tradable shares market value (million yuan) 1668.32 750.34 99.00 16929.54 106 
Borrowers’ total shareholding owned by the largest shareholder 
divided by the total shareholding owned by the second largest 
shareholder (Z-Index) 
26.87 5.71 1.00 293.94 106 
Borrowers’ total shareholding owned by the top five shareholders 
minus the total shareholding owned by the largest shareholder 
(CR5－CR1) 
15.82% 12.50% 0.60% 48.35% 106 
Borrowers’ board size  0.99 0.95 0.70 1.18 106 
Percentage of independent directors on the borrowers’ board 35.00% 33.33% 25.00% 57.14% 106 
The number of borrowers board meetings in previous year 9.39 8.00 3.00 33.00 106 
Borrowers’ supervisory board size 0.55 0.48 0.30 0.85 106 
The number of borrowers’ supervisory board meetings in 
previous year 
3.99 4.00 1.00 9.00 106 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics of loans Mean Median Minimum Maximum Observations 
Amount of loan (million yuan) 457.92 69.50 12.20 9500.00 82 
Maturity of loan (years) 2.36 1 0.5 14 70 
Interest rate on loan (%) 6.16 5.94 4.78 9.83 37 
Loans with covenants/collateral 68 
Non-syndicated loans 97 
Loans for capital expenditure 59 
Loans for long-term investment  20 
Loans to repay existing debt 2 
No specific purpose 25 
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Table 4.3 Adjustments of the required reserve ratio in China 
Date Before  
Adjustment 
After 
Adjustment 
Range of 
Adjustment 
1984 
 
The central bank stipulated the required 
reserve ratio based on the categories of 
deposit. For the enterprise deposit, the 
required reserve ratio was 20%; for the rural 
deposit, the required reserve ratio was 25%; 
and for the saving deposit, the required 
reserve ratio was 40% 
  
1985 10%   
1987 10% 12% 2% 
09/1988 12% 13% 1% 
21/03/1998  13% 8% -5% 
21/11/1999  8% 6% -2% 
21/09/2003  6% 7% 1% 
25/04/2004  7% 7.50% 0.50% 
05/07/2006  7.50% 8% 0.50% 
15/08/2006  8% 8.50% 0.50% 
15/11/2006  8.50% 9% 0.50% 
15/01/2007  9% 9.50% 0.50% 
25/02/2007  9.50% 10% 0.50% 
16/04/2007  10% 10.50% 0.50% 
15/05/2007  10.50% 11% 0.50% 
05/06/2007  11% 11.50% 0.50% 
15/08/2007  11.50% 12% 0.50% 
25/09/2007  12% 12.50% 0.50% 
25/10/2007  12.50% 13% 0.50% 
26/11/2007  13% 13.50% 0.50% 
25/12/2007  13.50% 14.50% 1% 
25/01/2008  14.50% 15% 0.50% 
18/03/2008  15% 15.50% 0.50% 
25/04/2008  15.50% 16% 0.50% 
20/05/2008  16% 16.50% 0.50% 
07/06/2008  16.50% 17.50% 1% 
(Large-scale Financial Institutions)17.50%  
17.50% 
 
0 
 
25/09/2008  
(Medium/Small-scale Financial 
Institutions)17.50% 
 
16.50% 
 
-1% 
(Large-scale Financial Institutions)17.50%  
17.00% 
 
-0.5% 
 
15/10/2008  
((Medium/Small-scale Financial 
Institutions)16.50% 
 
16.00% 
 
-0.5% 
(Large-scale Financial Institutions)17.50%  
16.00% 
 
-1% 
 
05/12/2008  
((Medium/Small-scale Financial 
Institutions)16.50% 
 
14.00% 
 
-2% 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
 
Date Before  
Adjustment 
After 
Adjustment 
Range of 
Adjustment 
(Large-scale Financial Institutions)16.00%  
15.50% 
 
-0.5% 
 
 
25/12/2008  ((Medium/Small-scale Financial 
Institutions)14.00% 
 
13.50% 
 
-0.5% 
(Large-scale Financial Institutions)15.50%  
16.00% 
 
0.5% 
 
12/01/2010  
((Medium/Small-scale Financial 
Institutions)13.50% 
 
13.50% 
 
0 
(Large-scale Financial Institutions)16.00%  
16.50% 
 
0.5% 
 
25/02/2010  
((Medium/Small-scale Financial 
Institutions)13.50% 
 
13.50% 
 
0 
(Large-scale Financial Institutions)16.50%  
17.00% 
 
0.5% 
 
10/05/2010  
((Medium/Small-scale Financial 
Institutions)13.50% 
 
13.50% 
 
0 
(Large-scale Financial Institutions)17.00%  
17.50% 
 
0.5% 
 
10/11/2010  
((Medium/Small-scale Financial 
Institutions)13.50% 
 
14.00% 
 
0.5% 
(Large-scale Financial Institutions)17.50%  
18.00% 
 
0.5% 
 
19/11/2010  
((Medium/Small-scale Financial 
Institutions)14.00% 
 
14.50% 
 
0.5% 
(Large-scale Financial Institutions)18.00%  
18.50% 
 
0.5% 
 
10/12/2010  
((Medium/Small-scale Financial 
Institutions)14.50% 
 
15.00% 
 
0.5% 
(Large-scale Financial Institutions)18.50%  
19.00% 
 
0.5% 
 
14/11/2011  
((Medium/Small-scale Financial 
Institutions)15.00% 
 
15.50% 
 
0.5% 
Source: The PBOC 
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Table 4.4 Adjustments of interest rate in China 
Deposit Rate Lending Rate  
Date Before Adjustment After Adjustment  Range of Adjustment Before Adjustment After Adjustment Range of Adjustment 
21/02/2002  2.25% 1.98% -0.27% 5.85% 5.31% -0.54% 
29/10/2004  1.98% 2.25% 0.27% 5.31% 5.58% 0.27% 
28/04/2006  2.25% 2.25% 0.00% 5.58% 5.85% 0.27% 
19/08/2006  2.25% 2.52% 0.27% 5.85% 6.12% 0.27% 
18/03/2007  2.52% 2.79% 0.27% 6.12% 6.39% 0.27% 
19/05/2007  2.79% 3.06% 0.27% 6.39% 6.57% 0.18% 
21/07/2007  3.06% 3.33% 0.27% 6.57% 6.84% 0.27% 
22/08/2007  3.33% 3.60% 0.27% 6.84% 7.02% 0.18% 
15/09/2007  3.60% 3.87% 0.27% 7.02% 7.29% 0.27% 
21/12/2007  3.87% 4.14% 0.27% 7.29% 7.47% 0.18% 
16/09/2008 4.14% 4.14% 0.00% 7.47% 7.20% -0.27% 
09/10/2008  4.14% 3.87% -0.27% 7.20% 6.93% -0.27% 
30/10/2008  3.87% 3.60% -0.27% 6.93% 6.66% -0.27% 
27/11/2008  3.60% 2.52% -1.08% 6.66% 5.58% -1.08% 
23/12/2008 2.52% 2.25% -0.27% 5.58% 5.31% -0.27% 
20/10/2010 2.25% 2.50% 0.25% 5.31% 5.56% 0.25% 
26/12/2010 2.50% 2.75% 0.25% 5.56% 5.81% 0.25% 
Source: The PBOC 
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Panel B in Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of bank characteristics for the sample 
period 2005 to 2009. The results show that for 45% (37 out of 83) of the loan sample, the 
bank loan announcements, including a number of loans from different banks, are made by Big 
Four state-owned banks. This result is less than the percentage of loans made by Big Four 
tate-owned banks for the sample period 1996 to 2004 (259 out of 453), implies that the 
dominant position of Big Four state-owned banks in China’s banking industry is challenged 
by the joint-stock banks and foreign banks. According to China Banking Regulatory 
Commission 2006 Annual Report, the assets share of the state-owned commercial banks has 
been declining over the years, with a decrease of 2.93 percentage points from 2003 and 0.91 
percentage points from 2005. Meanwhile, assets share for the joint-stock commercial banks 
has been rising, with an increase of 1.68 and 0.47 percentage points from 2003 and 2005, 
respectively. In addition, at the end of 2006, under a World Trade Organization agreement, 
the banking sector in China was opened to foreign banks. Assets share for the foreign banks 
has been rising with an increase of 1.50 and 2.11 percentage points from 2003 and 2006, 
respectively (China Banking Regulatory Commission 2006 Annual Report). Furthermore, 
90% (9 out of 94) of loans are from state owned or controlled banks. This percentage is less 
than the percentage of loans from state owned or controlled banks for the sample period 1996 
to 2004 (473 out of 487), implying that more non-state banks are operating in China’s 
banking industry. Nearly, two-thirds of the loans (53 out of 85) are issued by local branches. 
This result is consistent with the result for the sample period 1996 to 2004 that two-thirds of 
the loans (278 out of 451) are issued by local branches. In addition, 72.5% (58 out of 80) of 
loans are made by banks that are in provinces with a higher marketization level in credit 
allocation. This result is more than the percentage of loans made by banks that are in 
provinces with a higher marketization level in credit allocation or the sample period 1996 to 
2004 (320 out of 485).  
Panel C in Table 4.2 summarises the borrowers’ characteristics for the sample period 2005 to 
2009. There are 84 borrowing firms in the full sample. Similar to the finding for the sample 
period 1996 to 2004, the firm size of the borrowers is smaller than the average of all listed 
firms for the sample period 2005 to 2009. The average total assets of the borrowers are 
3485.04 million yuan, which is less than the mean (16609.26 million yuan) of the total assets 
of all listed firms.  
Panel C of Table 4.2 also provides information about the borrowers’ qualities. For example, 
53 of 106 (50%) announcements are by larger borrowers; 58 of 106 (54.72%) announcements 
are by borrowers with a divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights; 7 of 106 
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(6.60%) announcements are by borrowers with negative profits in the previous year; 58 of 106 
(54.72%) announcements are by borrowers whose controlling shareholder is the state or a 
state-related institution; 14 of 106 (13.21%) announcements are by borrowers with combined 
CEO-Chair structure; 11 of 106 (10.38%) announcements are from firms whose equity 
includes foreign-targeted B or H or N shares; and 7 of 106 (6.60%) announcements are by 
borrowers currently with “Special Treatment” status.   
In addition, the results in Panel C in Table 4.2 show that, in terms of some expropriation-
reduction mechanisms, such as borrowers’ board size, borrowers’ board meetings in previous 
announcement year and borrowers’ supervisory board meetings in the previous year, the 
borrowers in the study sample experience a lower expropriation-problem structure than the 
average of all listed firms. For example, the mean of borrowers’ board size is 0.99, which is 
slightly larger than the mean (0.96) of board size of all listed firms. The mean of the 
borrowers’ board meetings in previous announcement year is 9.39, more than the mean (8.48) 
of board meetings of all listed firms. The mean of the borrowers’ supervisory board meetings 
in the previous year is 3.99, slightly more than the mean (3.98) of supervisory board meetings 
of all listed firms.  
However, in terms of the other expropriation-reduction mechanisms, such as the power 
balance in the ownership structure, the percentage of independent directors on the borrowers’ 
board and borrowers’ supervisory board size, the results in Panel C in Table 4.1 show that the 
borrowers experience a higher expropriation-problem structure than the average of all listed 
firms. For instance, the power balance in the ownership structure of the study sample is worse 
than the average of all listed firms. The average of the Z-Index (the total shareholding owned 
by the largest shareholder divided by the total shareholding owned by the second largest 
shareholder) is 26.87, which is larger than the mean (25.87) of the Z-Index of all listed firms. 
The average of CR5－CR1 (total shareholding owned by the top five shareholders minus the 
total shareholding owned by the largest shareholder) is 15.82%, which is less than the mean 
(16.52%) of CR5－CR1 of all listed firms. The mean of the percentage of independent 
directors on the borrowers’ board is 35.00%, which is slightly less than the mean (35.29%) 
percentage of independent directors on board of all listed firms. The mean of borrowers’ 
supervisory board size is 0.55, which is slightly smaller than the mean (0.59) of supervisory 
board size of all listed firms.  
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Finally, similar to the finding for the sample period 1996 to 2004, the largest percentage of 
the loan announcements granted to borrowers is in manufacturing industries (53 out of 106) 
for the sample period 2005 to 2009.  
Panel D in Table 4.2 presents the loan characteristics for the sample period 2005 to 2009. The 
average loan size is 457.92 million yuan. This result is consistent with the evidence from the 
sample period 1996 to 2004 that only firms obtaining large loans are required to disclose bank 
loan announcements. The variation in the loan maturity is also moderate, with a mean 
maturity of 2.36 years. The range of variation in the loan interest rates is still relatively low 
since interest rate is still regulated by the PBOC (Feyzioglu et al., 2009). Furthermore, similar 
to the statistics for the sample period 1996 to 2004, most loans (97 out of 106) are made by 
single banks and almost two-thirds of the loans require covenants or collateral. Finally, 59 of 
106 (55.66%) loans are for capital expenditure, 20 of 106 (18.87%) loans for long-term 
investment and 2 of 106 (1.89%) loans to repay existing debt.  
4.3 Abnormal Returns around Bank Loan Announcements 
4.3.1 Abnormal Returns around Bank Loan Announcements for the Sample 
Period 1996 to 2004 
Table 4.5 provides the summary statistics on the abnormal returns around bank loan 
announcements and three different parametric and non parametric significance tests. For each 
day in the event period, the standardised abnormal returns ( sSAR ) are averaged across the 
501 bank loan announcements. Based on the daily sSAR  throughout the event period (see 
Panel A in Table 4.5), there are significantly negative abnormal returns. For example, the 
SAR  on day －1 is －0.05%, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. The SAR  on 
day 0 and day 1 are －0.08% and －0.09% respectively and are statistically significant at the 
1% level. For nearly all event windows, CSARs  are negative and significant (see Panel B in 
Table 4.5). For instance, the average [－1, 0] CSAR  is －0.12% and the average [0, 1] CSAR  
is －0.17%, are statistically significant at the 10% and 1% level respectively. Thus, the 
market response for the borrowing firm’s equity over several days following the bank loan 
announcement is typically negative. The negative market response to bank loan 
announcements in China supports hypothesis H1.  
In addition, the average [－10, －1] CSAR  is positive and insignificant, which implies that 
there is no systematic information leakage before the bank loan announcements. Therefore, 
this study focuses on the CSAR  over a two-day event window [0, 1].  
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Table 4.5 Abnormal returns around bank loan announcements in China from 1996 to 2004 
Panel A: Average standardised abnormal return ( SAR ) 
Event day or window 
(0: Announcement day) 
SAR   T-test Percent of SAR  greater 
than zero 
Sign-test Wilcoxon signed rank test 
－10 －0.01% －0.30 45.31% －2.10** －1.42 
－9 0.08% 1.98** 49.90% －0.04 －1.08 
－8 0.01% 0.30 47.11% －1.30 －1.29 
－7 0.02% 0.51 47.40% －1.03 －0.06 
－6 －0.02% －0.48 46.11% －1.74* －1.60 
－5 －0.01% －0.26 46.11% －1.74* －1.04 
－4 0.01% 0.25 49.10% －0.40 －0.40 
－3 0.05% 1.18 46.71% －1.47 －0.28 
－2 －0.03% －0.68 45.11% －2.19** －1.53 
－1 －0.05% －1.02 44.71% －2.37** －1.92* 
0 －0.08% －1.73* 43.91% －2.73*** －2.24** 
1 －0.09% －2.02** 41.52% －3.80*** －2.91*** 
2 －0.04% －0.81 45.11% －2.19** －2.03** 
3 －0.13% －2.95*** 41.52% －3.80*** －3.04*** 
4 0.05% 1.15 48.50% －0.67 －0.16 
5 0.04% 0.95 50.90% 0.40 －0.24 
6 －0.04% －0.89 47.50% －1.12 －1.23 
7 －0.08% －1.76* 47.11% －1.30 －2.06** 
8 －0.02% －0.37 46.31% －1.65* －1.43 
9 －0.05% －1.22 47.31% －1.21 －1.76* 
10 －0.07% －1.48 42.12% －3.53*** －2.74*** 
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Table 4.5 (continued) 
 
Note: The average standardised abnormal return ( SAR ) and cumulative average standardised abnormal return ( CSAR ) were calculated using the 
market model and standard event study methodology. The estimation window for calculating the market model parameters was [－150, －31]. SAR  
and CSAR  were tested for significance using a two-tail t-test. The sign test categorises data into binary outcomes with the null hypothesis that the 
percentage of negative SAR  (CSAR ) equals the percentage of positive SAR  (CSAR ). The Wilcoxon signed-rank test has a null hypothesis of no 
difference in magnitudes between the negative and positive SAR  (CSAR ). “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. The number of observations is 501.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Cumulative average standardised abnormal return ( CSAR ) 
Event day or window 
(0: Announcement day) 
SAR   T-test Percent of SAR  greater 
than zero 
Sign-test Wilcoxon signed rank 
test 
[－10,－1] 0.05% 1.18 50.10% 0.04 －0.18 
[－1,0] －0.12% －2.74*** 44.51% －2.46** －1.77* 
[0,1] －0.17% －3.74*** 43.51% －2.90*** －2.68*** 
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4.3.2 Abnormal Returns around Bank Loan Announcements for the Sample 
Period 2005 to 2009 
Table 4.6 provides the summary statistics on the abnormal returns around bank loan 
announcements and three different parametric and non parametric significance tests for the 
sample period 2005 to 2009. For each day in the event period, the standardised abnormal 
returns ( sSAR ) are averaged across the 106 bank loan announcements. Based on the daily 
sSAR  throughout the event period (see Table 4.6), there are no significant abnormal returns 
under the parametric tests (two-tail t-test) for the sample period 2005 to 2009. Furthermore, 
the result of the sign test shows that the percentage of sSAR  for each day during the event 
window is significantly greater than the percentage of sSAR  and the result of the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test shows that there is a significant difference between the negative and positive 
sSAR  for each day during the event window. Thus, the market response for the borrowing 
firm’s equity over several days following the bank loan announcement is negative, but 
insignificant for the sample period 2005 to 2009. This result fails to support hypothesis H1 
and is inconsistent with the finding for the sample period 1996 to 2004. This implies that the 
Chinese stock market does not view bank loan announcements unfavourably any longer after 
a series of reforms in the Chinese banking system. Reforms in the Chinese banking system 
started in 2005 include introducing strategic investors, listing of banks’ shares and restricting 
the share of government ownership thereby reducing government intervention in Chinese 
banks. Banks may have more authority and freedom to grant loans based on commercial 
reasons and take full advantage of their unique information to screen and monitor borrowers.  
However, the result shows no significantly positive market response to bank loan 
announcements in the Chinese financial market although the Chinese banking system has 
been improved following a series of reforms. Reforms in Chinese banking system are not 
complete and thus the government interference in the banking system is still substantial in 
certain areas. For example, most Chinese banks are still controlled by the government and the 
government’s huge percentage in banks’ ownership structures makes it difficult for 
individuals or institutional investors to compete through Greenfield investment and direct 
participation in Chinese state-owned banks. Chinese banks can not reject policy loans 
absolutely at this stage. 
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Table 4.6 Abnormal returns around bank loan announcements in China from 2005 to 2009 
Event day or window 
(0: Announcement day) 
SAR   T-test Percent of SAR  greater 
than zero 
Sign-test Wilcoxon signed rank test 
－10 －0.02% －0.24 15.89% －7.06*** －7.46*** 
－9 －0.02% －0.26 14.02% －7.44*** －7.93*** 
－8 －0.02% －0.24 14.95% －7.25*** －7.43*** 
－7 －0.03% －0.26 14.02% －7.44*** －7.30*** 
－6 －0.03% －0.28 11.22% －8.02*** －7.89*** 
－5 －0.02% －0.22 15.89% －7.06*** －6.62*** 
－4 －0.03% －0.27 17.76% －6.67*** －6.84*** 
－3 －0.03% －0.28 10.28% －8.22*** －8.14*** 
－2 －0.02% －0.24 12.15% －7.83*** －7.43*** 
－1 －0.03% －0.26 11.22% －8.02*** －7.52*** 
0 －0.03% －0.28 15.89% －7.06*** －7.25*** 
1 －0.03% －0.30 8.41% －8.60*** －8.06*** 
2 －0.02% －0.21 13.08% －7.64*** －6.78*** 
3 －0.03% －0.26 17.76% －6.67*** －6.81*** 
4 －0.02% －0.25 19.63% －6.28*** －7.00*** 
5 －0.02% －0.22 15.89% －7.06*** －6.85*** 
6 －0.02% －0.24 13.08% －7.64*** －6.97*** 
7 －0.02% －0.21 18.69% －6.48*** －6.13*** 
8 －0.03% －0.30 14.02% －7.44*** －7.83*** 
9 －0.03% －0.27 14.02% －7.44*** －6.88*** 
10 －0.03% －0.30 12.15% －7.83*** －7.84*** 
Note: The average standardised abnormal return ( SAR ) and cumulative average standardised abnormal return ( CSAR ) were calculated using the 
market model and standard event study methodology. The estimation window for calculating the market model parameters was [－150, －31]. SAR  
and CSAR  were tested for significance using a two-tail t-test. The sign test categorises data into binary outcomes with the null hypothesis that the 
percentage of negative SAR  (CSAR ) equals the percentage of positive SAR  (CSAR ). The Wilcoxon signed-rank test has a null hypothesis of no 
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difference in magnitudes between the negative and positive SAR  (CSAR ). “***”, “**”, and “*” indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. The number of observations is 106.  
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4.4 Characterisation of the Market Response 
To further examine the effects of bank and loan characteristics on the size of the market 
response to bank loan announcements, this study groups bank loan announcements into pairs 
according to bank and loan characteristics and then conducts univariate tests and multivariate 
cross-sectional regression analyses to test whether the abnormal returns are statistically 
different between the two groups in each pair. Since there is no significant effect of bank loan 
announcements on the borrowing firm’s equity for the sample period 2005 to 2009, this study 
focuses only on the effects of bank, borrower and loan characteristics on the size of the 
market response to bank loan announcements for the sample period 1996 to 2004. 
Table 4.7 reports the summary statistics on the [0, 1] cumulative average standardised 
abnormal returns divided by banks (Panel A), borrowers (Panel B) and loan (Panel C) 
characteristics for the sample period 1996 to 2004.  
Panel A in Table 4.7 presents the univariate statistics on bank loan announcements by bank 
characteristics. The negative stock return effect is significantly stronger for loans from Big 
Four state banks than for loans from other banks. This result is consistent with hypothesis H2 
that the negative effect of a bank loan announcement is particularly significant for loans from 
Big Four banks. In addition, there is a significantly positive response to the loans made by 
private banks, though the sample is quite small (14 out of 501). The two-day CSAR  for loans 
issued by provincial level branches and headquarters is not significantly different from zero. 
In contrast, the negative CSAR  is significantly greater for loans made by a bank’s local 
branch, such as municipal or township branches below the provincial level. This result 
supports hypothesis H2, which predicts that local branches are more inclined to suffer 
intervention by the local government and suffer higher moral hazard. Lastly, loans issued by 
banks in the provinces with the lower marketization level in credit allocation have more 
negative CSAR  than loans made by banks in provinces with higher marketization level in 
credit allocation. This finding is consistent with hypothesis H2, which expects that banks in 
provinces with lower marketization level in credit allocation are routinely under special 
pressure by government to supply “policy loans”. Indeed, the banking system in China is still 
heavily interfered with significant portions of state ownership. In addition, all the banks in 
China have local branches throughout the country. 
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Table 4.7 Cumulative average standardised abnormal returns in China sorted by bank, borrower and loan characteristics from 1996 to 2004 
Panel A: Sorted by bank characteristics 
Category No. 
of 
obs. 
CSAR  
[0, 1] 
T-test of 
CSAR =0 
% 
CSAR  
positive 
Sign test Wilcoxon 
signed 
rank test 
CSAR
 
difference 
(higher－
lower) 
t-test of 
mean 
difference 
Bank Type         
    Big Four state banks 259 －0.20% －3.18*** 43.51% －2.55** －2.75***   
    Other banks  194 －0.13% －1.76* 45.88% －0.85 －0.75 0.07% 0.45 
         
Bank Ownership         
    State owned/controlled banks  473 －0.20% －4.44*** 42.49% －3.26*** －3.15***   
    Private banks  14 0.57% 2.12** 71.43% 1.60 －1.54 0.77% 2.37** 
         
Bank Ranking         
    Loans issued by local branches 278 －0.18% －3.08*** 42.09% －2.64*** －2.28**   
    Loans issued by headquarters or main 
provincial branches 
173 －0.12% －1.59 48.55% －0.38 －0.48 0.06% 0.39 
         
Bank Location         
Bank in the province with the higher 
marketization level in credit allocation 
320 －0.14% －2.57** 45.00% －1.79* －1.97**   
Bank in the province with the lower 
marketization level in credit allocation 
165 －0.22% －2.82*** 40.00% －2.60*** －2.00** 0.08% 0.47 
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Table 4.7 (continued) 
Panel B: Sorted by borrower characteristics 
Category No. 
of 
obs. 
CSAR  
[0, 1] 
T-test of 
CSAR =0 
% 
CSAR  
positive 
Sign test Wilcoxon 
signed 
rank test 
CSAR  
difference 
(higher－lower) 
t-test of 
mean 
difference 
Borrower Size         
    Large firms 150 0.03% 0.33 46.67% －0.81 －0.44   
    Small firms 351 －0.25% －4.69*** 42.17% －2.94*** －2.89*** 0.28% 1.79* 
         
Divergence between Cash-flow Rights and 
Control Rights (DCC) 
        
    Borrowers with divergence (DCC≠0) 208 －0.23% －3.32*** 42.32% －2.63*** －1.93*   
Borrowers without divergence (DCC=0) 293 －0.12% －2.09** 45.19% －1.38 －1.87* 0.11% 0.72 
         
Borrower Performance-ROA         
With increase  158 －0.05% －0.57 41.77% －2.07** －1.29   
With no increase 343 －0.22% －4.13*** 44.31% －2.11** －2.42** 0.18% 1.22 
         
Borrower Performance-Tq_70         
    With increase 72 －0.07% －0.63 45.83% －0.71 －0.55   
    With no increase 429 －0.18% －3.79*** 43.12% －2.85*** －2.70*** 0.11% 0.62 
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Table 4.7 (continued) 
Panel B: Sorted by borrower characteristics (continued) 
Category No. 
of 
obs. 
CSAR  
[0, 1] 
T-test of 
CSAR =0 
% 
CSAR  
positive 
Sign test Wilcoxon 
signed 
rank test 
CSAR
 
difference 
(higher－
lower) 
t-test of 
mean 
difference 
Borrower Performance-Tq_80         
With increase 72 －0.08% －0.65 45.83% －0.71 －0.58   
    With no increase 429 －0.18% －3.78*** 43.12% －2.85*** －2.69*** 0.11% 0.61 
         
Borrowers’ Ownership         
Borrowers’ controlling shareholder is 
state or state-related institutions  
349 －0.22% －4.09*** 40.11% －3.69*** －3.18***   
Borrowers’ controlling shareholder is 
non-state or non-state-related institutions 
152 －0.05% －0.60 51.32% 0.32 －0.00 0.17% 1.15 
         
The Power Balance in Borrowers’ 
Ownership Structure-Z-Index 
        
Above median 248 －0.25% －3.99*** 38.30% －3.68*** －3.20***   
Equal to median 8 －0.05% －0.15 37.50% －0.71 －0.42   
    Below median 245 －0.08% －1.31 48.98% －0.32 －0.54   
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Table 4.7 (continued) 
Panel B: Sorted by borrower characteristics (continued)  
Category No. 
of 
obs. 
CSAR  
[0, 1] 
T-test of 
CSAR =0 
% 
CSAR  
positive 
Sign test Wilcoxon 
signed 
rank test 
CSAR  
difference 
(higher－lower) 
t-test of 
mean 
difference 
The Power Balance in Borrowers’ 
Ownership Structure-CR5－CR1 
        
Above median 250 －0.10% －1.59 49.60% －0.13 －0.39   
    Equal to median 1 －0.30% －0.30 0.00% 0 0   
    Below median  250 －0.23% －3.69*** 37.20% －4.04*** －3.45***   
         
Borrowers’ Board Size         
Large board (Above median) 165 －0.09% －1.21 41.81% －2.10** －1.80*   
Equal to Median 163 －0.17% －2.17** 47.24% －0.70 －0.76   
Small board (Below median) 173 －0.23% －3.07*** 41.62% －2.20** －2.08**   
         
The Composition of Borrowers’ Board-The 
Percentage of Independent Directors on the 
Borrowers’ Board 
        
Above median 184 －0.09% －1.21 45.45% －1.31 －1.85*   
    Equal to median 21 －0.19% －0.87 57.14% 0.65 －0.36   
    Below median  188 －0.29% －4.01*** 41.46% －2.44** －2.00**   
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Table 4.7 (continued) 
Panel B: Sorted on Borrower Characteristics (continued)  
Category No. 
of 
obs. 
CSAR  
[0, 1] 
T-test of 
CSAR =0 
% 
CSAR  
positive 
Sign test Wilcoxon 
signed 
rank test 
CSAR  
difference 
(higher－lower) 
t-test of 
mean 
difference 
Borrowers’ CEO and Board Chairman 
Duality 
        
    With combined CEO-Chair structure 70 －0.22% －1.83* 44.29% －0.96 －1.17   
With separating CEO-Chair structure 431 －0.16% －3.30*** 43.39% －2.75*** －2.41** 0.06% 0.31 
         
The Number of Borrowers’ Board Meetings 
in the Previous Announcement Year 
        
Above median 223 －0.12% －1.80* 47.98% －0.60 －0.68   
    Equal to median 57 －0.32% －2.40** 40.35% －1.46 －1.64   
    Below median  221 －0.17% －2.61*** 39.82% －3.03*** －2.51**   
         
Borrowers’ Supervisory Board Size         
Large supervisory board (Above median) 219 －0.03% －0.48 47.95% －0.61 －0.40   
Equal to median 279 －0.27% －4.46*** 40.50% －3.17*** －2.78***   
Small supervisory board (Below median) 3 －0.70% －1.22 0.00% －1.73* －1.60   
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Table 4.7 (continued) 
Panel B: Sorted by borrower characteristics (continued)  
Category No. 
of 
obs. 
CSAR  
[0, 1] 
T-test of 
CSAR =0 
% 
CSAR  
positive 
Sign test Wilcoxon 
signed 
rank test 
CSAR
 
difference 
(higher－
lower) 
t-test of 
mean 
difference 
The Number of Borrowers’ Supervisory 
Board Meetings in the Previous 
Announcement Year 
        
Above median 228 －0.11% －1.68* 42.98% －2.12** －1.52   
    Equal to median 146 －0.24% －2.89*** 46.58% －0.83 －1.77*   
    Below median  127 －0.18% －3.11*** 44.39% －2.17** －2.31**   
         
Offshore Shares-BHN         
    With B shares or H shares or N shares  20 0.84% 3.74*** 50.00% 0.00 1.05   
    Without B shares or H shares or N           
shares 
481 －0.21% －4.58*** 43.24% －2.96*** －3.00*** 1.04% 1.70* 
         
Special Treatment Status (ST)         
    Borrowers under ST status 112 －0.14% －1.50 44.64% －1.13 －0.73   
    Borrowers not under ST status 389 －0.17% －3.44*** 43.19% －2.69*** －2.63*** 0.03% 0.16 
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Table 4.7 (continued) 
Panel B: Sorted by borrower characteristics (continued)  
Category No. 
of 
obs. 
CSAR  
[0, 1] 
T-test of 
CSAR =0 
% 
CSAR  
positive 
Sign test Wilcoxon 
signed 
rank test 
CSAR  
difference 
(higher－
lower) 
t-test of 
mean 
difference 
Borrower Industry         
    Borrowers from construction industry 9 －0.58% －1.75* 44.44% －0.33 －0.89   
Borrowers from farming, forestry, animal 
husbandry and fishery industry 
6 －0.20% －0.50 33.33% －0.82 －0.73   
Borrowers from information technology 
industry 
40 0.15% 0.92 47.50% －0.32 －0.52   
Borrowers from integrated industry  52 －0.36% －2.60*** 46.15% －0.55 －0.97   
Borrowers from manufacturing industry 203 0.01% 0.16 43.84% －1.75* －0.71   
Borrowers from mining and quarrying 
industry 
4 0.35% 0.71 50.00% 0 －0.37   
Borrowers from production of supply of 
power, gas and water industry 
28 －0.45% －2.40** 42.86% －0.76 －1.21   
Borrowers from real estate industry 81 －0.34% －3.04*** 48.15% －0.33 －1.52   
Borrowers from social services industry 19 －0.22% －0.95 36.84% －1.15 －1.45   
Borrowers from transmitting & culture 
industry  
8 －0.81% －2.27** 25.00% －1.41 －1.82*   
Borrowers from transportation, storage 
industry 
32 －0.55% －3.13*** 21.88% －3.18*** －2.39**   
Borrowers from wholesale and retail 
trades industry 
19 0.02% 0.08 57.89% 0.69 0.40   
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Table 4.7 (continued) 
Panel C: Sorted by loan characteristics 
Category No. 
of 
obs. 
CSAR  
[0, 1] 
T-test of 
CSAR =0 
% 
CSAR  
positive 
Sign test Wilcoxon 
signed 
rank test 
CSAR  
difference 
(higher－lower) 
t-test of 
mean 
difference 
Loan Size         
Above median 244 －0.18% －2.76*** 42.62% －2.30** －1.93*   
Below median 244 －0.12% －1.94* 45.49% －1.41 －1.33 0.06% 0.35 
         
Maturity         
    One year or shorter 375 －0.22% －4.30*** 42.67% －2.84*** －2.88***   
    Longer than one year 84 0.89% 0.81 51.19% 0.22 －0.40 1.11% 1.50 
         
Covenants/collateral         
With covenants/collateral 294 －0.18% －3.01*** 44.22% －1.98** －2.07**   
Without covenants/collateral 196 －0.15% －2.09** 42.35% －2.14** －1.63 0.03% 0.18 
         
Syndication          
Non-syndicated loans 496 －0.18% －3.90*** 43.54% －2.87*** －2.75***   
Syndicated loans 5 0.61% 1.36 40.00% －0.44 －0.27 0.79% 1.12 
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Table 4.7 (continued) 
Panel C: Sorted by loan characteristics (continued)  
Category No. 
of 
obs. 
CSAR  
[0, 1] 
T-test of 
CSAR =0 
% 
CSAR  
positive 
Sign test Wilcoxon 
signed 
rank test 
CSAR  
difference 
(higher－
lower) 
t-test of 
mean 
difference 
Purpose         
    For capital expenditure  313 －0.15% －2.65*** 43.77% －2.30** －1.99**   
    For long term investment 64 －0.01% －0.04 45.31% －0.75 －0.64   
    For repaying old debts 15 －0.58% －2.24** 20.00% －2.32** －2.33**   
    No specific purpose 109 －0.26% －2.67*** 44.95% －1.05 －1.12   
Note: Table 4.7 reports the [0, 1] cumulative average standardised abnormal returns ( CSAR ) around bank loan announcements by sub-samples with 
parametric and nonparametric significance tests. The sign test has a null hypothesis that the percentage of negative SAR  (CSAR ) equals the percentage 
of positive SAR  (CSAR ). The Wilcoxon signed-rank test has a null hypothesis of no difference in magnitude between the negative and positive SAR  
( CSAR ). ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. In some sorts, lack of data leaves the total number of 
observations below 501. 
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Sorting the bank loan announcements by borrower characteristics also yields some interesting 
results, as shown in Panel B in Table 4.7. The market response to a bank loan announcement 
is significantly negative for smaller firms. In contrast, there is no significant abnormal return 
for larger firms. This result supports hypothesis H3, which predicts that information 
opaqueness will be more pronounced in smaller firms. To identify the relationship between 
potential expropriation problems and the magnitude of the negative market response to bank 
loan announcement, this study divides the sample into borrowers with a high possibility of 
expropriation or tunnelling and borrowers with low possibility of expropriation or tunnelling. 
The result indicates that the negative market response to bank loan announcements is 
significantly stronger for borrowing firms with a divergence between cash-flow rights and 
control rights than for borrowing firms without such a divergence. In addition, results from 
the firms based on borrower performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) show that the negative 
market reaction to bank loan announcements is stronger if the performance has deteriorated in 
the announcement year. This study also finds that the negative reaction to bank loan 
announcements is stronger for borrowing firms controlled by the state or state-related 
institutions than for borrowing firms controlled by non-state or non-state-related institutions. 
These findings are consistent with hypothesis H3, which hypothesises that the market has a 
negative view on the loans to borrowing firms with higher possibility of expropriation or 
tunnelling. 
Further sorting the bank loan announcements by borrower characteristics, the negative CSAR  
is significantly larger for borrowing firms with lower power balance in ownership structure 
(higher Z-Index and lower CR5－CR1) than those with higher power balance in their 
ownership structure (lower Z-Index and higher CR5－CR1).  
Panel B in Table 4.7 also shows that the negative stock return effect of a loan announcement 
is significantly greater for borrowers with a lower percentage of independent directors26 on 
the board; fewer board meetings in the previous year; smaller supervisory board size and 
fewer supervisory board meetings in the previous year than those with a higher percentage of 
independent directors on the board; more board meetings in the previous year; a larger 
supervisory board size and more supervisory board meetings in the previous year. In addition, 
it is notable that 20 bank loan announcements from borrowing firms issuing offshore shares 
such as B shares or H shares or N shares, display significantly positive abnormal returns, 
whereas bank loan announcements from borrowing firms without offshore shares generate 
                                               
26
 The independent directors’ data is available only from 2002 since CSRC required listed firms to establish a 
system of independent directors from 2001 (Ho, 2003; Wang & Deng, 2006).  
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significantly negative abnormal returns. Collectively, these findings are consistent with 
hypothesis H3, which hypothesises that loans to poorly-governed borrowing firms are not 
favoured by the stock market.  
However, there are three notable findings from the data. First, the negative reaction to bank 
loan announcements is stronger for smaller borrowers’ board size than for larger borrowers’ 
board size, which implies that the larger boards are perceived to be more effective in helping 
to reduce expropriation problems. Perhaps the increasing number of board members in 
Chinese listed firms could improve the board’s efficiency since the directors come from more 
diverse backgrounds and have different interests. Secondly, there is a significantly negative 
market response for both borrowing firms with combined CEO-Chair structure and borrowing 
firms with separate CEO-Chair structure, which implies that a separate CEO-Chair structure 
in Chinese listed firms has no effect in mitigating expropriation problems. This is possible 
because there is no conflict of interest between the CEO and chairman and both are almost 
exclusively insiders in Chinese listed firms. Thirdly, the market response to the 112 bank loan 
announcements from borrowing firms under ST status is statistically insignificant. Insiders in 
an ST firm have a strong incentive to improve performance and rid themselves of the ST label 
since the firm will be delisted if its performance does not improve in the two years following 
ST designation. In the interim, insiders have to reduce their tunnelling behaviour temporarily 
to avoid the pressing risk of delisting.  
This study also shows a significantly negative market response to bank loan announcements 
for borrowers from the construction, integrated, production of supply of power, gas and water, 
real estate, transmitting & culture, and transportation and storage industries (6 out of 12 
industries exhibit significant market response). However, the market response to bank loan 
announcements for borrowers from other industries is not significant. This finding supports 
hypothesis H6, which hypothesises a significant difference in market response to bank loan 
announcements between different industries.  
This study also sorts the bank loan announcement data by loan characteristics. The results are 
reported in Panel C in Table 4.7. The negative effect of bank loan announcements is more 
pronounced the larger the loan size. This result is consistent with hypothesis H4, which 
hypothesises that the market may not favour larger loans since the loans may be used to prop 
up troubled borrowing firms in a banking environment in which non-commercial motivations 
are common. In addition, the negative CSAR  is significantly larger for loans with shorter 
maturity (one year or less) than those with longer maturity. Non-syndicated loans have more 
negative CSAR  than syndicated loans. These findings support hypothesis H4. Furthermore, 
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there are significantly negative reactions for loans with covenants/collateral and loans without 
covenants/collateral. Loans with covenants/collateral have slightly more negative effect than 
those without covenants/collateral. These results are consistent with hypothesis H4. Indeed, 
very few Chinese listed firms are liquidated due to the support from the government. Thus, 
equity investors in China may not favour loans with covenants/collateral. An alternative 
explanation to the significantly negative reactions for loans with covenants/collateral could be 
that they reduce the flexibility of the borrower.  
Finally, this study also shows a significantly negative market response for loans used for 
capital expenditure, repaying old debts and no specific purpose, whereas loans for long term 
investment27 display a non-significant market reaction. This finding supports hypothesis H5, 
which hypothesises a significant difference in market response to loan announcements for 
different loan purposes. Perhaps the loans used for capital expenditure, repaying old debt and 
no specific purpose are perceived as being easily misused by insiders and, therefore, the 
market does not like those loans.  
Overall, the results in Table 4.7 suggest that bank, borrower and loan characteristics influence 
the magnitude of the negative market response to bank loan announcements, and empirically 
validate the hypotheses developed.  
4.5 Multivariate Cross-sectional Analysis  
Cross-sectional regression was used to explain the market response to bank loan 
announcements. Since there is no significant market response to bank loan announcements for 
the sample period 2005 to 2009, this study focuses only on the effects of bank, borrower and 
loan characteristics on the size of the market response to bank loan announcements for the 
sample period 1996 to 2004. The dependent variable is the cumulative average standardised 
abnormal return for the two-day event window [0, 1] (CSAR [0, 1]).  
A number of independent variables were selected to proxy for bank, borrower and loan 
characteristics. Bank characteristics include a dummy variable indicating whether the lender 
is one of Big Four state banks (BIG4_BANK); a dummy variable indicating whether the 
lender is one of the state owned or controlled banks (BANK_OWNERSHIP); a dummy 
variable indicating whether a loan is issued by a bank’s local branch below the provincial 
level (BANK_RANKING); a dummy variable indicating whether the lender is one of the 
banks in the province with a lower marketization level in credit allocation 
(BANK_LOCATION).  
                                               
27
 The long term investment in this study refers investment in specific project more than one-year.  
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The borrower characteristics include the borrowers’ information opaqueness 
(BORROWER_SIZE), the divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights (DCC), the 
difference in profitability (ROA and Tobin’s Q taking into account of illiquidity discounts of 
70%) between the year before the bank loan announcement and bank loan announcement year 
(DROA; DTq_70), the expropriation-reduction mechanisms (Z-INDEX, CR5 － CR1, 
BOARD_SIZE, BOARD_COMPOSITION, DUALITY, BOARD_MEETING, SB_SIZE, 
SB_MEETING and BHN) and the borrowers’ financial situation (ST). 
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if borrower’s 
controlling shareholder is the state or state-related institution.  
The loan characteristics include the loan size (LOAN_SIZE), loan maturity 
(LOAN_MATURITY), and a dummy variable indicating whether the loan is issued by a 
single bank (SYNDICATION), and a dummy variable indicating whether the loan required 
covenants or collateral (COVENANTS/COLLATERAL).  
This study also adds categorical variables defined as N-1 dummy variables (N=number for the 
category) to proxy for borrowers’ industry, loan purpose and bank loan announcement year. 
The dummy variables (INDUSTRY_1, INDUSTRY_2, INDUSTRY_3, INDUSTRY_4, 
INDUSTRY_5, INDUSTRY_6, INDUSTRY_7, INDUSTRY_8, INDUSTRY_9, 
INDUSTRY_10, and INDUSTRY_11) indicate: (1) the borrower is in construction industry, 
(2) the borrower is in farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery industry, (3) the 
borrower is in information technology industry, (4) the borrower is in integrated industry, (5) 
the borrower is in manufacturing industry, (6) the borrower is in production of supply of 
power, gas and water industry, (7) the borrower is in real estate industry, (8) the borrower is 
in social services industry, (9) the borrower is in transmitting, culture industry, (10) the 
borrower is in transportation, storage industry, and (11) the borrower is in wholesale and retail 
trades industry. The dummy variables PURPOSE_CAPITAL, PURPOSE_REPAY and 
PURPOSE_NO indicate: (1) the loan is for capital expenditure, (2) the loan is for repaying 
old debts; and (3) the loan has no specific purpose, respectively. The dummy variables 
YEAR_1; YEAR_2; YEAR_3; YEAR_4; YEAR_5; YEAR_6; and YEAR_7 indicate the 
bank loan announcement year is 1998 to 2004 respectively.   
Table 4.8 presents the cross-sectional regression results for the sample period 1996 to 2004. 
Model 1 includes all the independent variables except the BOARD_COMPOSITION since 
the independent directors’ data are available only from 2002. Model 2 includes the 
BOARD_COMPOSITION while controlling for the sample period from 2002 to 2004.  
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The correlation matrix in Appendix D shows the correlation between the variables used to 
proxy for bank characteristics and the SYNDICATION can not be computed. This is because 
the bank characteristics of a bank loan announcement can be identified only if the loan is a 
non-syndication loan. Thus, the variables that were used to proxy bank characteristics and the 
dummy variable for SYNDICATION can not be included in a model at the same time since 
the dummy variable for SYNDICATION is a constant and needs to be removed if the model 
includes variables that were used to proxy for bank characteristics. Both Model 1 and Model 2 
exclude the dummy variable for SYNDICATION. Model 3 adds the dummy variable for 
SYNDICATION but excludes four variables that were used to proxy for bank characteristics 
and the BOARD_COMPOSITION. Model 4 adds the BOARD_COMPOSITION while 
controlling for the sample period from 2002 to 2004.  
Models 1 and 3 show that BIG4_BANK, BANK_RANKING, BANK_LOCATION, DROA, 
DTq_70, Z-INDEX, CR5 － CR1, BOARD_SIZE, DUALITY, BOARD_MEETING, 
SB_SIZE, SB_MEETING, ST, INDUSTRY_1, INDUSTRY_2, INDUSTRY_3, 
INDUSTRY_4, INDUSTRY_5, INDUSTRY_6, INDUSTRY_7, INDUSTRY_8, 
INDUSTRY_9, INDUSTRY_10, INDUSTRY_11, LOAN_SIZE, SYNDICATION, 
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL, PURPOSE_CAPITAL, PURPOSE_REPAY, 
PURPOSE_NO, YEAR_1, YEAR_2, YEAR_3, YEAR_4, YEAR_5, YEAR_6 and YEAR_7 
do not explain the cumulative average standardised abnormal returns around bank loan 
announcements during the whole sample period from 1996 to 2004. In addition, the VIF 
values for these variables and the correlation matrix in Appendix D show that these variables 
may lead to multicollinearity. Model 5 excludes these variables to avoid the multicollinearity 
problem.  
Models 2 and 4 show that BIG4_BANK, BANK_RANKING, BANK_LOCATION, 
BANK_OWNERSHIP, Z-INDEX, CR5－CR1, BOARD_SIZE, BOARD_COMPOSITION, 
DUALITY, SB_SIZE, SB_MEETING, BHN, INDUSTRY_1, INDUSTRY_2, INDUSTRY_3, 
INDUSTRY_4, INDUSTRY_5, INDUSTRY_6, INDUSTRY_7, INDUSTRY_8, 
INDUSTRY_9, INDUSTRY_10, INDUSTRY_11, LOAN_SIZE, LOAN_MATURITY, 
SYNDICATION, COVENANTS/COLLATERAL, PURPOSE_CAPITAL, 
PURPOSE_REPAY, PURPOSE_NO, YEAR_1, YEAR_2, YEAR_3, YEAR_4, YEAR_5, 
YEAR_6 and YEAR_7 do not  explain the cumulative average standardised abnormal returns 
around bank loan announcements for the sample period from 2002 to 2004. In addition, the 
VIF values for these variables and the correlation matrix in Appendix D show that these 
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variables may lead to multicollinearity. Model 6 excludes these variables to avoid the 
multicollinearity problem.  
Model 5 shows the coefficients for BANK_OWNERSHIP, BORROWER_SIZE, DCC, 
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP, BHN and LOAN_MATURITY significantly explain 
cumulative average standardised abnormal returns around bank loan announcements during 
the whole sample period from 1996 to 2004. Model 6 shows the coefficients for DCC, DROA, 
DTq_70, BORROWER_OWNERSHIP, BOARD_MEETING and ST significantly explain 
cumulative average standardised abnormal returns around bank loan announcements for the 
sample period from 2002 to 2004. Thus, combining Model 5 and 6, Model 7 uses 
BANK_OWNERSHIP, BORROWER_SIZE, DCC, DROA, DTq_70, 
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP, BOARD_MEETING, BHN, ST and LOAN_MATURITY to 
proxy for bank, borrower and loan characteristics to explain the market response to bank loan 
announcements for the whole sample period from 1996 to 2004. 
The data in Table 4.8 show the dummy for one of the state owned or controlled banks 
(BANK_OWNERSHIP) is significantly negative in Models 1, 5 and 7. This result is 
consistent with the evidence in Panel A in Table 4.7 and implies that the state owned or 
controlled banks are inclined to be under control from central and local government to issue a 
large number of policy loans with low operational efficiency to avert unemployment and 
potential instability in the country.  
In Models 3, 4, 5 and 7, smaller borrowing firms are likely to have a more negative [0, 1] 
CSAR  than larger firms. In non-government controlled banking systems, a larger positive 
market response to bank loan announcements for smaller borrowers implies that they indeed 
gain greater benefit from bank screening and monitoring services than larger borrowing firms. 
This is because larger borrowing firms are more likely to be monitored by analysts, bond 
rating agencies and the financial press and hence have less informational opaqueness. 
However, the market response to bank loan announcements is negative in China (see Table 
4.3), and the positive regression slope on BORROWER_SIZE implies that the negative bank 
loan announcement effect is weakened for larger borrowing firms. This is consistent with the 
finding in Panel B in Table 4.7 and suggests that smaller firms in China typically face more 
information asymmetry and thus have a larger informational content in bank loan 
announcements.  
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Table 4.8 Cross-section regression models explaining cumulative average standardised 
abnormal returns around bank loan announcements from 1996 to 2004 
Model 1      
 
    Collinearity Statistics 
Variables  Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob. Tolerance VIF 
INTERCEPT 0.206  2.321 0.089 0.920   
BIG4_BANK －0.082  0.196 －0.417 0.670 0.718 1.393 
BANK_OWNERSHIP －0.915 0.512 －1.789* 0.078 0.875 1.143 
BANK_RANKING 0.221  0.198 1.112 0.286 0.739 1.354 
BANK_LOCATION 0.016  0.199 0.081 0.920 0.770 1.298 
BORROWER_SIZE 0.331  0.226 1.469 0.251 0.688 1.453 
DCC －1.942  0.785 －2.475** 0.014 0.743 1.346 
DROA 0.339  0.372 0.912 0.365 0.810 1.235 
DTq_70 0.092  0.083 1.111 0.264 0.717 1.394 
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP －0.521  0.231 －2.253** 0.024 0.591 1.692 
Z-INDEX 0.000  0.001 0.128 0.899 0.675 1.481 
CR5－CR1 0.355 0.788 0.450 0.691 0.559 1.790 
BOARD_SIZE 0.823 0.931 0.884 0.385 0.657 1.523 
BOARD_COMPOSITION       
DUALITY 0.291  0.272 1.068 0.306 0.809 1.237 
BOARD_MEETING 0.035 0.023 1.519 0.131 0.665 1.505 
SB_SIZE 0.338  0.892 0.380 0.644 0.563 1.776 
SB_MEETING 0.058 0.057 1.024 0.306 0.692 1.445 
BHN 0.764  0.498 1.533 0.124 0.795 1.258 
ST －0.006  0.215 －0.027 0.994 0.803 1.246 
INDUSTRY_1 －1.041  1.150 －0.905 0.371 0.257 3.890 
INDUSTRY_2 －0.716  1.567 －0.457 0.683 0.546 1.832 
INDUSTRY_3 －0.118  1.031 －0.114 0.926 0.083 12.055 
INDUSTRY_4 －0.880  1.004 －0.876 0.392 0.068 14.788 
INDUSTRY_5 －0.495  0.986 －0.502 0.621 0.030 33.631 
INDUSTRY_6 －1.049  1.045 －1.004 0.327 0.113 8.873 
INDUSTRY_7 －0.822  0.997 －0.824 0.421 0.049 20.490 
INDUSTRY_8 －0.779  1.089 －0.716 0.486 0.166 6.006 
INDUSTRY_9 －0.930  1.174 －0.792 0.434 0.281 3.554 
INDUSTRY_10 －0.841  1.032 －0.815 0.428 0.093 10.738 
INDUSTRY_11 －0.395  1.074 －0.368 0.736 0.135 7.428 
LOAN_SIZE 0.299  0.623 0.481 0.672 0.826 1.211 
LOAN _MATURITY 0.121 0.075 1.627 0.101 0.576 1.737 
SYDICATION       
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL －0.131  0.199 －0.660 0.491 0.730 1.370 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL －0.102  0.322 －0.317 0.713 0.277 3.612 
PURPOSE_REPAY －0.771  0.572 －1.348 0.167 0.700 1.429 
PURPOSE_NO －0.300  0.354 －0.848 0.374 0.307 3.257 
YEAR_1       
YEAR_2 －0.162  1.837 －0.088 0.936 0.115 8.711 
YEAR_3 －0.533  1.759 －0.303 0.760 0.053 18.876 
YEAR_4 0.040  1.739 0.023 0.990 0.018 56.127 
YEAR_5 －0.095  1.735 －0.055 0.946 0.011 88.000 
YEAR_6 －0.494  1.740 －0.284 0.768 0.011 88.495 
YEAR_7 －0.426  1.733 －0.246 0.795 0.012 82.377 
Observations 394 
Adjusted R-squared  0.018 
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
Model 2      
 
    Collinearity Statistics 
Variables  Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob. Tolerance VIF 
INTERCEPT －0.332  1.702 －0.195 0.845   
BIG4_BANK 0.104  0.222 0.466 0.641 0.708 1.413 
BANK_OWNERSHIP －0.846  0.570 －1.483 0.139 0.858 1.166 
BANK_RANKING 0.268  0.234 1.144 0.254 0.707 1.414 
BANK_LOCATION －0.108  0.232 －0.467 0.641 0.743 1.345 
BORROWER_SIZE 0.334  0.268 1.248 0.213 0.709 1.410 
DCC －1.886  0.914 －2.062** 0.040 0.740 1.351 
DROA 0.753  0.407 1.852* 0.065 0.704 1.420 
DTq_70 0.241  0.131 1.839* 0.067 0.648 1.543 
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP －0.651  0.263 －2.479** 0.014 0.565 1.770 
Z-INDEX 0.000  0.001 －0.002 0.998 0.625 1.599 
CR5－CR1 －0.043  0.965 －0.044 0.965 0.519 1.926 
BOARD_SIZE 1.627  1.129 1.442 0.151 0.590 1.694 
BOARD_COMPOSITION 0.237  1.394 0.170 0.865 0.234 4.279 
DUALITY 0.258  0.311 0.830 0.408 0.838 1.193 
BOARD_MEETING 0.050  0.026 1.931* 0.055 0.662 1.510 
SB_SIZE －0.069  1.068 －0.065 0.948 0.508 1.967 
SB_MEETING 0.045  0.062 0.722 0.471 0.725 1.380 
BHN 0.323  0.563 0.574 0.567 0.738 1.354 
ST －0.452  0.258 －1.750* 0.081 0.732 1.366 
INDUSTRY_1 －0.927  1.216 －0.762 0.446 0.310 3.225 
INDUSTRY_2 －1.543  2.016 －0.765 0.445 0.666 1.501 
INDUSTRY_3 －0.003  1.067 －0.003 0.998 0.100 10.048 
INDUSTRY_4 －0.744  1.033 －0.720 0.472 0.084 11.960 
INDUSTRY_5 －0.221  1.012 －0.218 0.827 0.037 26.956 
INDUSTRY_6 －0.658  1.069 －0.615 0.539 0.111 9.018 
INDUSTRY_7 －0.752  1.027 －0.732 0.465 0.059 16.918 
INDUSTRY_8 －0.464  1.163 －0.399 0.690 0.206 4.848 
INDUSTRY_9 －0.630  1.205 －0.523 0.602 0.272 3.679 
INDUSTRY_10 －0.269  1.074 －0.250 0.803 0.114 8.736 
INDUSTRY_11 －0.267  1.113 －0.240 0.811 0.136 7.375 
LOAN_SIZE 0.525  0.862 0.609 0.543 0.752 1.329 
LOAN _MATURITY 0.064  0.086 0.739 0.461 0.625 1.599 
SYDICATION       
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL －0.179  0.232 －0.771 0.441 0.694 1.440 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL 0.077  0.362 0.214 0.831 0.280 3.576 
PURPOSE_REPAY －0.976  0.613 －1.592 0.113 0.678 1.476 
PURPOSE_NO －0.132  0.393 －0.337 0.737 0.316 3.162 
YEAR_1       
YEAR_2       
YEAR_3       
YEAR_4       
YEAR_5       
YEAR_6 －0.465  0.379 －1.226 0.221 0.267 3.743 
YEAR_7 －0.359  0.471 －0.762 0.446 0.182 5.485 
Observations 311 
Adjusted R-squared  0.004 
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
Model 3      
 
    Collinearity Statistics 
Variables  Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob. Tolerance VIF 
INTERCEPT 0.560  2.091 0.268 0.789   
BIG4_BANK       
BANK_OWNERSHIP       
BANK_RANKING       
BANK_LOCATION       
BORROWER_SIZE 0.448  0.200 2.240** 0.026 0.721 1.387 
DCC －2.137  0.743 －2.877*** 0.004 0.743 1.346 
DROA 0.366  0.365 1.002 0.317 0.833 1.201 
DTq_70 0.106  0.080 1.321 0.187 0.705 1.419 
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP －0.440  0.216 －2.041** 0.042 0.607 1.648 
Z-INDEX 0.000  0.001 0.347 0.729 0.681 1.469 
CR5－CR1 0.485  0.732 0.663 0.508 0.575 1.740 
BOARD_SIZE 0.629  0.860 0.731 0.465 0.658 1.520 
BOARD_COMPOSITION       
DUALITY 0.258  0.246 1.046 0.296 0.843 1.186 
BOARD_MEETING 0.032  0.022 1.461 0.145 0.678 1.474 
SB_SIZE －0.198  0.795 －0.249 0.804 0.625 1.601 
SB_MEETING 0.055  0.053 1.035 0.301 0.705 1.418 
BHN 0.949  0.456 2.081** 0.038 0.703 1.423 
ST －0.014  0.206 －0.070 0.944 0.793 1.262 
INDUSTRY_1 －1.322  1.033 －1.281 0.201 0.317 3.150 
INDUSTRY_2 －1.330  1.214 －1.095 0.274 0.455 2.198 
INDUSTRY_3 －0.279  0.897 －0.311 0.756 0.097 10.269 
INDUSTRY_4 －0.931  0.874 －1.065 0.287 0.086 11.628 
INDUSTRY_5 －0.602  0.849 －0.709 0.478 0.034 29.048 
INDUSTRY_6 －1.115  0.908 －1.228 0.220 0.137 7.323 
INDUSTRY_7 －1.020  0.866 －1.117 0.240 0.057 17.436 
INDUSTRY_8 －0.863  0.947 －0.911 0.363 0.192 5.205 
INDUSTRY_9 －1.120  1.027 －1.090 0.276 0.321 3.115 
INDUSTRY_10 －0.903  0.904 －0.998 0.319 0.116 8.609 
INDUSTRY_11 －0.726  0.942 －0.770 0.441 0.165 6.071 
LOAN_SIZE 0.355  0.608 0.584 0.560 0.842 1.188 
LOAN _MATURITY 0.135  0.065 2.067** 0.039 0.631 1.584 
SYDICATION 1.183  1.000 1.183 0.238 0.538 1.860 
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL 0.068  0.180 0.378 0.705 0.765 1.307 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL 0.062  0.303 0.205 0.837 0.282 3.540 
PURPOSE_REPAY －0.729  0.526 －1.386 0.166 0.708 1.412 
PURPOSE_NO －0.094  0.332 －0.285 0.776 0.318 3.141 
YEAR_1 －2.743  2.102 －1.305 0.193 0.302 3.306 
YEAR_2 －2.473  1.954 －1.266 0.206 0.089 11.278 
YEAR_3 －2.710  1.937 －1.399 0.163 0.039 25.671 
YEAR_4 －1.989  1.921 －1.036 0.301 0.013 76.097 
YEAR_5 －2.153  1.912 －1.126 0.261 0.008 120.063 
YEAR_6 －2.516  1.912 －1.316 0.189 0.008 123.215 
YEAR_7 －2.402  1.916 －1.254 0.211 0.009 115.194 
Observations 448 
Adjusted R-squared  0.031 
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
Model 4      
 
    Collinearity Statistics 
Variables  Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob. Tolerance VIF 
INTERCEPT －0.916 1.965 －0.466 0.641   
BIG4_BANK       
BANK_OWNERSHIP       
BANK_RANKING       
BANK_LOCATION       
BORROWER_SIZE 0.430 0.237 1.814* 0.071 0.733 1.364 
DCC －2.173 0.868 －2.503** 0.013 0.748 1.337 
DROA 0.710 0.399 1.781* 0.076 0.740 1.351 
DTq_70 0.252 0.126 1.996** 0.047 0.657 1.521 
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP －0.554 0.244 －2.267** 0.024 0.602 1.661 
Z-INDEX 0.000 0.001 0.256 0.798 0.652 1.534 
CR5－CR1 0.189 0.895 0.211 0.833 0.540 1.852 
BOARD_SIZE 1.458 1.041 1.401 0.162 0.619 1.614 
BOARD_COMPOSITION 0.399 1.322 0.302 0.763 0.234 4.268 
DUALITY 0.244 0.287 0.849 0.397 0.864 1.157 
BOARD_MEETING 0.044 0.025 1.776* 0.077 0.690 1.450 
SB_SIZE －0.829 0.953 －0.870 0.385 0.575 1.738 
SB_MEETING 0.062 0.058 1.078 0.282 0.759 1.317 
BHN 0.625 0.519 1.205 0.229 0.710 1.409 
ST －0.389 0.248 －1.571 0.117 0.735 1.361 
INDUSTRY_1 －1.415 1.109 －1.275 0.203 0.378 2.647 
INDUSTRY_2 －1.862 1.362 －1.367 0.173 0.497 2.012 
INDUSTRY_3 －0.333 0.939 －0.354 0.723 0.121 8.298 
INDUSTRY_4 －0.967 0.907 －1.066 0.287 0.106 9.455 
INDUSTRY_5 －0.541 0.875 －0.618 0.537 0.043 23.248 
INDUSTRY_6 －0.974 0.936 －1.040 0.299 0.135 7.421 
INDUSTRY_7 －1.129 0.900 －1.254 0.211 0.069 14.536 
INDUSTRY_8 －0.675 1.009 －0.669 0.504 0.232 4.305 
INDUSTRY_9 －1.052 1.065 －0.988 0.324 0.309 3.235 
INDUSTRY_10 －0.516 0.953 －0.541 0.589 0.146 6.834 
INDUSTRY_11 －0.802 0.986 －0.813 0.417 0.165 6.062 
LOAN_SIZE 0.525 0.835 0.629 0.530 0.785 1.274 
LOAN _MATURITY 0.121 0.078 1.551 0.122 0.697 1.434 
SYDICATION 0.288 1.321 0.218 0.827 0.790 1.265 
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL －0.005 0.210 －0.023 0.981 0.730 1.370 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL 0.291 0.342 0.851 0.396 0.287 3.487 
PURPOSE_REPAY －0.811 0.564 －1.437 0.152 0.688 1.454 
PURPOSE_NO 0.121 0.370 0.326 0.745 0.333 3.007 
YEAR_1       
YEAR_2       
YEAR_3       
YEAR_4       
YEAR_5       
YEAR_6 －0.476 0.355 －1.341 0.181 0.270 3.704 
YEAR_7 －0.352 0.444 －0.792 0.429 0.182 5.483 
Observations 354 
Adjusted R-squared  0.020 
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
Model 5      
 
    Collinearity Statistics 
Variables  Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob. Tolerance VIF 
INTERCEPT 0.704 0.481 1.462 0.144   
BIG4_BANK       
BANK_OWNERSHIP －0.780 0.454 －1.717* 0.087 0.996 1.004 
BANK_RANKING       
BANK_LOCATION       
BORROWER_SIZE 0.389 0.173 2.255** 0.025 0.965 1.036 
DCC －2.238 0.679 －3.295*** 0.001 0.864 1.158 
DROA       
DTq_70       
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP －0.373 0.179 －2.079** 0.038 0.859 1.164 
Z-INDEX       
CR5－CR1 
 
     
BOARD_SIZE       
BOARD_COMPOSITION       
DUALITY       
BOARD_MEETING       
SB_SIZE       
SB_MEETING       
BHN 1.046 0.425 2.459** 0.014 0.989 1.012 
ST       
INDUSTRY_1       
INDUSTRY_2       
INDUSTRY_3       
INDUSTRY_4       
INDUSTRY_5       
INDUSTRY_6       
INDUSTRY_7       
INDUSTRY_8       
INDUSTRY_9       
INDUSTRY_10       
INDUSTRY_11       
LOAN_SIZE       
LOAN _MATURITY 0.105 0.054 1.920* 0.055 0.964 1.037 
SYDICATION       
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL       
PURPOSE_CAPITAL       
PURPOSE_REPAY       
PURPOSE_NO       
YEAR_1       
YEAR_2       
YEAR_3       
YEAR_4       
YEAR_5       
YEAR_6       
YEAR_7       
Observations 448 
Adjusted R-squared  0.054 
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
Model 6      
 
    Collinearity Statistics 
Variables  Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob. Tolerance VIF 
INTERCEPT 0.207 0.324 0.638 0.524   
BIG4_BANK       
BANK_OWNERSHIP       
BANK_RANKING       
BANK_LOCATION       
BORROWER_SIZE 0.245 0.190 1.293 0.197 0.938 1.066 
DCC －1.921 0.770 －2.496** 0.013 0.857 1.166 
DROA 0.654 0.364 1.795* 0.073 0.809 1.237 
DTq_70 0.179 0.106 1.689* 0.092 0.850 1.176 
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP －0.371 0.192 －1.932* 0.054 0.827 1.209 
Z-INDEX       
CR5－CR1 
 
     
BOARD_SIZE       
BOARD_COMPOSITION       
DUALITY       
BOARD_MEETING 0.035 0.020 1.751* 0.081 0.920 1.087 
SB_SIZE       
SB_MEETING       
BHN       
ST －0.357 0.207 －1.727* 0.085 0.918 1.089 
INDUSTRY_1       
INDUSTRY_2       
INDUSTRY_3       
INDUSTRY_4       
INDUSTRY_5       
INDUSTRY_6       
INDUSTRY_7       
INDUSTRY_8       
INDUSTRY_9       
INDUSTRY_10       
INDUSTRY_11       
LOAN_SIZE       
LOAN _MATURITY       
SYDICATION       
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL       
PURPOSE_CAPITAL       
PURPOSE_REPAY       
PURPOSE_NO       
YEAR_1       
YEAR_2       
YEAR_3       
YEAR_4       
YEAR_5       
YEAR_6       
YEAR_7       
Observations 393 
Adjusted R-squared  0.028 
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
Model 7      
     Collinearity Statistics 
Variables  Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Prob. Tolerance VIF 
INTERCEPT 0.496 0.544 0.912 0.362   
BIG4_BANK       
BANK_OWNERSHIP －0.753 0.456 －1.651* 0.099 0.992 1.008 
BANK_RANKING       
BANK_LOCATION       
BORROWER_SIZE 0.398 0.176 2.257** 0.025 0.928 1.078 
DCC －2.254 0.682 －3.307*** 0.001 0.862 1.160 
DROA 0.238 0.348 0.683 0.495 0.901 1.110 
DTq_70 0.04 0.069 0.062 0.951 0.927 1.079 
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP －0.341 0.184 －1.854* 0.064 0.820 1.220 
Z-INDEX       
CR5－CR1 
 
     
BOARD_SIZE       
BOARD_COMPOSITION       
DUALITY       
BOARD_MEETING 0.023 0.019 1.247 0.213 0.886 1.129 
SB_SIZE       
SB_MEETING       
BHN 0.956 0.432 2.213** 0.027 0.963 1.038 
ST －0.068 0.186 －0.365 0.715 0.945 1.058 
INDUSTRY_1       
INDUSTRY_2       
INDUSTRY_3       
INDUSTRY_4       
INDUSTRY_5       
INDUSTRY_6       
INDUSTRY_7       
INDUSTRY_8       
INDUSTRY_9       
INDUSTRY_10       
INDUSTRY_11       
LOAN_SIZE       
LOAN _MATURITY 0.116 0.056 2.706*** 0.038 0.927 1.079 
SYDICATION       
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL       
PURPOSE_CAPITAL       
PURPOSE_REPAY       
PURPOSE_NO       
YEAR_1       
YEAR_2       
YEAR_3       
YEAR_4       
YEAR_5       
YEAR_6       
YEAR_7       
Observations 448 
Adjusted R-squared  0.050 
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The coefficient for DCC (the divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights) is 
significant and negative in all regression models. The result is robust when other explanatory 
variables are included in the regressions. The finding indicates that borrowing firms with a 
greater divergence in voting and cash-flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder yield 
greater negative market reaction when bank loans are announced. This result supports 
hypothesis H3 that the market reacts unfavourably when bank loans are announced by 
borrowing firms with a higher divergence between the voting and cash-flow rights of their 
ultimate controlling shareholder. Since the divergence in voting and cash-flow rights of the 
ultimate controlling shareholder reflects the possibility of the borrowers’ expropriation 
problem, this result implies that equity investors may realise controlling shareholders have the 
incentives (small cash-flow rights) and ability (sufficient voting rights) to abuse their power 
and misuse funds from banks to seek their private benefit at the expense of minority 
shareholders and creditors. The coefficients for DROA and DTq_70 are significantly positive 
in Models 2, 4 and 6. The results suggest that the negative effect of a bank loan announcement 
is stronger for borrowing firms with poorer performance in the announcement year. These 
results are consistent with those in Panel B in Table 4.7, which implies that the negative stock 
return effect of a loan announcement is significantly greater for borrowing firms with higher 
probability of expropriation problem. However, the coefficients for DROA and DTq_70 are 
significant only when controlling for the sample period from 2002 to 2004. Perhaps equity 
investors may gradually realise the decrease in the firm’s performance as a signal of the 
expropriation problem.  
The coefficient for BORROWER_OWNERSHIP is significant and negative in Models 1, 5 
and 7. This result suggests that the negative effect of a bank loan announcement is stronger 
for borrowing firms controlled by the state or state-related institutions than those controlled 
by the non-state or non-state-related institutions. This finding is consistent with the argument 
that firms with a larger concentration of state ownership tend to have a higher possibility of 
the expropriation problem.  
The coefficient for BOARD_MEETING is significantly positive in Models 2, 4 and 6. These 
results suggest that the negative effect of a bank loan announcement is stronger for borrowing 
firms with fewer board meetings in the previous year. This is consistent with the results in 
Panel B in Table 4.7, which suggests that the negative stock return effect of a bank loan 
announcement is significantly greater for borrowing firms that have ineffective expropriation-
reduction mechanisms. However, the coefficient for BOARD_MEETING is significant only 
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when controlling for the sample period from 2002 to 2004. Perhaps the increasing frequency 
of board meetings gradually could improve a board’s efficiency.  
In Models 3, 5, and 7, the borrowing firms with offshore shares such as B shares or H shares 
or N shares tend to have a less negative [0, 1] CSAR  than those without offshore shares. This 
is consistent with the evidence in Panel B in Table 4.3 and suggests that firms that have issued 
offshore shares draw the attention of foreign investors and face better monitoring, and hence 
reduce the expropriation problem. 
The dummy variable for financially distressed borrowing firms (ST) is significant and 
negative in Models 2 and 6. This is inconsistent with the results in Panel B in Table 4.7. 
However, the coefficient for ST is significant only when controlling for the sample period 
from 2002 to 2004. This result implies that, for the whole sample period, equity investors may 
favour loans for financially distressed borrowing firms since they may realise that insiders in 
an ST firm have to reduce their tunnelling behaviour temporarily to avoid the pressing risk of 
delisting. However, for the sample period from 2002 to 2004, equity investors may not favour 
loans for troubled borrowers.  
Furthermore, loan maturity carries a significantly positive coefficient in Models 3, 5 and 7. It 
is expected that short-term loans generate a greater positive bank loan announcement effect 
than long-term loans in non-government-controlled banking systems since banks’ monitoring 
powers would be increasing with more frequent renewals. However, banks’ monitoring 
function is weakened in China due to intervention of the government, so the positive slope on 
LOAN_MATURITY simply implies that the equity investors recognise that short-term loans 
may not be employed as one of complementary monitoring mechanisms by banks in China. In 
fact, some Chinese listed companies use short-term loans to fund long-term assets (Bailey et 
al., 2010). This behaviour leads to a stronger negative bank loan announcement effect 
following loans with shorter maturities than those with longer maturities. This result is 
consistent with the evidence in Panel C in Table 4.7. 
The R squared values are relatively low in all models because the dependent variable and 
independent variables are derived from different fields. The dependent variable is stock data 
and most independent variables are accounting data. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the empirical results based on a sample of 501 bank loan 
announcements in the Chinese financial market from 1996 to 2004 and a sample of 106 bank 
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loan announcements from 2005 to 2009. In contrast to what previous studies have found for 
bank loan announcements in non-government-controlled banking systems, the results show 
that the Chinese financial market typically reacts unfavourably to bank loan announcements 
for the sample period 1996 to 2004. Further, using bank loan announcements from 2005 to 
2009, there is no significant market response to bank loan announcements in the Chinese 
financial market.  
When the negative bank loan announcement effects for the sample period 1996 to 2004 are 
broken down by bank characteristics, this study finds that the negative bank loan 
announcement effects are particularly significant for loans from Big Four state banks, loans 
from state owned or controlled banks, loans from banks with lower ranking and loans from 
banks in provinces with lower marketization level in credit allocation.  
When the negative bank loan announcement effects are sorted on borrower characteristics, 
this study finds that the negative bank loan announcement effects are strengthened for 
problematic borrowing firms including firms that are opaque, have a higher possibility of 
expropriation or tunnelling, have ineffective expropriation-reduction mechanisms, are 
controlled by the state and are in financial distress.  
This study also finds that the negative bank loan announcement effects are particularly 
significant for loans of a greater amount, with a shorter term, with covenants/collateral, and 
less syndication. Furthermore, this study shows there is a significant difference in the market 
response to bank loan announcements among different loan purposes, and among different 
industries.  
The multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis confirms the study’s hypotheses (see 
Section 4.4 and Table 4.8). The coefficients for BANK_OWNERSHIP, BORROWER_SIZE, 
DCC, DROA, DTq_70, BORROWER_OWNERSHIP, BORAD_MEETING, BHN, ST and 
LOAN_MATURITY are statistically significant. This suggests that the negative market 
response to bank loan announcements is partially explained by these variables in the Chinese 
financial market. 
The findings for the sample period 1996 to 2004 support our prior hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4, 
H5 and H6. For example, there is a negative relationship between bank loan announcements 
and abnormal returns in the Chinese financial market. The negative effect of a bank loan 
announcement is particularly significant for loans from Big Four state banks, state owned or 
controlled banks, banks with lower ranking and banks in provinces with lower marketization 
level in credit allocation; for problematic borrowing firms including firms that are opaque, 
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have a higher possibility of expropriation or tunnelling, have ineffective expropriation-
reduction mechanisms, are controlled by the state and are in financial distress; for loans with 
greater amount, shorter term, with covenant/collateral, and less syndication. Furthermore, 
there is a significant difference in market response to bank loan announcements among 
different bank loan purposes and among different industries. The findings for the sample 
period 2005 to 2009 fails to support hypothesis H1 and is inconsistent with the finding  that 
there is a significantly negative market response to bank loan announcements in the Chinese 
financial market for the sample period 1996 to 2004. This implies that reforms in the Chinese 
banking system which started in 2005 may have reduced government interventions in the 
banks. Chinese banks, thus, may have more authority and freedom to grant loans based on 
commercial reasons and take full advantage of their unique information to screen and monitor 
borrowers. Therefore, the Chinese stock market does not view bank loan announcements 
unfavourably any longer.  
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    Chapter 5 
Summary and Conclusions 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the study and draws conclusions regarding the market response to 
bank loan announcements in the Chinese financial market. Section 5.2 briefly reviews the 
study. Section 5.3 discusses the empirical results and the implications drawn from the 
findings. Section 5.4 discusses the policy implications of the research findings. Limitations of 
the study are discussed in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 provides some suggestions for future 
research. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes the study.  
5.2 Study Overview  
The literature has enhanced our understanding of the market response to bank loan 
announcements in non-government-controlled banking systems, but it is unclear how the 
market response to bank loan annoucements impacts government-controlled banking systems. 
The issue of the market response to bank loan announcements in government-controlled 
banking systems has not been adequately addressed in the literature. This thesis examines the 
market response to bank loan announcements in the China’s banking system, which is 
government controlled. 
A sample of bank loan announcements was obtained from the CSMAR® China Listed Firms’ 
Bank Loans Research Database for the period 1996 through 2009. The share-split reform 
started in 2005 which affected the stock price of listed Chinese companies considerably. In 
order to avoid the influence of the share-split reform, this study divides the sample period into 
two sub-samples, namely, 1996 to 2004 and 2005-2009. The standard event study 
methodology was used to examine the market response to bank loan announcements in the 
Chinese financial market. The market model was used to calculate abnormal returns. The 
expected returns of client borrowing firms were calculated based on the market model 
parameters estimated over a 120-day estimation window, t = −150 to t = −31 before the 
announcement date. The 21-day (day −10 to day 10) event window is defined as the period 
covering 10 days before the bank loan announcement date (t = 0), the day bank loan was 
announced, and the following 10 days after the bank loan announcement date. Abnormal 
returns were further standardised and aggregated across borrowing firms. The T-test, sign test, 
and Wilcoxon signed-rank test were conducted based on the standardised abnormal returns.  
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The sample of bank loan announcements for the sample period 1996 to 2004 was sorted 
according to bank, borrower and loan characteristics. The [0, 1] CSAR  was calculated for 
each subgroup and then the statistical significance for each [0, 1] CSAR  determined.  
Bank, borrower and loan characteristics were then combined and used as independent 
variables in a number of multivariate cross-sectional regressions to test the relative 
explanatory powers of each bank, borrower and loan characteristic on the [0, 1] CSAR  for the 
sample period 1996 to 2004. 
5.3 Result Discussions and Implications 
A detailed analysis of the empirical results is presented in Chapter 4. This section reviews the 
empirical findings and compares the results with the findings documented in previous studies. 
The implications of the empirical results are then discussed.  
5.3.1 Results for Research Objective One and their Implications 
This study tests the market response to bank loan announcements in the Chinese financial 
market and the empirical results show that the borrowers’ stock value reacts negatively to a 
bank loan announcement for the sample period 1996 to 2004. This result is consistent with 
Bailey et al. (2010) and Shen et al. (2007), but inconsistent with previous studies in non-
government-controlled banking systems that show bank loan announcements produce 
significantly positive abnormal returns.  
In non-government-controlled banking systems, such as the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Thailand, banks issue loans only to 
creditworthy borrowers, and the approval of a bank loan is considered by the stock market as 
a good signal. In a government-controlled banking system, government owned or controlled 
banks may grant loans both for commercial and political reasons. Banks may be obliged to 
lend money to some listed firms in order to avoid unemployment or social instability, 
regardless of whether these firms are healthy or distressed (Dinc, 2003; Faccio, 2006; Khwaja 
& Mian, 2005). If these weak borrowers are prevalent, the market response should be negative, 
and the converse (Bailey et al., 2010).  
The empirical results of this study show that, under the pressure from the government 
management, Chinese banks assume a large amount of policy lending to avert unemployment 
and potential instability in the country. The effectiveness of bank monitoring in China is 
constrained by government intervention.  
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In addition, the empirical results imply that poorly-performing borrowers are prevalent in 
China. With a policy of lending by state owned or controlled banks, where Chinese listed 
companies face soft budget constraints, both healthy and distressed borrowers are able to 
obtain bank loans relying on the government for refinancing. Chinese listed firms may be 
subject to inefficient management and expropriation problems by controlling shareholders 
since there are no pressures to improve the performance of listed firms.  
However, the empirical result shows that the market response for the borrowing firm’s equity 
over several days following the bank loan announcement is negative, but insignificant for the 
sample period 2005 to 2009. This result is inconsistent with the finding that the Chinese stock 
market views bank loan announcements unfavourably for the sample period 1996 to 2004. 
This implies that the Chinese stock market does not view bank loan announcements 
unfavourably any longer for the sample period 2005 to 2009. This may be because a series of 
reforms have taken place in the Chinese banking system since 2005, and it is plausible that 
government interventions in Chinese banks have been reduced since then.  
5.3.2 Results for Research Objective Two and their Implications 
Research objective two of this study examines how bank, borrower and loan characteristics 
may influence the share price reaction to bank loan announcements in the Chinese financial 
market.  
5.3.2.1 Effects of Bank Characteristics 
The empirical results show that the negative effect of bank loan announcements according to 
bank characteristics is particularly significant when loans are granted by state owned or 
controlled banks especially Big Four banks, banks with lower ranking and banks in provinces 
with lower marketization level in credit allocation for the sample period 1996 to 2004. These 
results are consistent with Bailey et al.’s (2010) and Gao et al.’s (2006) findings, which show 
that the negative market response to bank loan announcement is prevalent if the lending bank 
is under strong political interference and suffers from greater pressure to issue loans for non 
value-maximizing purposes. 
Banks in China are generally under government pressure to supply “policy loans”. Loans 
from banks with higher government ownership and stronger political interference transmit a 
negative signal. Big Four banks in China are subject to more political interference and assume 
more policy loans over other domestic banks. Chinese banks with lower ranking (local 
branches) may be influenced by local government and pressured to issue loans to pursue the 
political interests of the local government (Bailey et al., 2010). Banks in a province with a 
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lower marketization level in credit allocation suffer from stronger interference by the local 
government since the marketization level in credit allocation differs in different provinces in 
China (Fan & Wang, 2001; Fan et al., 2002, 2004, 2007; Gao et al., 2006). Therefore, the 
negative market response to bank loan announcements is significantly larger if the lending 
bank is state owned or controlled banks especially Big Four banks, banks with lower ranking 
and banks in provinces with lower marketization level in credit allocation.  
5.3.2.2 Effects of Borrower Characteristics 
Dividing the bank loan announcement effect by typical borrower characteristics, the results 
show that the negative effect of bank loan announcements is particularly significant for 
borrowing firms that are opaque for the sample period 1996 to 2004. This is consistent with 
Aintablian and Roberts’ (2000), Bailey et al.’s (2010), Fama’s (1985) and Slovin et al.’s 
(1992) argument that large firms are transparent and hence there is smaller information 
content in bank loan announcements. The result also reveals that large firms are generally 
well monitored and have acquired a reputation since more information is available about them 
in the capital market in both non-government-controlled banking systems and government-
controlled banking systems. Therefore, bank loan announcements do not provide much new 
information to investors. On the other hand, small firms suffer from more severe moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems because they typically have shorter corporate histories, less 
public information is available for investors and poorer reputations. Thus, the negative news 
of a bank loan announcement elicits a more pronounced decrease in share value in small firms 
than in large firms. 
The empirical results also show that there is no significant response for borrowing firms in 
financial distress for the sample period 1996 to 2004. This is consistent with Bailey et al.’s 
(2010) finding. Bailey et al. (2010) explain that firms in financial distress may have been 
created by the Chinese government and hence there is little informational value in additional 
bank loan announcements. Furthermore, the result indicates that insiders in a ST firm have a 
strong incentive to improve performance and rid themselves of the ST label since the firm will 
be delisted if its performance does not improve in the two years following ST designation. In 
the interim, insiders have to reduce their tunnelling behaviour temporarily to avoid the 
pressing risk of delisting. However, the result contradicts Bolton and Freixas’ (2000), 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1994) and James’ (1996) argument that the bank loan 
announcement effect is greater for borrowing firms with a higher possibility of financial 
distress in non-government-controlled banking systems. This is because banks generate 
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information and a monitoring function in non-government-controlled banking systems. 
Banks’ willingness to restructure conveys a good signal of firm prospects.   
Furthermore, the empirical results show that there is a significant difference in the market 
response to bank loan announcements between different industries in the Chinese financial 
market for the sample period 1996 to 2004. This finding is consistent with Bailey et al. (2010) 
and Brumm (1996). This implies that the industry to which a borrowing firm belongs is an 
important characteristic that can affect the magnitude of the bank loan announcement effect in 
both non-government-controlled banking systems and government-controlled banking 
systems.  
5.3.2.3 Effects of Loan Characteristics 
Dividing the bank loan announcement effect by loan characteristics, the empirical results 
show that the negative effect of a bank loan announcement is particularly significant for loans 
of greater size for the sample period 1996 to 2004. This is consistent with Easterwood and 
Kadapakkam’s (1991), Kang and Liu’s (2008), Krishnaswami et al.’s (1999) argument that 
there is larger information content in bank loan announcements for loans of larger size than 
those with smaller size, but contradicts Lummer and McConnell’s (1989) argument that there 
is no significant difference in the excess returns between large and small sized announced 
loans. This finding implies that markets in non-government-controlled banking systems may 
favour larger loans since banks may spend more effort in evaluating and monitoring when 
issuing larger loans, whereas markets in government-controlled banking systems such as 
China may not favour larger loans since the loans may be used to help troubled borrowing 
firms. In a government-controlled banking system like China’s, approval of a loan may be 
perceived by the Chinese stock market as a negative signal that the borrowing firm is in 
trouble and requires the loan to keep afloat (Bailey et al., 2010). Thus, a larger loan required 
by a borrowing firm is perceived by the Chinese stock market as a signal that the borrowing 
firm is experiencing financial distress.   
In addition, the result shows that the negative effect of a bank loan announcement is 
particularly significant for loans with a shorter maturity for the sample period 1996 to 2004. 
This is consistent with Bailey et al. (2010), but inconsistent with Diamond’s (1991a, 1993), 
Fama’s (1985) and Flannery’s (1986) argument that the market reacts favourably to shorter-
term loans. This finding implies markets in non-government-controlled banking systems 
favour shorter-maturity bank loans, whereas markets in government-controlled banking 
systems such as China do not favour shorter-maturity bank loans. This is because borrowing 
firms are required to roll shorter-maturity bank loans over frequently. In non-government-
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controlled banking systems, it is the repeated refinancing transactions with the borrowers that 
make banks continuously re-evaluate the borrowing companies, thereby strengthening the 
banks’ unique ability to assess inside information and monitor the loans effectively. However, 
in government-controlled banking systems such as China, the complementary monitoring 
functions of shorter-maturity bank loans cannot be implemented since the bank monitoring 
function is not efficient. Furthermore, many Chinese listed firms use short-term loans to fund 
long-term assets (Bailey et al., 2010).  
The results also show that the negative effect of a bank loan announcement is particularly 
significant for loans with covenants/collateral for the sample period 1996 to 2004. This 
finding is consistent with Demiroglu and James’ (2007), James and Smith’s (2000), Park’s 
(2000) and Rajan and Winton’s (1995) argument that there is larger information content in 
bank loan announcements for loans with covenants/collateral. This implies markets in non-
government-controlled banking systems favour bank loans with covenants/collateral, whereas 
markets in government-controlled banking systems such as China do not favour bank loans 
with covenants/collateral. This is because, in non-government-controlled banking systems, the 
presence of debt with covenants/collateral increases the banks’ incentive to monitor by 
increasing the sensitivity of a lenders’ return to information or by decreasing the banks’ 
payoff if it does not monitor. However, in government-controlled banking systems such as 
China, the complementary monitoring functions of covenants/collateral cannot be 
implemented since the bank monitoring function is not efficient. Indeed, many controlling 
shareholders in Chinese listed firms expropriate minority shareholders through loan 
guarantees to related parties (Berkman, Cole & Fu, 2009).  
The negative effect of a bank loan announcement is particularly significant for non-syndicated 
loans, signifying that the Chinese stock market does not favour non-syndicated loans for the 
sample period 1996 to 2004. This finding contradicts Aintablian and Roberts’ (2000), Chen 
and Tsai’s (2006), Fery et al.’s (2003) and Preece and Mullineaux’s (1996) argument that 
markets in non-government-controlled banking systems view non-syndicated loans 
favourably. Preece and Mullineaux (1996) argue that the capacity to renegotiate a bank loan is 
relatively inexpensive in corporate restructuring and should complement monitoring as a 
source of value to borrowers. Consequently, as the number of lenders increases in a syndicate, 
contracting costs increase and the capacity to renegotiate declines. However, in government-
controlled banking systems such as China, banks operate in a relatively non-competitive 
environment because of the dominant (albeit declining) share of state-owned banks in total 
lending and continuing political intervention. In addition, under soft budget constraints, it is 
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not costly for borrowing firms to switch banks. Thus, non-syndicated loans in China are not 
favoured by the stock market since Chinese listed firms do not use non-syndicated loans to 
enhance contractual flexibility and limit contracting costs. Furthermore, the result shows that 
there is no significant market response to syndicated bank loan announcements in the Chinese 
financial market. This result contradicts Houston and James’ (1996) and Rajan’s (1992) 
argument that multiple bank lending or syndicated loans could enhance contractual flexibility 
and limit hold-up problems, which result in a statistically positive relationship between the 
borrowers’ abnormal returns and syndicate size. This may be because the sample of 
syndicated loans is quite small (5 out of 501) in this study.   
Collectively, contrary to previous studies that show a larger positive response to bank loan 
announcements for loans with larger size, shorter maturity, with covenants/collateral and with 
less syndication in non-government-controlled banking systems, this study’s results reveal 
there is a larger negative response to bank loan announcements for loans with larger size, 
shorter maturity, with covenants/collateral and with less syndication in the Chinese financial 
market for the sample period 1996 to 2004. These results imply that the market recognises 
that the complementary monitoring functions of traditional loan characteristics employed by 
banks in loan contracts are not efficient in China. Thus, the stock market in China does not 
favour bank loans with a complementary monitoring function, such as larger size, shorter 
maturity, with covenants/collateral and with less syndication.  
Finally, the results show a significantly negative market response for loans used for capital 
expenditure, repaying old debts and no specific purpose, whereas loans for long term 
investment display a non-significant market reaction for the sample period 1996 to 2004. This 
finding is consistent with Bailey et al.’s (2010) study that there is a significantly negative 
market response for loans used to repay old loans, but fails to support Bailey et al.’s (2010) 
finding that there is a significantly negative market response for loans for long term 
investment. The inconsistent result could be due to the different criteria in classifying loan 
purpose. For example, this study classifies loans for long term investment according to the 
statements in contracts but Bailey et al. (2010) regard loans used by heavy industry as loans 
for long term investment. Thus the loan purpose is an important characteristic that can affect 
the magnitude of the bank loan announcement effect in the Chinese financial market.  
Conducting several cross-sectional regression analyses, the results show that the negative 
market response to bank loan announcements is much stronger for loans from state owned or 
controlled banks, for borrowers with smaller size and for loans with shorter maturities for the 
sample period 1996 to 2004. These results are partly consistent with Bailey et al.’s (2010) 
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finding that the negative market response to bank loan announcements is much stronger for 
borrowers of smaller size. 
5.3.3 Results for Research Objective Three and their Implications 
Research objective three examines the incidence of the expropriation problem of the banking 
system by the controlling shareholder among companies listed on the Chinese Stock 
Exchange. 
The empirical results show that the negative market reaction to bank loan announcements is 
stronger for borrowing firms with a divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights. In 
addition, the results show that the negative market reaction to bank loan announcements is 
stronger if the performance has deteriorated in the announcement year for the sample period 
1996 to 2004. These results imply that the negative effect of a bank loan announcement is 
particularly significant for borrowing firms that have a higher possibility of expropriation or 
tunnelling. These findings are consistent with Bailey et al.’s (2010) and Shen et al.’s (2007) 
argument that the banking system is directly involved in “tunnelling”, that is, controlling 
shareholders in listed firms may use bank loans to pursue their private benefit. In addition, the 
result shows that the negative reaction to bank loan announcements is stronger for borrowing 
firms controlled by the state or state-related institutions than for borrowing firms controlled 
by non-state or non-state-related institutions. This result is consistent with Bailey et al.’s 
(2010), Shen et al.’s (2007) and Tian’s (2004) argument that borrowing firms with a larger 
concentration of state ownership may be subject to non value-maximising goals and signals a 
higher possibility of expropriation of funds.  
These results imply that approval of a bank loan is perceived by the Chinese stock market as a 
negative signal if bank loans are associated with problematic borrowing firms. This negative 
market response to bank loan announcements is particularly strong for borrowing firms with a 
higher possibility of expropriation or tunnelling since the controlling shareholders in such 
borrowing firms are more likely to engage in transferring or tunnelling borrowed funds. This 
negative market response to bank loan announcements is also particularly strong for 
borrowing firms controlled by the state or state-related institutions. This is because firms 
controlled by the state or state-related institutions, as the main source of employment and 
social safety net, are more likely to be supported in the Chinese financial market whether they 
are healthy or distressed (Bailey et al., 2010; Brandt &Zhu, 2000; Dobson & Kashyap, 2006). 
Thus, borrowing firms controlled by the state or state-related institutions may pursue political 
objectives that are often different from profit maximisation. In addition, the expropriation 
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problem in borrowing firms controlled by the state or state-related institutions is likely to be 
more serious since such firms easily obtain bank loans given the political mandate of Chinese 
banks (Bailey et al., 2010). Therefore, the negative bank loan announcement effect is greater 
for borrowing firms controlled by the state or state-related institutions in the Chinese financial 
market.  
In summary, the results show that the negative market response to bank loan announcements 
is much stronger for borrowing firms with a greater divergence in voting and cash-flow rights 
of the ultimate controlling shareholder, with a greater decrease in their performance in the 
announcement year and controlled by the state or state-related institutions for the sample 
period 1996 to 2004. These findings are consistent with Bailey et al. (2010) and Shen et al. 
(2007) who suggest that expropriation of the banking system by the controlling shareholder 
exists among Chinese listed firms.   
5.3.4 Results for Research Objective Four and their Implications 
Research objective four evaluates the influence (or effectiveness) of ownership structure and 
internal corporate governance mechanisms in limiting or controlling the magnitude of the 
expropriation problem between Chinese listed firms and banks.  
The results show that the negative market reaction to bank loan announcements is stronger for 
borrowing firms with lower power balance in their ownership structure, lower percentage of 
independent directors on the borrower board, fewer borrower board meetings in the previous 
year, smaller supervisory board size and fewer borrower supervisory board meetings in the 
previous year for the sample period 1996 to 2004. In addition, the results show that the 
negative reaction to bank loan announcements is stronger for borrowing firms with a smaller 
board size for the sample period 1996 to 2004. This finding is consistent with Goodstein, 
Gautam and Boeker’s (1994), Jensen and Murphy’s (1990), Pearce and Zahra’s (1992) and 
Pfeffer’s (1973) argument that the board’s capacity for monitoring increases as more directors 
are added since directors come from more diverse backgrounds, but contradicts Bhagat and 
Black’s (2002), Eisenberg et al.’s (1998) and Yermack’s (1996) argument that small boards of 
directors are more effective. The reason for such a contradiction may be that it is difficult for 
controlling shareholders to control the board of directors as the board size and diversity 
increases in Chinese listed firms.  
As discussed previously, the negative market response to bank loan announcements is 
particularly strong for borrowing firms with a higher possibility of expropriation or tunnelling 
in the Chinese financial market for the sample period 1996 to 2004 since the controlling 
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shareholders in such borrowing firms are more likely to engage in transferring or tunnelling 
borrowed funds. Furthermore, the results show that the Chinese stock market appears to 
respond negatively to bank loan announcements for borrowing firms that are weakly governed, 
that is, borrowing firms that lack efficient expropriation-reduction mechanisms that could 
mitigate the expropriation problem of the banking system by controlling shareholders for the 
sample period 1996 to 2004. These findings imply that a higher power balance, a relatively 
larger board size, a higher percentage of independent directors on the borrower board, higher 
board meeting frequency, relatively larger supervisory board size and a higher supervisory 
board meeting frequency are more effective in controlling the magnitude of the expropriation 
problem between Chinese listed firms and banks.  
The results also show a significantly negative market response for both borrowing firms with 
combined CEO-Chair structure and borrowing firms with separating CEO-Chair structure for 
the sample period 1996 to 2004. This finding is consistent with Gomes and Novaes’ (2005) 
and Shi and Shitu’s (2004) argument that the CEO and the chairman may be almost 
exclusively insiders if the ownership structure is highly concentrated. This is because the 
controlling shareholders typically have the ability to appoint their “own candidate” as CEO, 
i.e., having separate CEO-Chair structures, but both the CEO and chairman represent 
controlling shareholders’ interests. However, the result contradicts Boyd’s (1995), Brown and 
Caylor’s (2006), Core et al.’s (1999), and Mak and Li’s (2001) findings that the separation of 
CEO and chair positions will reduce agency costs and improve monitoring ability. The result 
shows that there is no significant difference in the market response for both borrowing firms 
with combined CEO-Chair structure and borrowing firms with separate CEO-Chair structure. 
This result implies that the separation of CEO and chair is not an effective mechanism in 
controlling the magnitude of the expropriation problem between Chinese listed firms and 
banks. This is because the ownership in Chinese publicly listed firms tends to be highly 
concentrated rather than diversified. Both CEO and the chairman are typically appointed by 
the controlling shareholders directly in proportion to their shareholding (Cheung et al., 2005; 
Ho, 2003). The CEO and the chairman may be almost exclusively insiders in Chinese listed 
firms. Thus, the Chinese stock market does not favour bank loans to either borrowing firms 
with combined CEO-Chair structure or borrowing firms with separate CEO-Chair structure.   
Finally, the empirical results show that borrowing firms issuing offshore shares, such as B, H 
or N shares, display significantly positive abnormal returns, whereas bank loan 
announcements from borrowing firms without offshore shares generate significantly negative 
abnormal returns for the sample period 1996 to 2004. This finding is consistent with Bai et 
 124 
al.’s (2004) and Bailey et al.’s (2010) argument that companies that have issued offshore 
shares, such as B, H or N shares, are subject to stricter legal rules and more transparent 
financial disclosure requirements. In addition, the monitoring systems of foreign investors are 
relatively more sophisticated. The empirical results show that the Chinese stock market 
favours bank loans to borrowing firms with offshore shares. This result implies that firms 
with offshore shares are generally better governed and can effectively control the magnitude 
of the expropriation problem between Chinese listed firms and banks.  
In summary, this study found that the negative market response to bank loan announcements 
is much stronger for borrowing firms without offshore shares for the sample period 1996 to 
2004. However, Bailey et al. (2010) find that the coefficient for offshore shares is not 
statistically significant in all their regressions. Bailey et al.’s (2010) finding may be due to the 
very small sample size, only 12 borrowing firms with offshore shares in their sample.  
5.4 Policy Implication 
The findings of this study have several important implications for policy-makers and 
regulators in China. The findings yield some suggestions for policy makers to implement 
reform in Chinese banking system, minimise the magnitude of the expropriation problem 
between Chinese listed firms and banks and improve the performance of Chinese listed firms 
in order to increase the efficiency of Chinese banking system.  
The empirical finding shows that stock values for Chinese borrower firms typically decline 
significantly around bank loan announcements for the sample period 1996 to 2004. 
Furthermore, these negative announcement effects are heightened for loans from banks with 
higher government ownership and strong political interference. These findings imply that the 
Chinese stock market appears to free from government intervention which curtail efficiency 
of bank loans. This is because, with a high degree of government ownership, Chinese banks 
tend to pursue political objectives and can not make their decisions on commercial basis. Thus, 
restricting the share of government ownership is a possible solution to reduce the government 
intervention in Chinese banks.  
However, restricting the share of government does not imply total privatisation of Chinese 
state owned or controlled banks. The government’s huge percentage in banks’ ownership 
structures makes it difficult for individuals or institutional investors to compete through 
Greenfield investment and direct participation in Chinese state-owned banks. Inviting 
strategic investors to participate in state-owned banks to diversify ownership and improve 
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management quality, turning state-owned banks into publicly listed banks and letting public 
to supervise these banks were some possible solutions.  
Introducing strategic investors can diversify ownership structures of stated-owned banks and 
limit “one dominating state-owned stock monopolizes” in Chinese banking system. Under 
diversified ownership structure, the power of the government in Chinese banks can be diluted, 
and therefore the government intervention can be reduced. If Chinese banks can have 
autonomy to make decisions based on commercial principles, they would be able to make full 
use of uniquely informational advantages to solve the information asymmetry problem 
between banks and borrowers and monitor borrowing firms effectively. Bank loan 
announcements, therefore, would convey positive signal to the stock market.  
However, the result shows no significantly positive market response to bank loan 
announcements in the Chinese financial market for the sample period 2005 to 2009 although 
the Chinese banking system has been improved following a series of reforms. This result 
implies that reforms in Chinese banking system have not been completed and thus the 
government interference in the banking system is still substantial in certain areas. In addition, 
following the subprime loan crisis, a number of overseas strategic investors have chosen to 
cash out their shares held in Chinese banks once they became tradable to offset their heavy 
losses occurred outside of China during the crisis. For example, the Royal Bank of Scotland 
have sold all BOC shares they held, profiting by about 800 million pounds and the UBS have 
sold all BOC shares they held profiting by about $335 million toward the end of 2008. Bank 
of America, a strategic investor in the CBC, reduced its holding and profited $ 1.1 billion. 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., a foreign strategic investor of the ICBC, sold 3.03 billion H 
shares of the ICBC in 2009 (CSC Staff Shanghai, 2009). At the same time, the investment of 
foreign banks is questionable given recent failures in the U.S. and the European banking 
systems. Therefore, inviting strategic investors to restrict the share of government ownership 
can not resolve the government interference in the Chinese banking system completely.  
Financial liberalisation is another possible solution to reduce the government intervention in 
Chinese banking reform. Over the past few years, China has already made substantial 
progress in financial liberalisation, such as gradually introducing market practices into the 
banking system, gradually freeing interest rate and opening up to foreign competition and 
fully opening up at the end of 2006 (Garcia-Herrero, Gavila & Santabarbara, 2006). However, 
the government interference in the banking system is still substantial in certain areas. For 
example, most Chinese banks still do not have enough autonomy to set the price of their 
deposit and lending rates since reform in interest rate liberalisation has not completed. 
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From 1996, the PBOC started the interest rate liberalisation process (The People’s Bank of 
China, 2005). Most of necessary steps towards interest rate liberalisation in China have been 
already taken (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 Key dates in interest rate liberalization in China 
Year Process 
1996 Abolished the upper limit on interbank lending rates 
1997 Liberalised repo rates 
1998-2004 Gradually increased the upper limit on lending rates 
1999 Begun to gradually allow different institutions to negotiate rates on over 
Y30 million deposits with above 5-year maturity 
2000 Liberalised foreign currency lending rates 
2000 Liberalised foreign currency deposit rates for deposits over $3 million 
2003 Removed floor on foreign currency deposit rates 
2003 Liberalised deposit rates in Pound, Franc, Swiss Franc, and Canadian Dollar 
2004 Liberalised all foreign currency deposit rates with maturity above 1 year 
2004 Removed ceiling on all lending rates (except for urban and rural credit 
cooperatives, which have a cap of 130 percent over reference rates) 
2004 Removed floor on all deposit rates 
Source: The People’s Bank of China (2005) and Feyzioglu, Porter and Takats (2009) 
After years of reform, however, progress towards interest rate deregulation has stalled with 
the lending rate floors and deposit rate ceilings still remain (Feyzioglu et al., 2009). The 
removals of the ceiling on the lending rate and the floor on the deposit rate allowed 
commercial banks flexibility in setting prices after October 2004 (The People’s Bank of China, 
2005). However, the lower limit on the lending rate restricts competition for loans and the 
upper limit on the deposit restricts competition for deposits. Few banks can improve the 
lending rate or lower the deposit rate, because, if they do so, they would lose clients. Indeed, 
Chinese banks are not commercial based because the price of deposit and lending is still 
controlled by the PBOC.  
In addition, current floor on the reference lending rate and the ceiling on reference deposit can 
offer a safe margin for commercial banks to maintain a relatively high net interest (Figure 5.1). 
Therefore, as long as banks make loans, they can make profits. There is no need for most 
commercial banks to change their lending operations significantly. Most of lending may still 
be directed to SOEs, including some unprofitable SOEs, which have implicit guarantees from 
the government. This safe and stable interest margin set by the PBOC provides little incentive 
for banks to improve their efficiency in credit allocation and monitoring of the loan 
performance. 
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Figure 5.1 Reference rate on loans and deposits 
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Furthermore, interest rate controls limit the competition among banks. Non-state banks, 
particular foreign banks, can not break the market monopoly of state banks, resulting in an 
inefficient use of credits and serious structural imbalances in Chinese banking system. The 
role of foreign competition is limited even with WTO commitments. Therefore, the Chinese 
banking industry is still dominated by state owned or controlled bank. The government 
intervention in Chinese banking sector is still very large. Chinese banks may be influenced by 
the government and pressured to issue loans to pursue the political interests and can not make 
full use of their advantages in collecting information about borrowers and subsequently 
provide effective monitoring services. Bank loan announcements still can not transfer positive 
signals to the stock market.  
Therefore, interest rate liberalisation is a necessary building block for China to reduce 
government interference and enhance the role of market forces in credit allocation. The PBOC 
should deregulate deposit and lending rate to allow commercial banks to decide all their 
commercial rates in accordance with market forces. The PBOC is advised to remove the 
deposit rate, lending rate and their ceiling and floor requirement, but simply set one prime rate 
on which commercial banks borrow for short-term liquidity.  
However, when interest rate constraints are removed, competitions between banks may 
encourage banks to enter risky businesses and support excessive borrowing in the economy if 
there is no appropriate regulation and supervision (Feyzioglu et al., 2009). Therefore, CBRC 
should design vigilant regulatory and supervisory frameworks to keep up with the changing 
financial landscape and guard against the banking crisis from aggressive competition between 
banks. The PBOC should conduct proactive monetary policy to contain excessive lending. 
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Moreover, the PBOC should strengthen indirect monetary policy instruments, as direct 
control over interest rates and credit quantity are removed following interest rate deregulation. 
In summary, it is possible for China to implement interest rate deregulation to reduce the 
government intervention in Chinese banks. However, precautionary banking regulation, 
supervision and monetary policy should be taken into account to ensure risks that followed 
interest rate deregulation are controlled.  
The results also provide broader picture of China’s economy. Over the past few years, the 
Chinese government has frequently tried to influence bank lending decisions to favour SOEs 
to increase production, accelerate economic growth, and maintain employment. However, 
even if this administrative practice is temporarily successful, in the long run, it impedes the 
sustainable development of Chinese banks and enterprises. This in turn could lead to massive 
unemployment and social unrest as Chinese banks and enterprises collapse, thus threatening 
the stability in China and beyond. Therefore, China’s sustainable development urgently 
requires reduction of massive government intervention in the Chinese banking system. 
However, reforms in the Chinese banking system can not be independent of the reforms in 
other areas such as reforms in SOEs and social welfare systems. This is because, if the banks 
have autonomy and incentives to make sound decisions, they would not continually subsidise 
poor-performing SOEs. If the SOEs do not have easy access to credits, they would either have 
to improve their production efficiency or declare bankrupt. Therefore, efforts should be taken 
by the Chinese government to help SOEs to become more efficient and independent. China 
has made some substantial progress in reforming SOEs. Many small SOEs have been 
privatised or outright shut down, while larger SOEs have downsized through shedding some 
surplus labour. Despite improvements in SOEs, reforms have not completed due to concerns 
about possible social unrest results from laid-off workers. Therefore, reforms in Chinese 
banking system and SOEs should be accompanied by establishing and developing functioning 
social welfare system to provide unemployed person with benefits, pensions, and health 
insurance. If the social welfare system can function well to solve possible social unrest 
resulting from reforms in the banking system and SOEs, the Chinese government do not need 
to intervene in banks’ lending behaviour, and therefore, banks can have autonomy to make 
decisions based on commercial principles. Chinese banks can take advantage of inside 
information they possess to assess firms’ perspectives, issue loans to borrowing firms that 
have bright perspectives and monitor borrowers effectively. Therefore, the Chinese stock 
market can have confidence in the efficiency of bank loans, and respond positively to bank 
loan announcements.  
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The research findings also can help academics, policy-makers and practitioners identify why 
the Chinese banking system is directly involved in expropriation by controlling shareholders 
among Chinese listed firms. This is because the ownership structure of China’s listed firms is 
highly concentrated with successive layers of holding companies through parallel or pyramid 
structures, which results in divergence between the control rights and the cash-flow rights of 
controlling shareholders. The expropriation problems of the banking system by the controlling 
shareholder among Chinese listed firms are exacerbated when controlling shareholders are 
state or state-related institutions. This is because state ownership of both Chinese banks and 
Chinese listed firms brings about soft budget constraints, which give the controlling 
shareholder a free hand over a larger pool of bank loans. It is therefore important for policy-
makers and regulators to make concerted efforts to minimise expropriation and achieve better 
corporate performance.  
In order to prevent expropriation of the banking system by the controlling shareholder, 
Chinese authorities should consummate laws and regulations to protect the rights of the 
banking system. In addition, the authorities should further diversify Chinese bank ownership 
structure and improve the role of strategic investors in domestic banks. If the Chinese banking 
system is not dominated by state owned or controlled banks, banks are able to make their 
lending decisions based on the borrowers’ profitability, not the availability of funds. At the 
same time, Chinese listed firms, particular SOEs, have to face hard budget constraints where 
controlling shareholders in Chinese listed firms cannot embezzle bank loans easily. 
Furthermore, Chinese banks should be given a comprehensive and legitimate set of rules by 
the Chinese legislature to monitor Chinese listed firms and participate in the governance of 
listed companies.  
The results also show that expropriation in the banking system by the controlling shareholders 
can be mitigated by some effective mechanisms including ownership-related arrangements 
and corporate governance mechanism related arrangements These results suggest that efforts 
are needed to improve the power balance in complex ownership structures with multiple large 
shareholders and improve the role of the board of directors and supervisory board, such as 
strengthening the independence of the board, advocating the board function of strategic 
management to prevent manipulation by large shareholders, clearly defining the function of 
the supervisory board and increasing the independence of that board. 
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5.5 Limitations  
There are several limitations to this study. First, this study suffered from sample selection bias. 
Chinese publicly listed firms, represent only a small proportion of China’s enterprises. Only 
relative large and perhaps a better-performed group of enterprises can obtain approval to be 
listed. Chinese listed firms started more or less on an equal basis since they undertook the 
same corporatisation process required by CSRC (Xu & Wang, 1997, 1999). Thus, it is clear 
that publicly listed companies are not representative of all enterprises in China. The sample 
selection bias suffered by this study is unavoidable in the context of the Chinese data setting. 
Secondly, there have been many studies of the market response to bank loan announcements 
in non-government-controlled banking systems. However, research on the market response to 
bank loan announcements in government-controlled banking systems, particularly in China, is 
still in its early stage. Only three studies were identified in the literature (see Cui & Zhao, 
2004; Bailey et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2007). This restricts the number of comparisons of the 
empirical results in this study with existing literature. The upside, however, is that this study 
provides an avenue for future research.  
5.6 Suggestions for Future Research 
Future studies might consider mitigating the political interference in banking system and 
withdrawing soft budget constraints. In China, state owned or controlled banks are subject to 
government intervention and hence bear the burden of the “policy lending”. To a certain 
extent, the pressure of the government makes Chinese banks operate at low efficiency, 
evidenced by a large proportion of NPLs or misdirected credit (Dobson & Kashyap, 2006; 
Leung et al. 2002; Tian, 2001b, 2004). For example, comparing China and other major Asian 
economies in recent years, Allen et al. (2008) show that the number of NPLs is the highest in 
China and the profitability of China’s banking system is the lowest for the same group of 
countries. In addition, dual government ownership of banks and most listed companies 
inevitably results in soft budget constraints. Under soft budget constraints, a bank loan is 
indeed a catalyst for expropriation. That is, the bank loan gives the controlling shareholder a 
free hand over a larger pool of capital. Therefore, mitigating political interference in the 
banking system and withdrawing soft budget constraints are fundamental to improve 
allocation efficiency within China, control the magnitude of the expropriation problem 
between Chinese listed firms and banks and improve the performance of both Chinese banks 
and listed firms. Thus, approaches to mitigate political interference in the banking system and 
withdrawing soft budget constraints deserve future researchers’ attention.  
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However, mitigating political interference in the banking system does not mean reducing 
government regulation and supervision of the banking system. Weak bank regulations may 
lead to a series of kickbacks. For example, the 2008 financial crisis was caused by global 
macro liquidity policies and a poor regulatory framework (Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson & Lee, 
2008). Thus, the extent of government intervention in banks that can improve banking 
supervision and regulation and, at the same time, avoid excess intervention deserves future 
consideration.   
The expropriation problem and corporate governance in Chinese listed firms will be 
interesting areas of research, particularly since most companies have completed the share-split 
reform and the non-marketable shareholdings of state-owned enterprises and other central 
government nominees are transformed into liquid assets. Lu, Balatbat & Czernkowski (2008) 
argue that the share-split reform is expected to bring substantial benefits to the development 
of the Chinese capital market, for example, depth in liquidity of the A-share market, uniform 
valuation basis of A-shares, better alignment of interests between shareholders and managers 
and minority interests and improvement in the companies’ corporate governance structure. 
Therefore, the role of the share-split reform in mitigating the expropriation between Chinese 
listed firms and banks and improving corporate governance should be addressed in future 
research.  
5.7 Conculsions  
This study investigates the market response to bank loan announcements in the Chinese 
financial market. Contrary to previous studies on bank loan announcements in non-
government-controlled banking systems, this study found that, using bank loan 
announcements from 1996 to 2004, there are significant declines in the stock values of 
Chinese borrowing firms at times of bank loan announcements. This is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that both positive and negative bank loan announcement effects are 
possible, depending on whether the banking system is run on purely commercial goals in non-
government-controlled banking systems or is subject to political intervention in government-
controlled banking systems. In non-government-controlled banking systems, the lending 
practices of commercial banks are based only on commercial considerations and profit-
maximising and banks do indeed play a unique role in generating information and thus 
reducing information asymmetries. Only creditworthy borrowing firms can obtain bank loans 
and bank loan announcements are favoured by the stock market. However, in government-
controlled banking systems such as China, state owned or controlled banks may lend to 
poorly performing firms for political reasons such as avoiding unemployment and social 
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instability rather than economic considerations. If these weak borrowing firms are prevalent, 
the direction of the market response to bank loan announcements is negative and vice versa. 
The empirical results of this study show that under the pressure from the government 
management, Chinese banks still assume a large amount of policy lending to avert 
unemployment and potential social instability in the country. The effectiveness of the 
monitoring role of banks in China is also lessened by government intervention. In addition, 
poorly-performing borrowers are prevalent in China. 
The negative effect is particularly significant for loans from Big Four state banks, state owned 
or controlled banks, banks with lower ranking and banks in provinces with lower 
marketization level in credit allocation for the sample period 1996 to 2004. These findings 
imply that banks in China are generally under political interference and pressure to issue loans 
for non value-maximising purposes. Loans from banks with the higher state ownership and 
stronger political interference transmit negative signals.  
The negative effect is particularly significant for problematic borrowing firms including firms 
that are opaque, have a higher possibility of expropriation or tunnelling, have ineffective 
expropriation-reduction mechanisms, are controlled by the state and are in financial distress 
for the sample period 1996 to 2004. These findings imply that approval of a bank loan is 
perceived by the Chinese stock market as a particularity negative signal if the borrowing firm 
measures poorly on quality and creditworthiness.  
The negative effect is also particularly significant for loans of a greater amount, shorter term, 
with covenants/collateral and less syndication for the sample period 1996 to 2004. These 
findings imply that, in government-controlled banking systems such as China, the 
complementary monitoring functions of loan characteristics in loan contracts, such as greater 
amount, shorter term, with covenants/collateral and less syndication cannot be effectively 
implemented since the bank monitoring function is inadequate and inefficient.  
This study also finds that there is a significant difference in the market response to bank loan 
announcements among different industries and different loan purposes for the sample period 
1996 to 2004. This implies that the industry to which a borrowing firm belongs and the loan 
purpose are important characteristics that can affect the magnitude of the bank loan 
announcement effect in both non-government-controlled banking systems and government-
controlled banking systems.  
However, using bank loan announcements from 2005 to 2009, the significantly negative 
market response to bank loan announcements in the Chinese financial market for the sample 
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period 1996 to 2004 disappears. This implies that the government intervention in China’s 
banks may be reduced following a series of reforms that started in 2005. Chinese banks, thus, 
may have more autonomy to grant loans according to market criteria. As the Chinese banking 
system improves further, the unfavourable view of the Chinese stock market on bank loan 
announcements should disappear eventually.  
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     Appendix A 
Event Studies on the Impact of Bank Loan Announcements on Borrower Firm Price 
Studies Country Period All 
Loans 
(%) 
Public 
Debts 
(%) 
Private 
Placements 
(%) 
Bank 
Loans  
(%) 
Type and Number of 
Announcements 
Mainly Lender/Loan/Borrower 
Characteristics 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 
(Z-Value) 
US 
 
1972-1982  NS NS 0.89 
(2.58)*** 
Credit Agreements (155) 
James (1987) 
(Z-Value) 
US 
 
1974-1983  NS －0.91 
(－1.87)* 
1.93 
(3.96)*** 
Bank Loan Announcements (80) 
James and Wier (1988)  US 1973-1983  NS －0.91* 1.93*** Financing Announcements (207) 
Public Straight Debt (90)/  
Private Placement of Debt (30)/ 
Bank Loan Agreement (80) 
Bank Credit Agreements (728) 
Revised (357)/New (371) 
1.24 (4.33)***/－0.01 (NS) 
Lummer and McConnell 
(1989) 
(Z-Value) 
US 1976-1986    0.61 
(2.69)*** 
Favourable (259)/ 
Unfavourable (22) 
0.87 (3.76) ***/ 
－3.96 (－3.28)*** 
Loan Agreements (273) 
Renewals (124)/Initiations (149) 
1.55 (4.16)***/1.09 (3.09)*** 
Slovin et al. (1992) 
(Z-Value) 
 
 
 
US 1980-1986    1.30 
(5.08)*** 
Small firms (156)/ 
Large firms (117) 
1.92 (5.35)***/0.48 (NS) 
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Studies Country Period All 
Loans 
(%) 
Public 
Debts 
(%) 
Private 
Placements 
(%) 
Bank 
Loans  
(%) 
Type and Number of 
Announcements 
Mainly Lender/Loan/Borrower 
Characteristics 
Bank Credit Agreements (491) 
Renewals (304)/New (187) 
0.36 (1.97)**/0.26 (NS) 
Best and Zhang (1993) 
(Z-Value) 
US 1977-1989    0.32 
(2.31)** 
Noisy Renewals (156)/ 
Accurate New (187) 
0.60 (2.35)**/－0.05 (NS) 
McDonald (1994) 
(Z-Value) 
US 1980-1986    0.64 
(1.99)** 
Loan Commitment 
Announcements (250) 
Loan Agreements (439) Preece and Mullineaux 
(1994) 
(Z-Value) 
US 1980-1987   1.84 
(4.25)*** 
0.79 
(3.77)*** Bank (387)/Non-bank (36)/ 
Non-bank BHC Subsidiaries (16) 
0.79 (3.77)***/1.84 (4.25)***/ 
2.77 (3.84)*** 
Syndicated Loan Announcements 
(574)  
Armitage (1995b) 
(T-Value) 
UK 1988-1991     NS 
New Facilities (363)/ 
Increase Facilitates (36) 
NS/0.73 (2.03)** 
Loans (626) 
Renewals (187)/New Banks (51) 
1.09 (2.83)***/0.65 (1.88)* 
Billett et al. (1995) 
(T-Value) 
US 1980-1989 0.68 
(4.33)*** 
 1.08a 
(1.58) 
0.63 
(3.63)*** 
Bank’s Rating  
AAA (78) < BAA (29) 
0.63 (2.83)***/－0.57 (NS) 
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Studies 
  
Country Period All 
Loans 
(%) 
Public 
Debts 
(%) 
Private 
Placements 
(%) 
Bank 
Loans  
(%) 
Type and Number of 
Announcements 
Mainly Lender/Loan/Borrower 
Characteristics 
All Uncontaminated Bank Loan 
Announcements (328) 
Unsecured (194)/Secured (52)/ 
Unknown (82) 
1.00 (NS)/0.62 (NS)/ 
1.66 (3.83)*** 
Revolving (282)/Term(29)/ 
Unknown (17) 
1.42 (4.18)***/0.36 (NS)/ 
－2.80 (－2.28)** 
Short (87)/Long (142)/ 
Unknown (99) Maturity 
0.49 (NS)/1.74 (4.33)***/ 
0.73 (NS) 
One (185)/Two – Five (70)/Five or 
More (64)/Unknown (9) 
Participating Banks 
1.58 (3.49)/0.42 (NS)/ 
0.19 (NS)/3.14 (NS) 
Brumm (1996) 
(Z-Value) 
US 1987-1992    1.11 
(3/37)*** 
Initial (89)/Favourable Renewal 
(70)/Unfavourable Renewal 
(18)/Terminations (6) 
2.01 (5.64)***/3.12 (6.12)***/ 
－4.86 (－8.33)***/ 
－13.15 (－6.79)*** 
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Studies Country Period All 
Loans 
(%) 
Public 
Debts 
(%) 
Private 
Placements 
(%) 
Bank 
Loans  
(%) 
Type and Number of 
Announcements 
Mainly Lender/Loan/Borrower 
Characteristics 
Small (183)/Medium (86)/ 
Large (59) Firms 
1.61 (3.92)***/0.68 (NS)/ 
0.17 (NS) 
1-Mining (26)/ 
2-Manufacturing (33)/ 
3-Manufacturing (113)/ 
4-Transportation (20)/ 
5-Trade (66)/ 
7-Services (43)/ 
8-Services (27) 
－0.13 (NS)/0.07 (NS)/ 
1.78 (3.01)***/2.45 (2.58)***/ 
1.39 (2.13)**/0.49 (NS)/0.03 (NS) 
 
 
 
Listed on NYSE/AMEX (143)/ 
Listed on NASDAQ (185) 
1.23 (2.13)**/1.01 (2.62)*** 
Loan Agreements (419) Preece and Mullineaux 
(1996) 
(Z-Value) 
US 1980-1987    1.00 
(5.17)*** No Syndicate (121)/ 
All Syndicate (325) 
1.79 (4.88)***/0.73 (3.32)*** 
Thakor (1996) 
(Z-Value) 
US 1989-1993    0.02% 
(6.63)*** 
Loan Commitments (161) 
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Studies Country Period All 
Loans 
(%) 
Public 
Debts 
(%) 
Private 
Placements 
(%) 
Bank 
Loans  
(%) 
Type and Number of 
Announcements 
Mainly Lender/Loan/Borrower 
Characteristics 
Corporate Loan (137) 
Renewals (35)/New (69)/ 
Restructuring (18) 
1.27 (3.52)***/0.62 (2.78)***/ 
3.46 (4.28)*** 
Aintablian and Roberts 
(2000) 
(T-Value) 
Canada 1988-1995   NS 1.23 
(5.62)*** 
Favourable (20)/Unfavourable (4) 
1.73 (3.98)***/－2.48 (NS) 
Bank Credit Agreements (122) 
(1) Lines of Credit 
<1988 (13)/>1988 (33) 
4.82 (NS)/0.32 (NS) 
André et al. (2001) 
(Z-Value) 
Canada 1982-1995    2.27 
(2.68)*** 
(2) Tem loans  
<1988(22)/>1988 (54) 
1.14 (NS)/3.3 (3.35)*** 
Corporate Loans (66) 
Public (30)/Private (36) 
－0.10 (NS)/0.48 (2.88)*** 
Bank (22)/Non-bank (14) 
0.84 (3.93)***/－0.083 (NS) 
Non-syndicated (18)/ 
Syndicated (18) 
0.15 (NS)/0.80 (3.41)*** 
New (27)/Renewal (9) 
0.70 (3.64)***/－0.18 (NS) 
Koh (2001) 
(T-Value) 
New 
Zealand 
1995-2000 0.22 
(1.77)* 
NS 0.48 
(2.88)*** 
0.84 
(3.93)*** 
Large Firms (22)/Small Firms (14) 
0.57 (2.69)***/0.33 (NS) 
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Studies Country Period All 
Loans 
(%) 
Public 
Debts 
(%) 
Private 
Placements 
(%) 
Bank 
Loans  
(%) 
Type and Number of Announcements 
Mainly Lender/Loan/Borrower 
Characteristics 
Hadlock and James (2002) 
(Z-Value) 
US 1980-1993   NS 1.45 
(3.44)*** 
Clean Bank Loans (144) 
All Corporate Loans (196) 
Published (45)/Non-published (151) 
Announcements 
1.19 (2.24)**/0.14 (NS) 
Fery et al. (2003) 
(T-Value) 
Australia 1983-1999   0.38 
(1.83)* 
 
Published: Single (18)/ 
                      Multiple (22) 
1.62 (2.30)**/0.88 (NS) 
Cui and Zhao (2004) 
(T-Value) 
China January 1, 
2004 
- 
May 20, 
2004 
   1.86 
(3.95)*** 
Bank Loan Announcements (53) 
Uncontaminated Bank Loan 
Announcements (128) 
Initiations (56)/Renewals (72) 
1.27 (2.83)***/1.23 (3.25)*** 
Local (67)/International (61) Lenders 
1.62 (3.65)***/0.84 (2.41)** 
Prior to (57)/After (71) 
Financial Crisis 
0.13 (NS)/4.61 (2.41)** 
Boscaljon and Ho (2005) 
(Z-Value) 
HK 
Korea 
Thailand 
Taiwan 
October 1, 
1991 
- 
April 30, 
2002 
   1.25 
(4.31)*** 
Hong Kong (44)/Korea (39) 
Taiwan (25)/Thailand (20) 
1.63 (3.94)***/2.61 (3.66)*** 
0.21 (NS)/－0.94 (NS) 
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Studies Country Period All 
Loans 
(%) 
Public 
Debts 
(%) 
Private 
Placements 
(%) 
Bank 
Loans  
(%) 
Type and Number of Announcements 
Mainly Lender/Loan/Borrower 
Characteristics 
－0.33***b 
－0.47c 
(－3.46)*** 
Billett et al. (2006) 
(T-Value) 
US 1980-2000    
－0.27d 
(－2.30)** 
Loans (10619) 
Syndicated Loan Announcements (40) 
Prior to (4)/After (36) 
Financial Crisis 
－0.50 (NS)/0.44 (1.86)* 
Large Firms (14)/Small Firms (26) 
－0.07 (NS)/0.58 (1.93)* 
High (20)/Low (20) Debt Ratio 
0.53 (1.91)*/0.17 (NS) 
High (20)/Low (20) Fixed Assets to 
Total Assets 
0.64 (1.95)*/0.06 (NS) 
Chen and Tsai (2006) 
(T-Value) 
Taiwan 1994-2003    0.28 
(1.75)* 
More (14)/Fewer (26) Arrangers in 
Syndication 
－0.20 (NS)/0.65 (2.18)** 
1980-2003 
0.46** 
Loan Announcements (1111) 
 
1980-1989 
0.60** 
1990-1999 
0.51** 
Fields et al. (2006) 
 
US 1980-2003    
2000-2003 
0.13 (NS) 
Renewals (594)/New (517) 
0.48*/0.45 (NS) 
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Studies Country Period All 
Loans 
(%) 
Public 
Debts 
(%) 
Private 
Placements 
(%) 
Bank 
Loans  
(%) 
Type and Number of 
Announcements 
Mainly Lender/Loan/Borrower 
Characteristics 
Bank Loan Agreements (122) 
Line of Credit (50)/ 
Term Loans (57)/ 
Both Terms Loans and Lines of 
Credit (15) 
1.33 (NS)/2.47 (2.34)***/ 
3.98 (2.86)*** 
New (92)/Revised (27)  
Credit Agreements  
1.97 (2.74)***/2.69 (NS) 
A Single Bank (40)/ 
Multiple Banks (82) 
3.44 (2.60)***/1.58 (1.89)* 
Mathieu et al. (2006) 
(T-Value) 
Canada  1984-1997    2.19 
(3.04)*** 
Separate (60)/Combined (57) 
CEO-Chair  
3.54 (3.50)***/0.55 (NS) 
All Syndications (2061) Le (2007) 
(Z-Value) 
US 1995-2000    0.39 
(3.22)*** Revolving Credits (1151)/ 
Term Loans (387)/ 
Hybrid Loans (123) 
0.47 (2.99)***/0.02 (NS)/ 
0.48 (NS) 
Shen et al. (2007) 
(T-Value) 
China January 1, 
2005 
- 
November 
18, 2005 
   －0.50 
(－2.07)** 
Bank Loan Announcements (225) 
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Studies Country Period All 
Loans 
(%) 
Public 
Debts 
(%) 
Private 
Placements 
(%) 
Bank 
Loans  
(%) 
Type and Number of 
Announcements 
Mainly Lender/Loan/Borrower 
Characteristics 
Bank Loan Announcements (285) 
Large Firm (142)/ 
Small Firm (142) 
－0.51 (NS)/－0.79 (－2.14)** 
Firms with Increase ROA (102)/ 
No Increase ROA (183) 
－0.20 (NS)/－0.90 (－2.84)*** 
Firms with Increase ROE (100)/ 
No Increase ROE (167) 
－0.58 (NS)/－0.61 (－1.93)* 
With (12)/Without (273)  
Offshore Shares  
0.30 (NS)/－0.68 (－2.74)*** 
Firms with (19)/without (266) 
Financial Distress 
0.31 (NS)/－0.71 (－2.82)*** 
High (142)/Low (142) Percentage 
of Largest Shareholder’s 
Ownership 
－1.13 (－3.23)***/－0.16 (NS) 
Non SOE (69)/SOE (216) Firms  
－0.40 (NS)/－0.72 (－2.40)*** 
Bailey et al. (2010) 
(T-Value) 
China 1999-2004    －0.64 
(－2.56)*** 
Firms in Heavy Industry (261)/ 
Other Industry (22) 
－0.63% (－2.41)***/－0.70 (NS) 
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Studies Country Period All 
Loans 
(%) 
Public 
Debts 
(%) 
Private 
Placements 
(%) 
Bank 
Loans  
(%) 
Type and Number of 
Announcements 
Mainly Lender/Loan/Borrower 
Characteristics 
Loans Used for Repaying Old 
Debts (66)/Other Purpose (219) 
－1.11 (－1.90)*/－0.50 (1.82)* 
Short (218) /Long (67) Maturity 
－0.66 (－2.22)**/－0.59 (NS) 
Loans Issued by Local Branches 
(142)/Headquarters or Main 
Provincial Branches (94) 
－0.63 (－1.75)*/－0.47 (NS) 
Big Four State Banks (118)/ 
Other Banks (94) 
－0.73 (－2.08)**/－0.58 (NS) 
       
State-owned Banks(278)/ 
Private Banks (3) 
－0.68 (－2.70)/4.70 (1.71)* 
Kang and Liu (2008) Japan 1985-2000    1.16*** Bank Loan Announcements (88) 
Clean Bank Loans (201) 
High (103)/Low (98) Monitoring 
Effort Lenders 
1.76 (2.72)***/0.14 (NS) 
Lee and Sharpe (2009) 
(T-Value) 
US 1995-1999    0.97 
(1.89)* 
High (108)/Low (91)/ No (2) 
Credit Rating Lenders 
1.92 (2.74)***/－0.12 (NS)/ 
－0.85 (NS) 
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This table lists the main findings of event studies tracing the impact of bank loan announcements on the stock prices of borrowing firms. The first 
column provides the studies citation. The second column reports the Country affiliation of the affected firms and the period during which the 
announcements were made are presented in the third column. The fourth column provides the market response to all loans announcements. The fifth 
column shows the market response to public debt announcements. The sixth column reports the market response to private placement announcements. 
The seventh column shows that the market response to bank loan announcements. The final column reports on the first row the type of announcement 
and the number of events and on the following row a number of mainly characteristics.  
* indicates significant at the 0.1 level; ** indicates significant at the 0.05 level; *** indicates significant at the 0.01 level; NS = non-significant.  
a T-test indicates insignificance at the 10% level (1.58), but the test statistic is significant at the 10% level (Billett et al., 1995) 
b
 This figure is the mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns (Billett et al., 2006) 
c
 Billett et al. (2006) found that when the event portfolio were equally-weighted, the borrowing firms’ subsequent abnormal returns were average -
0.47% monthly if using calendar time portfolio analysis.  
d
 Billett et al. (2006) found that when the event portfolio were value-weighted, the borrowing firms’ subsequent abnormal returns were average -0.27% 
monthly if using calendar time portfolio analysis. 
Studies Country Period All 
Loans 
(%) 
Public 
Debts 
(%) 
Private 
Placements 
(%) 
Bank 
Loans  
(%) 
Type and Number of 
Announcements 
Mainly Lender/Loan/Borrower 
Characteristics 
Bank Loan Announcements (985) Ongena and Roscovan (2009) US 1980-2003     0.45*** 
In-state (128)/ 
Neighbour-state (77)/ 
Non-neighbour State(523)/ 
Foreign (257) 
0.44 (NS)/ －0.20 
(NS)/0.32*/0.91*** 
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     Appendix B 
Summary of Impact on Bank Loan Announcement Effects 
by Lender, Borrower and Loan Characteristics 
Characteristics  Predicted impact on loan announcement 
abnormal return 
Lender   
Bank 0 
   Monitoring Ability 
      Reputation/Credit Rating 
      Size 
      Monitoring Effort 
   Ranking 
   Location 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
Non-bank 0 
Borrower  
   Size  － 
   Credit Rating － 
   Risk/Financial distress + 
   Expropriation problem － 
   Industry 0 
Loan  
   New 0 
Borrower has existing relationship  + 
No existing relationship/avoid rents + 
   Renewal + 
      Favourable  + 
      Unfavourable － 
      Mixed 0 
   Restructuring  + 
      Borrower’s distress known + 
      Borrower’s distress unknown 0 
   Maturity 0 
   Covenant/Collateral + 
   Syndication  0 
   Purpose  0 
   Size 0 
 
+ indicates positive effect, － indicates negative effects and 0 indicates that the effect is not 
sure 
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     Appendix C 
Definition and Computation of All Variables Used in the 
Study 
Name Definition Type 
BIG4_BANK Dummy variable equals to 1 if the lender 
is one of Big Four state banks, and 0 
otherwise 
Dummy 
BANK_OWNERSHIP Dummy variable equals to 1 if the lender 
is one of the state owned or controlled 
banks, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
BANK_RANKING Dummy variable equals to 1 if a loan is 
issued by a bank’s local branches below 
the provincial level, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
BANK_LOCATION Dummy variable equals to 1 if the bank 
in the province with the lower 
marketization level in credit allocation, 
and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
The natural logarithm of total asset Continuous BORROWER_SIZE 
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the 
natural logarithm of total asset is less 
than the median the natural logarithm of 
total asset of all the listed firms in the 
relevant year, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
DCC The divergence between cash-flow rights 
and control rights 
Continuous 
ROA After tax profits divided by the book 
value of total assets 
Continuous 
DROA The difference in ROA between year 
prior to bank loan announcement and 
bank loan announcement year 
Continuous 
Tq_70 The measurement of Tobin’s Q taking 
into account of illiquidity discounts of 
70% 
Continuous 
Tq_80 The measurement of Tobin’s Q taking 
into account of illiquidity discounts of 
80% 
Continuous 
DTq_70 The difference in Tobin’s Q taking into 
account of illiquidity discounts of 70% 
between year prior to bank loan 
announcement and bank loan 
announcement year 
Continuous 
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP Dummy variable equals to 1 if the state 
ultimately controls the company, and 0 
otherwise  
Dummy 
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Name Definition Type 
Z-INDEX The total shareholding owned by the largest 
shareholder divided by the total shareholding 
owned by the second largest shareholder 
Continuous 
CR5－CR1 The total shareholding owned by the top five 
shareholders minus the total shareholding owned 
by the largest shareholder 
Continuous 
BOARD_SIZE The number of directors on the board Continuous 
BOARD_COMPOSITION The percentage of independent directors on the 
board 
Continuous 
between 
(0,1) 
DUALITY Dummy variable equals to 1 if the one person 
holds both positions, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
BOARD_MEETING The number of board meetings per year Continuous 
SB_SIZE The natural logarithm of the total number of 
supervisory board members 
Continuous 
SB_MEETING The number of supervisory meetings per year Continuous 
BHN Dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrowers issue 
B or H or N or other shares not traded on the 
SHSE and SZSE, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
ST Dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrowers in ST 
status, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
INDUSTRY_1 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower is 
construction industry type, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
INDUSTRY_2 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower is 
farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 
industry type, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
INDUSTRY_3 Dummy variable equals to 1 if  the borrower is 
information technology industry type, and 0 
otherwise 
Dummy 
INDUSTRY_4 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower is 
integrated industry type, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
INDUSTRY_5 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower is 
manufacturing industry type, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
INDUSTRY_6 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower is 
production of supply of power, gas and water 
industry type, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
INDUSTRY_7 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower is real 
estate industry type, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
INDUSTRY_8 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower is 
social services industry type, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
INDUSTRY_9 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower is 
transmitting, culture industry type, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
INDUSTRY_10 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower is 
transportation, storage industry type, and 0 
otherwise 
Dummy 
INDUSTRY_11 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the borrower is 
wholesale and retail trades industry type, and 0 
otherwise 
Dummy 
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Name Definition Type 
LOAN_SIZE Total amount of loan divide by the total asset 
at the end of last year 
Continuous 
 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the loan size is 
more than the median loan size of all loans in 
the relevant year, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
LOAN _MATURITY The end of the life of the loan Continuous 
SYDICATION Dummy variable equals to 1 if the loan is the 
syndication, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL Dummy variable equals to 1 if the loan is 
with covenants/collateral, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL Dummy variable equals to 1 if the loan is 
used for capital expenditure, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
PURPOSE_ REPAY Dummy variable equals to 1 if the loan is 
used for repaying old debts, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
PURPOSE_ LONG Dummy variable equals to 1 if the loan is 
used for long term investment, and 0 
otherwise 
Dummy 
PURPOSE_NO Dummy variable equals to 1 if the loan has no 
specific purpose, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
YEAR_1 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the bank loan 
announcement year is 1998, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
YEAR_2 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the bank loan 
announcement year is 1999, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
YEAR_3 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the bank loan 
announcement year is 2000, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
YEAR_4 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the bank loan 
announcement year is 2001, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
YEAR_5 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the bank loan 
announcement year is 2002, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
YEAR_6  Dummy variable equals to 1 if the bank loan 
announcement year is 2003, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
YEAR_7 Dummy variable equals to 1 if the bank loan 
announcement year is 2004, and 0 otherwise 
Dummy 
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     Appendix D 
Correlation Matrix for Regression Variables 
 BIG4_ 
BANK 
BANK_ 
OWNERSHIP 
BANK_ 
RANKING 
BANK_ 
LOCATION 
BIG4_BANK     
BANK_OWNERSHIP 0.208**    
BANK_RANKING 0.134** 0.147**   
BANK_LOCATION 0.098* 0.012 -0.002  
BORROWER_SIZE 0.007 0.001 -0.234** 0.012 
DCC -0.068 -0.023 0.011 -0.075 
DROA 0.010 -0.025 0.034 0.033 
DTq_70 -0.018 -0.026 -0.115* -0.057 
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP 0.184** 0.022 0.080 0.143** 
Z-INDEX 0.014 0.004 0.061 -0.040 
CR5－CR1 -0.059 -0.086 -0.098* -0.016 
BOARD_SIZE -0.006 0.005 0.023 0.117** 
BOARD_COMPOSITION -0.010 -0.006 0.073 0.028 
DUALITY -0.025 0.071 0.090 0.080 
BOARD_MEETING -0.107* -0.061 -0.029 -0.087 
SB_SIZE 0.048 -0.021 -0.148** 0.005 
SB_MEETING 0.013 0.041 0.064 -0.079 
BHN 0.011 -0.037 0.045 -0.132** 
ST 0.069 -0.033 0.031 -0.026 
INDUSTRY_1 -0.005 0.024 -0.050 -0.001 
INDUSTRY_2 0.049 0.019 -0.023 0.100* 
INDUSTRY_3 -0.109* 0.004 -0.054 -0.176** 
INDUSTRY_4 -0.267** -0.024 0.023 -0.050 
INDUSTRY_5 0.207** 0.067 0.003 0.187** 
INDUSTRY_6 0.025 -0.123** -0.158** 0.010 
INDUSTRY_7 -0.040 0.011 0.103* -0.171** 
INDUSTRY_8 0.130** 0.035 0.003 0.013 
INDUSTRY_9 0.000 0.022 0.071 0.181** 
INDUSTRY_10 -0.048 -0.056 0.046 -0.062 
INDUSTRY_11 0.003 -0.029 -0.072 0.080 
LOAN_SIZE 0.043 0.040 0.000 -0.051 
LOAN _MATURITY 0.178** -0.027 -0.118* 0.095* 
SYDICATION N N N N 
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL -0.127** 0.038 0.039 0.075 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL 0.050 0.068 0.078 0.005 
PURPOSE_REPAY 0.042 0.031 -0.122** -0.027 
PURPOSE_NO -0.185** -0.088 -0.060 0.026 
YEAR_1 -0.054 0.008 -0.060 -0.032 
YEAR_2 0.036 0.021 -0.085 -0.013 
YEAR_3 0.070 0.037 -0.129** -0.030 
YEAR_4 0.042 0.005 -0.035 0.085 
YEAR_5 0.017 0.021 -0.031 -0.085 
YEAR_6 -0.019 -0.006 0.073 0.050 
YEAR_7 -0.071 -0.045 0.080 -0.013 
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 BORROWER_ 
SIZE 
DCC DROA DTq_70 
BIG4_BANK     
BANK_OWNERSHIP     
BANK_RANKING     
BANK_LOCATION     
BORROWER_SIZE     
DCC -0.033    
DROA 0.025 -0.007   
DTq_70 0.207** -0.029 -0.171**  
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP 0.062 -0.351** 0.105* -0.035 
Z-INDEX 0.065 -0.007 0.066 0.062 
CR5－CR1 -0.124** 0.015 -0.087 -0.109* 
BOARD_SIZE 0.065 -0.192** 0.016 0.033 
BOARD_COMPOSITION 0.018 0.053 -0.052 0.087 
DUALITY -0.038 -0.074 -0.030 -0.076 
BOARD_MEETING -0.098* 0.060 -0.208** 0.031 
SB_SIZE 0.219** -0.167** 0.054 0.113* 
SB_MEETING -0.113** -0.105* 0.043 -0.078 
BHN 0.089* 0.007 0.033 0.012 
ST 0.016 -0.072 0.164** -0.020 
INDUSTRY_1 -0.023 0.010 -0.014 0.009 
INDUSTRY_2 0.088* -0.006 0.007 0.010 
INDUSTRY_3 -0.032 0.078 -0.002 -0.021 
INDUSTRY_4 0.006 0.088* 0.005 0.053 
INDUSTRY_5 0.002 -0.023 0.029 -0.094* 
INDUSTRY_6 0.069 -0.102* 0.018 0.049 
INDUSTRY_7 -0.050 -0.077 -0.107* 0.045 
INDUSTRY_8 -0.016 -0.081 0.012 0.052 
INDUSTRY_9 -0.083 -0.076 0.018 -0.106* 
INDUSTRY_10 0.043 0.100* 0.028 0.004 
INDUSTRY_11 0.053 0.084 0.046 0.019 
LOAN_SIZE -0.120** 0.031 0.064 -0.183** 
LOAN _MATURITY 0.201** -0.016 0.034 0.096* 
SYDICATION -0.154** 0.000 -0.016 -0.067 
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL -0.120** -0.046 0.001 0.013 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL -0.105* -0.013 -0.030 -0.067 
PURPOSE_REPAY -0.038 0.020 0.059 0.078 
PURPOSE_NO 0.036 0.019 0.021 0.025 
YEAR_1 0.097* 0.055 -0.001 0.025 
YEAR_2 0.125** -0.012 0.004 0.025 
YEAR_3 0.115** 0.009 0.023 0.240** 
YEAR_4 0.019 -0.043 -0.018 -0.264** 
YEAR_5 -0.048 -0.007 0.061 -0.031 
YEAR_6 -0.053 -0.018 0.037 0.003 
YEAR_7 -0.024 0.054 -0.097* 0.117** 
 172 
 
 BORROWER_
OWNERSHIP 
Z-INDEX CR5－CR1 BOARD_ 
SIZE 
BIG4_BANK     
BANK_OWNERSHIP     
BANK_RANKING     
BANK_LOCATION     
BORROWER_SIZE     
DCC     
DROA     
DTq_70     
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP     
Z-INDEX 0.194**    
CR5－CR1 -0.315** -0.426**   
BOARD_SIZE 0.227** 0.052 -0.093*  
BOARD_COMPOSITION -0.033 -0.011 -0.005 0.087 
DUALITY 0.097* 0.002 -0.070 0.044 
BOARD_MEETING -0.148** -0.001 0.083 0.009 
SB_SIZE 0.070 -0.049 0.030 0.334** 
SB_MEETING 0.143** -0.027 -0.061 0.036 
BHN 0.024 -0.014 0.005 -0.020 
ST 0.136** 0.124** -0.110* 0.065 
INDUSTRY_1 -0.009 0.111* -0.067 -0.043 
INDUSTRY_2 0.033 -0.038 0.085 0.010 
INDUSTRY_3 -0.078 -0.053 0.177** -0.148** 
INDUSTRY_4 -0.231** -0.101* 0.132** 0.029 
INDUSTRY_5 0.041 0.020 -0.109* -0.062 
INDUSTRY_6 0.104* -0.055 0.097* 0.210** 
INDUSTRY_7 -0.029 -0.012 -0.095* -0.102* 
INDUSTRY_8 0.108* -0.039 -0.040 0.034 
INDUSTRY_9 0.084 -0.020 -0.088* 0.230** 
INDUSTRY_10 0.155** 0.119** -0.091* 0.028 
INDUSTRY_11 -0.074 0.121** 0.138** 0.044 
LOAN_SIZE 0.019 -0.039 -0.037 -0.071 
LOAN _MATURITY 0.041 0.053 -0.095* -0.006 
SYDICATION 0.065 -0.097* -0.015 0.054 
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL -0.104* 0.031 -0.063 0.034 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL -0.045 -0.034 0.060 -0.005 
PURPOSE_REPAY -0.062 -0.020 0.020 0.024 
PURPOSE_NO 0.011 0.076 -0.025 -0.075 
YEAR_1 -0.096* -0.022 0.065 0.000 
YEAR_2 0.015 0.086 -0.090* -0.001 
YEAR_3 -0.028 -0.013 -0.002 -0.134** 
YEAR_4 0.107* -0.045 0.061 -0.046 
YEAR_5 0.053 0.021 0.000 -0.071 
YEAR_6 -0.069 -0.039 -0.038 -0.030 
YEAR_7 -0.041 0.042 0.002 0.215** 
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 BOARD_ 
COMPOSITION 
DUALITY BOARD_
MEETING 
SB_SIZE 
BIG4_BANK     
BANK_OWNERSHIP     
BANK_RANKING     
BANK_LOCATION     
BORROWER_SIZE     
DCC     
DROA     
DTq_70     
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP     
Z-INDEX     
CR5－CR1     
BOARD_SIZE     
BOARD_COMPOSITION     
DUALITY -0.064    
BOARD_MEETING 0.210** 0.018   
SB_SIZE 0.021 0.071 -0.022  
SB_MEETING 0.022 0.047 0.314** -0.088* 
BHN 0.043 0.082 0.067 0.093* 
ST 0.138** -0.064 -0.028 0.084 
INDUSTRY_1 -0.089 0.011 0.062 -0.109* 
INDUSTRY_2 -0.017 -0.009 -0.051 -0.003 
INDUSTRY_3 0.008 -0.115* -0.027 -0.171** 
INDUSTRY_4 0.048 0.099* -0.003 0.213** 
INDUSTRY_5 -0.036 -0.101* -0.129** 0.122** 
INDUSTRY_6 -0.147** 0.073 0.052 0.144** 
INDUSTRY_7 0.052 0.021 0.160** -0.192** 
INDUSTRY_8 0.090 0.080 0.003 -0.031 
INDUSTRY_9 0.059 0.051 -0.042 -0.103* 
INDUSTRY_10 -0.037 0.035 -0.126** -0.076 
INDUSTRY_11 0.069 -0.041 0.175** 0.035 
LOAN_SIZE 0.060 0.019 -0.005 -0.077 
LOAN _MATURITY 0.052 -0.025 -0.165** 0.090 
SYDICATION -0.061 -0.040 0.086 0.081 
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL -0.047 0.107* 0.018 -0.048 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL 0.034 -0.027 0.028 -0.012 
PURPOSE_REPAY -0.035 -0.098* 0.073 0.006 
PURPOSE_NO -0.070 0.045 0.013 -0.039 
YEAR_1 N -0.066 -0.098* -0.051 
YEAR_2 N 0.051 -0.116** -0.028 
YEAR_3 N -0.110*  -0.153** 0.050 
YEAR_4 N 0.008 -0.176** 0.071 
YEAR_5 -0.808** 0.034 -0.108* -0.092* 
YEAR_6 0.223** 0.050 0.185** -0.031 
YEAR_7 0.593** -0.047 0.192** 0.062 
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 SB_MEETING BHN ST INDUSTRY_1 
BIG4_BANK     
BANK_OWNERSHIP     
BANK_RANKING     
BANK_LOCATION     
BORROWER_SIZE     
DCC     
DROA     
DTq_70     
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP     
Z-INDEX     
CR5－CR1     
BOARD_SIZE     
BOARD_COMPOSITION     
DUALITY     
BOARD_MEETING     
SB_SIZE     
SB_MEETING     
BHN 0.042    
ST -0.060 -0.037   
INDUSTRY_1 0.050 -0.028 0.037  
INDUSTRY_2 -0.033 -0.022 -0.073 -0.015 
INDUSTRY_3 -0.057 -0.022 -0.107* -0.040 
INDUSTRY_4 -0.130** -0.036 -0.022 -0.046 
INDUSTRY_5 0.010 0.185** 0.004 -0.112* 
INDUSTRY_6 0.013 -0.050 0.131** -0.033 
INDUSTRY_7 0.152** -0.090* -0.025 -0.059 
INDUSTRY_8 0.077 -0.040 0.107* -0.027 
INDUSTRY_9 -0.050 -0.026 0.068 -0.017 
INDUSTRY_10 -0.065 -0.012 -0.095* -0.035 
INDUSTRY_11 -0.006 -0.040 0.031 -0.027 
LOAN_SIZE 0.037 -0.058 0.065 -0.049 
LOAN _MATURITY -0.089 0.091 0.120** -0.042 
SYDICATION 0.074 -0.390** -0.006 0.014 
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL 0.117** -0.126** -0.094* 0.081 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL 0.018 -0.074 0.059 -0.050 
PURPOSE_REPAY 0.058 0.024 -0.103* -0.024 
PURPOSE_NO -0.031 0.041 -0.065 0.111* 
YEAR_1 -0.061 0.149** 0.034 -0.009 
YEAR_2 -0.114* -0.026 -0.046 -0.017 
YEAR_3 -0.162** 0.006 -0.025 0.044 
YEAR_4 -0.181** -0.057 -0.017 -0.015 
YEAR_5 0.037 -0.053 -0.079 0.055 
YEAR_6 0.264** -0.055 0.002 -0.014 
YEAR_7 -0.037 0.118** 0.121** -0.043 
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 INDUSTRY 
_2 
INDUSTRY 
_3 
INDUSTRY 
_4 
INDUSTRY
_5 
BIG4_BANK     
BANK_OWNERSHIP     
BANK_RANKING     
BANK_LOCATION     
BORROWER_SIZE     
DCC     
DROA     
DTq_70     
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP     
Z-INDEX     
CR5－CR1     
BOARD_SIZE     
BOARD_COMPOSITION     
DUALITY     
BOARD_MEETING     
SB_SIZE     
SB_MEETING     
BHN     
ST     
INDUSTRY_1     
INDUSTRY_2     
INDUSTRY_3 -0.032    
INDUSTRY_4 -0.037 -0.100*   
INDUSTRY_5 -0.091* -0.243** -0.281**  
INDUSTRY_6 -0.027 -0.072 -0.083 -0.201** 
INDUSTRY_7 -0.048 -0.129** -0.149** -0.362** 
INDUSTRY_8 -0.022 -0.058 -0.068 -0.164** 
INDUSTRY_9 -0.014 -0.038 -0.043 -0.105* 
INDUSTRY_10 -0.029 -0.077 -0.089* -0.216** 
INDUSTRY_11 -0.022 -0.058 -0.068 -0.164** 
LOAN_SIZE 0.004 0.016 -0.070 -0.064 
LOAN _MATURITY 0.034 -0.095* -0.081 0.057 
SYDICATION 0.011 -0.045 0.034 -0.040 
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL -0.023 -0.061 0.124** 0.041 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL 0.010 0.046 -0.047 -0.015 
PURPOSE_REPAY -0.019 -0.009 0.055 0.046 
PURPOSE_NO -0.014 0.005 0.058 -0.051 
YEAR_1 -0.007 -0.019 -0.022 0.012 
YEAR_2 -0.014 0.021 -0.043 0.025 
YEAR_3 -0.024 0.009 0.023 0.041 
YEAR_4 0.057 0.042 0.004 0.064 
YEAR_5 0.017 0.023 -0.056 -0.045 
YEAR_6 -0.026 -0.063 0.000 0.049 
YEAR_7 -0.021 0.000 0.061 -0.091* 
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 INDUSTRY 
_6 
INDUSTRY 
_7 
INDUSTRY 
_8 
INDUSTRY
_9 
BIG4_BANK     
BANK_OWNERSHIP     
BANK_RANKING     
BANK_LOCATION     
BORROWER_SIZE     
DCC     
DROA     
DTq_70     
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP     
Z-INDEX     
CR5－CR1     
BOARD_SIZE     
BOARD_COMPOSITION     
DUALITY     
BOARD_MEETING     
SB_SIZE     
SB_MEETING     
BHN     
ST     
INDUSTRY_1     
INDUSTRY_2     
INDUSTRY_3     
INDUSTRY_4     
INDUSTRY_5     
INDUSTRY_6     
INDUSTRY_7 -0.107*    
INDUSTRY_8 -0.048 -0.087   
INDUSTRY_9 -0.031 -0.056 -0.025  
INDUSTRY_10 -0.064 -0.115* -0.052 -0.033 
INDUSTRY_11 -0.048 -0.087 -0.039 -0.025 
LOAN_SIZE -0.036 0.146** 0.037 -0.008 
LOAN _MATURITY 0.132** -0.036 0.002 -0.041 
SYDICATION 0.024 0.044 0.020 0.013 
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL -0.011 -0.011 -0.187** 0.105* 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL -0.045 -0.007 0.089* 0.033 
PURPOSE_REPAY 0.059 -0.077 -0.035 -0.022 
PURPOSE_NO 0.040 -0.034 -0.029 -0.029 
YEAR_1 -0.015 0.058 -0.013 -0.008 
YEAR_2 -0.031 -0.013 -0.025 -0.016 
YEAR_3 -0.052 0.012 -0.043 -0.027 
YEAR_4 -0.102* -0.032 0.034 -0.053 
YEAR_5 0.070 0.031 -0.025 -0.041 
YEAR_6 0.009 0.002 -0.026 0.030 
YEAR_7 0.040 -0.015 0.055 0.074 
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 INDUSTRY 
_10 
INDUSTRY 
_11 
LOAN_SIZE LOAN_ 
MATURITY 
BIG4_BANK     
BANK_OWNERSHIP     
BANK_RANKING     
BANK_LOCATION     
BORROWER_SIZE     
DCC     
DROA     
DTq_70     
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP     
Z-INDEX     
CR5－CR1     
BOARD_SIZE     
BOARD_COMPOSITION     
DUALITY     
BOARD_MEETING     
SB_SIZE     
SB_MEETING     
BHN     
ST     
INDUSTRY_1     
INDUSTRY_2     
INDUSTRY_3     
INDUSTRY_4     
INDUSTRY_5     
INDUSTRY_6     
INDUSTRY_7     
INDUSTRY_8     
INDUSTRY_9     
INDUSTRY_10     
INDUSTRY_11 -0.052    
LOAN_SIZE -0.010 0.023   
LOAN _MATURITY 0.056 0.021 0.073  
SYDICATION -0.056 0.020 0.021 -0.209** 
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL -0.121** 0.013 -0.076 0.040 
PURPOSE_CAPITAL 0.034 -0.040 0.013 -0.279** 
PURPOSE_REPAY -0.046 0.026 0.010 0.059 
PURPOSE_NO -0.039 0.098* -0.114** -0.034 
YEAR_1 -0.017 -0.013 -0.004 0.181** 
YEAR_2 0.097* -0.025 0.053 0.098* 
YEAR_3 -0.016 -0.043 0.087 0.031 
YEAR_4 0.005 -0.054 0.065 0.046 
YEAR_5 0.065 -0.025 -0.070 -0.073 
YEAR_6 -0.030 -0.003 0.028 -0.027 
YEAR_7 -0.056 0.103* -0.067 -0.012 
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 SYDICATION COVENANTS/COLLATERAL 
BIG4_BANK   
BANK_OWNERSHIP   
BANK_RANKING   
BANK_LOCATION   
BORROWER_SIZE   
DCC   
DROA   
DTq_70   
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP   
Z-INDEX   
CR5－CR1   
BOARD_SIZE   
BOARD_COMPOSITION   
DUALITY   
BOARD_MEETING   
SB_SIZE   
SB_MEETING   
BHN   
ST   
INDUSTRY_1   
INDUSTRY_2   
INDUSTRY_3   
INDUSTRY_4   
INDUSTRY_5   
INDUSTRY_6   
INDUSTRY_7   
INDUSTRY_8   
INDUSTRY_9   
INDUSTRY_10   
INDUSTRY_11   
LOAN_SIZE   
LOAN _MATURITY   
SYDICATION   
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL 0.083  
PURPOSE_CAPITAL 0.005 -0.158** 
PURPOSE_REPAY 0.018 0.073 
PURPOSE_NO -0.044 0.133** 
YEAR_1 -0.312** -0.013 
YEAR_2 -0.147** 0.007 
YEAR_3 0.022 0.070 
YEAR_4 0.042 -0.046 
YEAR_5 0.060 -0.047 
YEAR_6 0.016 0.086 
YEAR_7 0.011 -0.029 
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 PURPOSE_ 
CAPITAL 
PURPOSE_
REPAY 
PURPOSE_
NO 
BIG4_BANK    
BANK_OWNERSHIP    
BANK_RANKING    
BANK_LOCATION    
BORROWER_SIZE    
DCC    
DROA    
DTq_70    
BORROWER_OWNERSHIP    
Z-INDEX    
CR5－CR1    
BOARD_SIZE    
BOARD_COMPOSITION    
DUALITY    
BOARD_MEETING    
SB_SIZE    
SB_MEETING    
BHN    
ST    
INDUSTRY_1    
INDUSTRY_2    
INDUSTRY_3    
INDUSTRY_4    
INDUSTRY_5    
INDUSTRY_6    
INDUSTRY_7    
INDUSTRY_8    
INDUSTRY_9    
INDUSTRY_10    
INDUSTRY_11    
LOAN_SIZE    
LOAN _MATURITY    
SYDICATION    
COVENANTS/COLLATERAL    
PURPOSE_CAPITAL    
PURPOSE_REPAY -0.227**   
PURPOSE_NO -0.680** -0.093*  
YEAR_1 -0.016 -0.011 -0.033 
YEAR_2 0.033 -0.022 -0.029 
YEAR_3 0.005 0.020 -0.019 
YEAR_4 0.013 -0.074 0.023 
YEAR_5 -0.085 0.027 0.088* 
YEAR_6 0.071 -0.001 -0.080 
YEAR_7 -0.001 0.034 -0.013 
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 YEAR 
_1 
YEAR 
_2 
YEAR 
_3 
YEAR 
_4 
YEAR 
_5 
YEAR 
_6 
BIG4_BANK       
BANK_OWNERSHIP       
BANK_RANKING       
BANK_LOCATION       
BORROWER_SIZE       
DCC       
DROA       
DTq_70       
BORROWER_ 
OWNERSHIP 
      
Z-INDEX       
CR5－CR1       
BOARD_SIZE       
BOARD_COMPOSITION       
DUALITY       
BOARD_MEETING       
SB_SIZE       
SB_MEETING       
BHN       
ST       
INDUSTRY_1       
INDUSTRY_2       
INDUSTRY_3       
INDUSTRY_4       
INDUSTRY_5       
INDUSTRY_6       
INDUSTRY_7       
INDUSTRY_8       
INDUSTRY_9       
INDUSTRY_10       
INDUSTRY_11       
LOAN_SIZE       
LOAN _MATURITY       
SYDICATION       
COVENANTS/ 
COLLATERAL 
      
PURPOSE_CAPITAL       
PURPOSE_REPAY       
PURPOSE_NO       
YEAR_1       
YEAR_2 -0.008      
YEAR_3 -0.014 -0.027     
YEAR_4 -0.027 -0.053 -0.090*    
YEAR_5 -0.038 -0.077 -0.129** -0.252**   
YEAR_6 -0.038 -0.077 -0.130** -0.255** -0.365**  
YEAR_7 -0.037 -0.073 -0.124** -0.242** -0.347** -0.350** 
N indicates it can not be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.  
** indicates correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
* indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
 
 
 
